THE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT AND HIS PROBLEMS, 1919-1939

By GORDON A. CRAIG

ONE of the recurring themes in those books on the diplomatic prehistory of the second World War which have come to us from the former enemy countries is the plight of the professional diplomat, whose training and knowledge convinced him that the policy of his government was leading straight to disaster but whose advice was seldom solicited and never followed. The memoirs of Erich Kordt, of Herbert von Dirksen, and of Rudolf Rahn, the books of Elisabetta Cerruti, Mario Donosti, and Filippo Anfuso[1] include abundant and circumstantial evidence of the lack of influence exercised in matters of high policy by the permanent staffs of the Foreign Offices of Germany and Italy and by their agents in the field. In his study of the origins of the Pact of Steel, Mario Toscano has described the desperate efforts made by Attolico, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, to convince his political superiors in Rome of the inadequacies and dangers of the projected alliance with Germany.[2] Those efforts failed; and they were certainly resented by the "realists" in Rome, who had long since reached the conclusion that foreign policy was too important to be left in the hands of professional diplomats. The same conclusion had been reached in Germany; and it was persisted in until the collapse of 1945. As early as 1936, the German foreign service had been deprived of most of its former prerogatives in the processes of policy formulation and execution. Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1938 until 1944, says in his memoirs: "Amateurish and irregular reports were often preferred to the official ones. Decisions were taken without the

[1] Erich Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, Stuttgart, 1950; Herbert von Dirksen, *Moskau, Tokio, London: Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahre deutscher Aussenpolitik, 1919-1939*, Stuttgart, 1949; Rudolf Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben*, Düsseldorf, 1950; Elisabetta Cerruti, *Visti da vicino*, Milan, 1951; Mario Donosti, *Mussolini e l'Europa: la politica estera fascista*, Milan, 1945; Filippo Anfuso, *Roma Berlino Salò*, Milan, 1950.

[2] Mario Toscano, *Le origini del Patto d'Acciaio*, Florence, 1948, especially pp. 170-80.

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Foreign Minister or the Foreign Office having had a say in the framing of them. The carrying out of the decisions was entrusted to the most various quarters. . . . The foreign service had been degraded to the level of a mere technical apparatus."[3]

We could dismiss all of this evidence of the diminution of the influence of expert advice in modern diplomacy as being nothing more than an interesting sidelight on the nature of totalitarian regimes if it were not for one thing that is sometimes forgotten. And that is that the experience of the professional diplomat in Germany and Italy finds striking parallels in the diplomatic practice of the democratic states of Europe in the interwar period. In both Great Britain and France especially, the neglect and abuse of the resources of expert diplomacy was a recurrent phenomenon in the years 1919-1939; and, when the new Fay or Schmitt or Seymour appears to write a comprehensive history of the origins of the second World War, he will have to compose at least a lengthy footnote on the subject. The political scientist who is willing to relate the experience of history to current problems will probably wish to do more than that, for some of the more unhappy features of prewar British and French practice are recognizable—in somewhat exaggerated forms—in the conduct of foreign relations in our own country at the present time.

I

"The art of diplomacy," Harold Nicolson has written, "as that of water-colours, has suffered much from the fascination which it exercises upon the amateur."[4] The years after 1919 were years in which the political leaders of the Western states found that fascination irresistible, and in which, undeterred by their lack of previous experience in the arts of diplomacy, they took into their hands "delicate work for which a life's training is no sure guarantee of success, and for which sciolism is an almost certain presage of failure."[5] Their successful penetration into what had

[3] *The Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker*, Chicago, 1951, p. 106.
[4] Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925*, New York, 1939, p. 54.
[5] A. L. Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy and New*, London, 1922, pp. 363-64.

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formerly been the preserve of diplomats of career is, of course, easily explained. Even in normal times, career diplomats are not beloved in democratic states, where foreign affairs seem, at the very least, to be a distraction from the true business of the nation and, at the worst, a source of constant trouble and danger, and where men who make a career of dealing with foreign affairs are apt to be viewed with grave suspicion. "On n'aime pas," Jules Cambon has said, "ces porteurs de secrets que sont les ambassadeurs."[6] In 1919 this vague suspicion had been greatly strengthened by the prevailing conviction that the secret diplomacy which was their stock in trade had been the principal cause of the recent war. When Woodrow Wilson announced in the Fourteen Points that "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view," his demand was accorded widespread approval; and, in March 1918, a speaker in the House of Commons proclaimed the doom of the professional caste when he declared:

> The old ambassadorial system has failed and is discredited in the eyes of most people. After the war, the old diplomacy of Court and upper classes will be, in the eyes of most people, obsolete and inadequate. . . . Difficulties between nations should no longer be settled in conclaves of Ambassadors.[7]

The cry of the times, then, seemed to be for new diplomatic methods and new diplomatic personnel, and the political leaders of the Western states were quick to respond to what they considered to be the popular desire. Conclaves of ambassadors at the Quai d'Orsay, the Wilhelmstrasse, and the Ballplatz—names now of sinister connotation—gave way to "frank and friendly conversations" in such charmingly unconventional places as the golf course at Cannes, the bosom of the Lago Maggiore, the mountain tavern at Thoiry, and a certain mossy log on the banks of the Potomac. The correctly dressed and distressingly uniform diplomats, who had until now held the center of the stage, ceded their places to a succession of politician-diplomats with such striking and memorable characteristics as plus-fours, Scots brogues, shaggy coiffures, white linen neckties, underslung

[6] Jules Cambon, *Le diplomate*, Paris, 1926, pp. 10-11.
[7] *Parliamentary Debates:* Commons, CIV (1918), 846.

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pipes, and various kinds of umbrellas. The new dispensation was dignified by the name "diplomacy by conference" and was celebrated in a much-read essay by Sir Maurice Hankey, who in the early years served as impresario for the entertainment.[8]

If we consider the case of Britain alone, it is easy to demonstrate that the new diplomacy created serious problems for the Foreign Office, the agency constitutionally charged with the conduct of Britain's foreign relations, and made its position embarrassing and at times almost insupportable. Think, for instance, of the four long years of insult and injury suffered by it at the hands of Mr. Lloyd George. Lloyd George's contempt for the diplomatic profession and its conventions was well known, for he made little attempt to conceal it. "I want no diplomats," he said during the course of the war. "Diplomats were invented simply to waste time. . . . It is simply a waste of time to let [important matters] be discussed by men who are not authorized to speak for their countries."[9] He showed that he meant this during the Paris Peace Conference. He went to that gathering, it is true, surrounded by clouds of experts from the Foreign Office and from other government departments; but he made singularly little use of them. He seems to have been irritated by their habit, when consulted, of producing closely argued analyses bristling with statistics. In any event, he soon relegated the Foreign Secretary and his staff to the limbo already tenanted by Mr. Lansing and his,[10] while he himself retired with Wilson, Clemenceau, and Orlando to see what intuition could do to solve the intricate problems of the peace.

When it appeared subsequently that intuition had not been enough and that the formulae devised by the Council of Four had postponed, and minimized, but certainly not solved, acute

[8] Sir Maurice Hankey, "Diplomacy by Conference," *The Round Table*, XI (1920-1921), 287-311.

[9] Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy*, pp. 364-65.

[10] If this seems an exaggeration, it should be remembered that, even in such an important matter as the treaty in which Great Britain and the United States guaranteed to come to France's aid in the event of future German aggression, the Foreign Secretary was not consulted. Only after the Treaty of Guarantee had been drafted in accordance with Lloyd George's personal instructions and been approved by Wilson and Clemenceau was Mr. Balfour informed of it.—Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, *Old Diplomacy*, London, 1947, p. 241.

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differences of opinion between the European Powers,[11] Lloyd George was not dismayed, nor was his faith in his own diplomatic talents shaken. He set out bravely to solve all the problems created by the Treaty of Versailles. That this should be done by methods tested by experience—by careful soundings of opinion in other capitals, by the tedious, but always useful, exchange of formal correspondence—does not seem to have occurred to him. "I wish the French and ourselves never wrote letters to each other," he said in 1920. "Letters are the very devil. They ought to be abolished altogether. . . . If you want to settle a thing, you see your opponent and talk it over with him. The last thing you do is write him a letter."[12] According to this prescription, Lloyd George acted in the years 1919-1922, meeting his opponents at San Remo and Spa and Cannes and Genoa and, when the occasion demanded greater intimacy, at his breakfast table at 10 Downing Street. At these meetings, without prior, or even subsequent, consultation with the Foreign Office, he decided policy, negotiated claims, and made commitments to foreign governments. At the Spa Conference, for instance, he gave promises of protection to the Polish Government which had not been authorized by the Cabinet and of which the Foreign Office and His Majesty's representative in Warsaw were given no intimation until after they had been discussed in the popular press.[13] The Foreign Office, with reason, came to expect the worst of the Prime Minister's peripatetic activities; and Curzon said sadly at the time of the Genoa Conference: "When I reflect that the P.M. is alone at Genoa with no F.O. to guide him . . . and when I recall the whole trend of his policy for the past three years—I can feel no certainty that we may not find ourselves committed to something pregnant with political dis-

[11] See, for instance, "Is There a New Diplomacy?", *Fortnightly Review*, CXI (1922), 711. Formula-making became a characteristic feature of Lloyd George's diplomacy. His latest biographer says: "Failure to reach agreement or to do no more than expose divergencies to the world could, as a rule and for the moment, be veiled in intentional obscurity by drafting a dextrous formula, an art in which his secretaries became proficient."—Thomas Jones, *Lloyd George*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 180.

[12] Lord Riddell, *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After*, London, 1933, p. 206.

[13] Kennedy, *Old Diplomacy*, p. 337.

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aster here."[14] The results of Genoa were startling, but not as calamitous as Curzon feared; but the apprehension of the Foreign Secretary was nevertheless justified. A year later, indeed, disaster was very narrowly averted, as Lloyd George's stubborn refusal to listen to Foreign Office advice in Eastern affairs and his unfortunate habit of encouraging the Greeks by winks and nods brought Britain to the verge of war at Chanak.

It is not intended to suggest here that the eclipse of the Foreign Office in the Lloyd George period was permanent. Indeed, in Curzon's last years in that office and in the years when Austen Chamberlain was Foreign Secretary, the Foreign Office resumed its normal position in the conduct of British policy. It cannot, however, be denied that Lloyd George's methods had created unfortunate precedents. The Prime Minister cannot be expected to stay out of foreign affairs, for he is ultimately responsible for policy. But perhaps never before Lloyd George had the Prime Minister interfered so directly, so frequently and so secretly with the actual day-by-day business of foreign relations—that is, with the implementation of formulated policy and with the varied tasks of negotiation. And this kind of interference was repeated sporadically, and generally with unfortunate effects, in the years that followed, reaching its highest point in the years 1937-1939. Here we need cite only a few examples. During the crisis created by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, when the Foreign Office was maintaining a position of studied neutrality in the double hope of restraining the French and preventing the victory of extremism in Germany, an ill-timed visit of Mr. Baldwin to Paris and an injudicious *communiqué* issued without Foreign Office knowledge created the impression that Britain was supporting French policy without reservation. This debacle led the British ambassador in Berlin to suggest that "it might be wise to apply to British Prime Ministers the rule governing the peregrinations of a Lord Chancellor and forbid their leaving England."[15] The rule, of course, was not invoked, as the subsequent wanderings of Ramsay Mac-

[14] Nicolson, *Curzon*, p. 245.
[15] *An Ambassador of Peace: Lord d'Abernon's Diary*, London, 1929, II, 285.

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Donald attest. Concerning these, we need note only that Mr. MacDonald, like other amateur diplomats, was apt to make imprecise but enthusiastic promises to his opposite numbers abroad and then to forget to tell the Foreign Office about them. There was an embarrassing business, for instance, in 1932, when MacDonald had talks at Bessinge with Tardieu, Bruening, and Stimson concerning the policy to be followed at the Lausanne Conference. The Germans argued later that the Prime Minister had promised to support their claim to equality of treatment in armaments. Mr. MacDonald didn't think he had said that at all. The Foreign Office had no way of telling whether he had or not, for they had received no record of the talks.[16]

The Foreign Office was never, perhaps, reduced to the "mere technical apparatus" that the German Foreign Office became under Hitler. But throughout the period it was subjected to more interference than any other service department[17]; it was often by-passed; periodically it was inadequately informed of meetings between economic experts, military advisers, and labor officials and deprived of any opportunity of evaluating the findings of such meetings; and, with distressing frequency, the right of its permanent staff to be considered as *the* expert advisers on foreign policy was contested or ignored. There was a recurring tendency on the part of the political leaders of the state, when matters of high moment were pending, to believe that the professionals in the Foreign Office were incompetent to deal with them, because of narrowness of view, dependence upon traditional concepts, or lack of "realism." Lloyd George believed this; Ramsay MacDonald believed it; and it became dogma with Neville Chamberlain.[18] Mr. Chamberlain, indeed,

[16] R. D. Butler and E. L. Woodward, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, second series, III, 123, 517 n.

[17] See, for instance, Curzon's views on this in Nicolson, *Curzon*, p. 60 n.

[18] The word "realism," with all its variants, was used with remarkable frequency by Chamberlain and by other British officials who associated themselves with his policy, often to differentiate their views and objectives from those of Eden, Vansittart, and others who had no faith in the policy of appeasement. The Germans and Italians were quick to realize that the word possessed persuasive, if not magic, qualities when introduced into conversations with the British, and they came to rely upon it heavily, as the diplomatic correspondence of the period shows. See, for instance, *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, third series, I, 22, 28, 49, 109, 257, 273, 307, 345, II, 133, 385;

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revived some of the more unfortunate methods of Lloyd George and carried them further—for, in justice to Lloyd George, it must be admitted that he never contested the views of his Foreign Secretary in the presence of a foreign ambassador, as Chamberlain did in a meeting with Eden and Grandi in 1938.[19] Like Lloyd George, Chamberlain preferred to find his advisers on foreign policy outside the Foreign Office[20]; and it is perhaps fitting that he should have included among them Lord Lothian, who, as Lloyd George's secretary in an earlier period, had announced that the Foreign Office "had no conception of policy in its wider sense."[21] It is doubtless fitting also that, in pursuance of such wider policy, Chamberlain should have tried his hand at "diplomacy by conference," although his travels, it is true, were restricted by circumstances to Germany, and although the fractiousness of his host rendered them less pleasant than the junkets of his predecessors.

The emphasis placed here on the British experience should not leave the impression that the French were unaffected by these developments. After the second World War, a commission was established by the French Constituent Assembly to investigate the "political, economic, diplomatic, and military events" that contributed to the collapse of 1940. The first summary report of that commission makes specific reference to the personal diplomacy of heads of states and political ministers.

Documents on German Foreign Policy: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Washington, 1949, and continuing, series D, I, 221, 264. See also Chamberlain's letter of 16 January 1938 to Mrs. Morton Price in which he says: "As a realist, I must do what I can to make this country safe."—Keith Feiling, *Life of Neville Chamberlain*, London, 1946, p. 323. The German ambassador in Paris spoke in July 1938 of French anxiety over "the dreaded realism of the British."—*Documents on German Foreign Policy*, series D, I, 1168.

[19] See Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, Verona, 1948, pp. 249 *et seq.*

[20] Feiling, *Chamberlain*, p. 327. According to a German memorandum of 11 October 1938, a "confidential agent of Neville Chamberlain" informed a member of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop in London that "in all future moves [i.e., negotiations between Britain and Germany] it was important that all major questions should be dealt with direct, thus bypassing the Foreign Office."—*Documents on German Foreign Policy*, series D, IV, 306. Since February 1938, Lord Vansittart, formerly permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had held the office of Diplomatic Adviser to His Majesty's Government. The title had little meaning, and Vansittart once said, in a private interview: "Nobody asks my advice and, when it is tendered, it is ignored."

[21] Riddell, *Intimate Diary*, p. 219.

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> After the conclusion of the treaties of 1919 [it reads], ministers had the habit of multiplying their contacts with their colleagues in other countries. The abuse of direct conversations opens the door to numerous dangers. Engagements are taken too easily. They are often improvised. It is better to define the course of a negotiation by a note which has matured in the silence of the ministry than by chance exchanges which are likely to be imprecise.[22]

This passage doubtless has reference to the kind of improvisation that took place at Geneva, where—after Germany's entrance into the League—the foreign ministers of the Great Powers met four times a year. The unnecessary frequency of these meetings had a stultifying effect upon normal diplomatic work, since the Foreign Office was placed in the position of waiting anxiously to see what decisions were made by the ministers. The ministers themselves, being politicians, were always anxious to reach decisions, since it seemed important to be able to record some success before they went home; and they were likely, in consequence, to "pluck the fruit before it was ripe."[23] Nor was it only the Geneva activities which gave concern to the permanent staff at home. There were other and more dangerous *tête-à-têtes*. M. Philippe Berthelot, the Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay, was never, for instance, able to learn from M. Briand precisely what the latter had promised to Herr Stresemann at Thoiry in 1926.[24] And no one has ever been able to discover what M. Laval did, or did not, promise Mussolini in January 1935, although that mystery had an undoubted effect in disrupting the co-ordination of Anglo-French policy in the Stresa period.[25]

II

The French report cited above dwells upon one other development that demands at least brief consideration in any discussion

[22] Commission d'Enquête parlementaire sur les événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945: *Rapport de M. Charles Serre, député au nom de la Commission d'Enquête parlementaire*, Paris, 1951, p. 86.

[23] Weizsäcker, *Memoirs*, p. 69.

[24] André Géraud, "Diplomacy, Old and New," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIII (1944-1945), 267.

[25] L. B. Namier, *Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936-1940*, London, 1950, p. 17. See also Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Entre les deux guerres: souvenirs sur la IIIe république*, Paris, 1945-1946, III, 14-16.

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of the diplomatic methods of this period—and that is the decline of the position and the authority of the ambassador. Traditionally, the ambassador—apart from what are known as his duties of representation—had a twofold function. He was supposed, in the first place, to communicate the wishes of his own government to that court at which he was resident and to use his trained judgment and experience in negotiation to secure their fulfillment. He was expected in the second place to send home objective reports on the political, economic, and social conditions of the country in which he was stationed. With the invention of the telegraph, and later of the telephone, the importance of the ambassador as a negotiator declined[26]; and it has been reduced even more by the recent tendency of governments to send special missions and "men of confidence" to foreign capitals to hold conversations which could often be conducted quite effectively by the resident diplomatic agents. The ambassador's importance as a trained observer of foreign conditions has diminished also, although for reasons that are more difficult to explain. In view of the issues at stake in the 1930's, for instance, it might be supposed that the situation reports of ambassadors and other agents abroad would have been read with interest in London and Paris and weighed carefully when policy had to be defined. This does not always seem to have been the case.

Two examples may be cited to illustrate this. As early as the fall of 1935, the French consul general in Cologne and other French agents in Germany were sending circumstantial reports to Paris with evidence that clearly pointed to an imminent German reoccupation of the Rhineland.[27] French governmental circles nevertheless expressed surprise and consternation when Hitler actually did send troops into that area in March of the following year. Again, when Robert Coulondre, the French ambassador in Moscow, visited the Commissariat for Foreign

[26] Sir Horace Rumbold speaks of "this age of rapid communication, of what I would call the telegraphic demoralization of those who formerly had to act for themselves and are now content to be at the end of a wire."—*Recollections of a Diplomatist*, London, 1902, I, 111-12. See also Cambon, *Le diplomate*, pp. 13, 118-19.

[27] Commission d'Enquête parlementaire: *Rapport*, pp. 86-87. See also the testimony of Jean Dobler, *ibid.*, *Témoignages et documents recueillis*, II.

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Affairs immediately after the Munich settlement, Potemkin, the Vice-Commissar, said to him: "My poor friend, what have you done? For us I see no other way out but a fourth partition of Poland." On the basis of this warning, Coulondre reported to Paris on 4 October 1938 that a Russian *rapprochement* with Germany could now be expected.[28] There was, however, no indication in the long months that followed that anyone in Paris was concerned about, or even envisaged, any such possibility. Coulondre's message had as little effect as Attolico's warnings to Rome a year later.

The failure to pay proper attention to reports from missions abroad can, of course, be explained in several ways. The tremendous increase of incoming correspondence in all foreign offices in the 1930's[29] probably forced overworked departmental staffs to give priority to cables which required action and to defer the analysis of situation reports to a later time which sometimes never came. The commission appointed by the French Assembly has suggested also that, in the period under review, the rapid increase of a departmental staff composed largely of men who had never served in the field tended to raise an "impassable barrier" between France's agents abroad and those charged with the formulation of her policy. "Too often," their report reads, "the ministers were informed of events abroad only through the medium of established functionaries of the ministry . . . functionaries who made their career almost exclusively in the offices of the Quai d'Orsay,"[30] and who, in consequence, lacked knowledge and judgment to appreciate the reports reaching their desks.

However valid these two explanations may be, they should not lead us to exclude a third. In any country and at any time, political ministers have a tendency to seek to impose their preconceived notions of foreign affairs upon the agents in the field; and they are apt, moreover, to place greatest confidence in those

[28] Robert Coulondre, *De Staline à Hitler*, Paris, 1950, p. 165.

[29] "In 1913, the number of dispatches &c. received at the Foreign Office was 68,119. The figures for the years 1935-38 were 169,248 in 1935, 187,878 in 1936, 201,323 in 1937, 223,879 in 1938."—*Documents on British Foreign Policy*, first series, I, iii.

[30] Commission d'Enquête parlementaire: *Rapport*, pp. 86-87.

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representatives abroad whose reports confirm their own views. German diplomats in the nineteenth century frequently complained that they were expected only to tell Bismarck that he was right; Hitler's ambassadors learned that it was dangerous to depart from the line established in the *Reichskanzlei*; and this sort of thing was certainly neither unknown nor unimportant in British and French diplomacy between the wars. The difficulty, in short, was not always that reports were not read, but that they were read and rejected, sometimes with intimations of punishment for future nonconformity. In 1922, a high official in England—and one attached neither to the Foreign Office nor the War Office—sought to effect the recall of Brigadier General J. H. Morgan from the Inter-Allied Control Commission in Germany, because he persisted in reporting, in the teeth of denials from England, that the Germans were defying the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty.[31] In 1938, a member of the French embassy staff in Moscow received a stinging reprimand from Paris because he had reported, with statistics to support his opinion, that the Russian army was stronger than it was the fashion in Paris to believe and was well equipped with tanks and aircraft.[32]

It is worth remembering that, if some British and French ambassadors of this period were men of mediocre attainments, independence of judgment and clarity of view were not always expected or rewarded. In the 1920's, Jules Cambon said to his brother Paul: "Are you aware that nowadays we could not serve as ambassadors?"[33] In the late 1930's, the Cambons would have been very rare birds indeed, for the approved diplomats were men like Perth in Rome and Henderson in Berlin, the latter of whom especially never reported anything that did not echo and reinforce the opinions and policies of Neville Chamberlain and who was probably kept in Berlin because he followed this practice.[34]

[31] J. H. Morgan, *Assize of Arms: The Disarmament of Germany and Her Rearmament, 1919-1939*, New York, 1946, pp. xvi-xvii.

[32] Coulondre, *De Staline à Hitler*, pp. 126-27, 129.

[33] Géraud in *Foreign Affairs*, XXIII, 267.

[34] "The Makers of Munich," *Times Literary Supplement* (London), 29 September 1950, p. 607.

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III

If we relate the deficiencies of British and French diplomatic practice to the known results of the policies of the two governments—and surely there is a logical relationship—it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they were ill-advised in their cavalier treatment of professional diplomacy after 1919. Yet these by-products of the so-called "new diplomacy"—the practice of by-passing the Foreign Office, of failing to consult it or to keep it informed in important matters, and of giving preconceived ideas priority over intelligence from the field—have attracted little criticism and attract little today, although they are still very much a part of democratic practice in foreign affairs.

A brief reference may be permitted here to current American experience. In this country the word "diplomat" is even more a hissing and a reproach than it was in Britain immediately after the first World War; and the average citizen seems willing and eager to believe the worst of the Foreign Service. In this atmosphere of popular antipathy, the State Department has lost much of its former authority as the central agency for the administration of foreign affairs in this country. Functions formerly reserved to it have been farmed out all over the government, to the Pentagon, the ECA and the Treasury, to the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior and to the Attorney General, to the Bureau of the Budget and the Export-Import Bank and other agencies. Some of this delegation of authority can, of course, be justified by the specialized nature of problems which have arisen since the end of the war; but the co-ordination of the activities of multiple agencies is always difficult, and in this case leaves much to be desired. The State Department is often placed in the awkward position of having to assume responsibility for actions taken without its knowledge.

In addition to this, in the field of political negotiation, this country has not escaped the evils of abrupt and inexpert intervention by officials whose experience has been confined to the domestic field; and—in view of Mr. Truman's expressed wish, not so long ago, to send Mr. Vinson to Moscow—we cannot be

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sure that we will not see more of this in the future. Finally, it would be difficult to contend that we are sufficiently conscious of the importance of encouraging integrity on the part of our Foreign Service Officers in the field. Who today can say how many of our representatives abroad feel compelled to adjust their judgments to preconceived notions at home or to the vagaries of congressional opinion? It was, after all, only four months ago that fragmented and unrelated passages from a diplomatic report written from China in 1944 were read before a congressional committee in an apparent attempt to prove their author sympathetic to Communism[35]; and other examples could be cited of the unfortunate and increasing tendency to force diplomats to explain and justify their past judgments before ill-informed, and essentially irresponsible, committees. This, at least, is something that the British and French never came to; and in 1918, when popular criticism of professional diplomacy was at its height, a British Foreign Secretary expressed very clearly the dangers of such procedure.

> If [said Mr. A. J. Balfour in the House of Commons] you are going to ask Foreign Office officials . . . to expend some of their energy in getting ready for cross-examination, you will really be destroying the public service. . . . They are not accustomed to it and they ought not to be accustomed to it. They are not trained for it, and they ought not to be trained for it. . . . I beg the House to remember that any system that keeps constantly before the eyes of the civil servants of this country the fear of examination, cross-examination and re-examination by gentlemen who may be described as professional politicians, would be most disastrous in the public interest.[36]

It is possible, of course, that the professional diplomat is an anomaly in democratic society and that we must seek new forms and procedures of foreign relations which are more fitting to this type of political community. That is a subject upon which a historian would be reluctant to embark. He can only suggest, on the basis of the interwar experience of the two great democracies of Western Europe, that flagrant neglect of the resources and conventions of professional diplomacy have in the past had unfortunate results.

[35] John S. Service, "'. . . pertinent excerpts . . .'," *Foreign Service Journal* (October 1951).

[36] *Parliamentary Debates*: Commons, CIV (1918), 876.

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THE POLITBURO THROUGH WESTERN EYES

By NATHAN LEITES

ONE of the factors in world politics which social scientists are beginning to subject to systematic analysis is that of elite behavior in international relations. While hypotheses about elite behavior appear to be not only essential to, but also implicit in, any formulation of foreign policy, it still requires to be demonstrated whether research of this order has any operational utility. Clearly, many students in this field have not articulated their assumptions about the conduct of elite groups in foreign affairs; it is often doubted that hypotheses based upon intensive investigation of the doctrine of elites and their cultural matrices have any bearing on the analyses usually pursued in the study of international relations.

In an effort to illustrate the utility of systematic and specialized research in this field, I shall discuss certain aspects of the image of the Moscow Politburo as presented by *The Economist* (London) in the period between Stalin's pre-election speech of February 9, 1946, and the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. The method followed will involve comparisons between judgments of Politburo intentions and behavior appearing in *The Economist* and judgments which might have been derived from the systematic analysis of the Bolshevik doctrine, and which I have briefly summarized in a recent book.[1]

Many of the statements of *The Economist*—one of the most competent and subtle Western periodicals on public affairs—which are discussed below have been refuted in the course of history; some seem to me to be doubtful on other grounds.[2]

[1] *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951.

[2] However, I do not want to imply that at the time these statements were made the errors of *The Economist* were significantly larger than, for example, those of comparable leaders of American opinion. Also, I do not want to imply that the statements from *The Economist* quoted below are representative, with regard to their truth value, of all the statements made on Soviet foreign policy by *The Economist* during that period. For the purposes of this paper, the cases where the past estimates of *The Economist* diverge from history and from my own present estimates are often the most useful ones.

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But this circumstance, far from pointing to any special characteristics of *The Economist*, only mirrors a major aspect of the relationship between the West and the Politburo during the last twenty-five years. Once the Soviet government had been accepted as a member of the system of great powers, the interpretations of Soviet behavior and intentions became subject to the tendency to view another in one's own image—a tendency that is particularly strong when the other is little known. This was true of the Politburo, and became ever more so as its seclusion, taciturnity, and public hypocrisy increased. On the other hand, the tendency to "project" one's own characteristics onto another will have particularly far-reaching consequences when the other is, in reality, very different. This, too, was and is true of the Politburo.

The Politburo itself has engaged in similar, if not greater, degrees of projection in fashioning its image of its Western enemies. It is likely—and this is one of the critical aspects of the present and future—that its distortions of the outer world are much less amenable to correction by experience than is the case in the West. In the pages to follow we shall see how, through the four years considered, *The Economist* has increased its capacity to assess and predict Politburo behavior.

I shall first discuss matters connected with the world balance of power after the end of the Second World War; then, matters concerning the so-called satellites of the Soviet Union; then, the nature of Politburo expansion; and, finally, negotiations with the Politburo.

Who—Whom?

After the end of the Second World War the Politburo presumably believed that the world outside of its domain was controlled by the "Anglo-American ruling circles." That is, from the moment of the defeat of Germany and Japan, the Politburo took for granted the division of the world into two blocs between which the always present question "who-whom?" would ultimately, sooner or later, with or without one or more wars, be put "on

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the order of the day" by history. However, in 1946 *The Economist* wrote about relations between the Soviet Union and the West:

> An obvious first step on the agenda of conciliation should be to mitigate the present tendency of international society to become divided into two mutually exclusive and hostile *blocs*. [September 28, 1946, p. 481.]

Here "conciliation" is regarded as an "obvious" and very positive term; there appears to be no awareness that it is exactly the opposite in Bolshevik language. The "division" of the world into "two mutually exclusive and hostile *blocs*" appears as a "tendency" which can be "mitigated," rather than as the very basis of the epoch, as I believe it does to the Politburo. A short while later *The Economist* wrote in a similar vein:

> British policy cannot refrain from trying to promote a closer association among the nations of Western Europe. . . . The overriding purpose, however, must never be simply to build up one part of Europe against another; . . . every opportunity [must] be taken to find ground of common interest and undertaking with the Eastern states, to subordinate the *blocs* to a revived Concert of Europe. . . . [October 19, 1946, p. 612.]

In contrast, the Politburo takes it for granted that if a power, or a set of powers, is being "built up," it is, by the very nature of politics, directed "against another"; and that the "ground of common interest and undertaking" between the two blocs dividing the world is incomparably smaller—if it exists at all—than the ground for potential or actual attempts at annihilation. According to the Politburo, there is nothing to which the two blocs should or could be "subordinated."

In 1947 *The Economist* said about the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers:

> If there was fundamental confidence between the three Foreign Ministers at any point, but particularly about the future economic organization of Europe, . . . most of the Moscow differences would disappear. [April 26, 1947, p. 616.]

But according to the Politburo, the very fact that the foreign ministers represented the "proletariat" and the "bourgeoisie"—classes which are capable of political insight, in contrast to the

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"petty bourgeoisie" which is not—would preclude the illusion of fundamental "confidence" between organizations aiming, by the very nature of the situation, at each other's annihilation.

Similarly, *The Economist* said later in 1947:

> . . . so long as the Russian-American duel continues *à outrance* UNO can be nothing but an assembly of partisans. [October 4, 1947, p. 554.]

But according to the Politburo, there are nothing but "partisans" in any political situation, regardless of whether the techniques of conflict employed in it are extreme in some particular (and, to the Politburo, irrelevant) sense or not.

According to the Politburo, all areas outside of the two power blocs are, or are about to be, controlled by one or the other of the blocs. But in 1946 *The Economist* wrote about relations between the Politburo and the West:

> There is, perhaps [*sic*], no reason why a rough *modus vivendi* should not be reached on the basis of preponderant Russian influence in Eastern Europe and preponderant Western influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, with areas of genuine independence in Turkey, Italy and Western Europe. [July 13, 1946, p. 43.]

—the implication being that the Politburo would recognize the existence of such "genuine independence." Later in 1946 *The Economist* wrote about current opinions which it did not reject:

> . . . spokesmen widely diverse in their political approach and newspapers representing as wide a variety of outlook . . . argue that the most immediate and most useful way in which Great Britain can help to break the ideological deadlock [between the Soviet Union and the non-Soviet world] is by pursuing in certain fields policies distinct from those connected with Mr. Byrnes, and in particular by seeking closer understanding with France, the other Great Power with most to lose as a result of the present extreme polarization between Communism and capitalist democracy. The closer association of Britain and France, it is argued, could help to prove that Europe need not be divided between two hostile, external Great Powers, and that methods of economic and political association exist which lie between the extremes of exclusive state trading and unfettered free enterprise. [September 28, 1946, p. 482.]

This seems to imply not only that the Politburo might come to recognize the possibility of a "third" position in the world system of power, but also the possibility of a "third" position in economic structure, and a connection between these two. These

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are assumptions about Politburo beliefs which I would not make.

In the view of the Politburo, politics (in action or in explanation) must always be treated as a matter of high tension by "serious" specialists, regardless of the appearance of calm by which "political philistines" may be taken in. However, in 1946 *The Economist* wrote, looking back over twenty years of Soviet foreign policy:

> Stalin's doctrine of "Socialism in one country" was designed to reconcile [the Party] . . . to settling down to a long prospect of peaceful coexistence of socialism and capitalism in the world. [March 23, 1946, p. 442.]

Such a "settling down," however, would mean that the Politburo had predicted a "long prospect" of the following kind: the Party, as well as its enemies, would continuously calculate whether they should make war against each other, and would continue to give a negative answer to this question in view of the relationship of forces. This, then, would be "settling down" to the usual maximal tension of "serious" politics. But, in 1946, having asserted that Soviet policy showed a "new mood of conciliation," *The Economist* asked:

> Why the change? . . . It is difficult to find a really adequate reason. . . . Russian policy . . . is only beginning to learn the necessary techniques for dealing with opposition and disagreement. [May 4, 1946, p. 703.]

This implied that the operational code of the Politburo is highly responsive to changes in the environment. I would propose the opposite hypothesis: presumably it is still inconceivable to the Politburo that the level of danger in politics could decrease before its world victory (or annihilation).

Later in 1946 *The Economist* proposed "to recapitulate one or two of the steps by which they [the great powers] could, if they would, draw back from the brink of disaster," and said:

> . . . the principal aim of the Powers is to restore a measure of cordiality. . . . [September 28, 1946, p. 481.]

—a statement which the Politburo would presumably regard as a consciously hypocritical one. The Bolshevik feeling is: one cannot assume that an "organ" of the "City" would even re-

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motely be tempted to believe in such nonsense (*chepukha*), since, first, feelings are irrelevant in "serious" politics; second, cordiality is not the feeling appropriate to political organizations which stand in a "who-whom" relation. Somewhat later *The Economist* approached this view when it said:

> . . . [the] leaders [of the Soviet state] would hardly know how to govern . . . without the atmosphere of a state of siege. . . . [November 30, 1946, p. 863.]

—except that these leaders presumably believe profoundly that the existence of conditions requiring such a state is constant. In 1948 *The Economist* acknowledged that high tension in a political game involving the Politburo is irreducible, and viewed this as a "tiresome" nuisance rather than as the expression of an epochal struggle:

> . . . the Western Powers' best hope of peace lies in making it perfectly clear at what point Russian action might precipitate a war.
>
> . . . In the past, Great Britain has based a large part of its dealings with Russia on precisely such an approach. The Eastern Question which was a permanent feature of nineteenth-century diplomacy was simply based on Russia's desire to expand to Constantinople checked by its knowledge that such an advance would lead to war with Britain. In seventy years, this tension did not lead to war. On the other hand, it very rarely slackened. The two nations simply lived with it—as one might with a tiresome relative. [September 25, 1948, p. 482.]

Oriented as the Politburo is on the basic power relationships of an epoch—which it believes change but slowly except during revolution and war—short-term fluctuations in public expressions and impressions of tension presumably appear as irrelevant in themselves (although they may, of course, be surface indications of important events). On the other hand, in 1946 *The Economist* wrote:

> Eight months have passed since the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers. There has been a steady deterioration in the relations between the Great Powers. . . . it may even be that the December Conference [of the foreign ministers in Moscow] accelerated the Allies' descent into the present slough of suspicion, irritation and disunity. [April 20, 1946, p. 626.]

However, it is likely that the Politburo would not have considered this "deterioration" in its relations with the Western

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powers as a major event, as it saw as the core of the historical epoch beginning with the defeat of Germany and Japan the conflict between itself and these powers. As against the ever-present orientation on "who-whom" between itself and them—an orientation involving maximal "suspicion" and "disunity"—changes in the level of expressed "disunity" and "suspicion" would appear as rather irrelevant, except if they could be taken as indicators of impending major actions. As for "irritation" (as well as "moods of conciliation"), serious politicians like those in Wall Street, the Kremlin, and the City will not permit it to influence their actions, although they may express or simulate irritation according to expediency.

Later in 1946, *The Economist* welcomed a "conciliatory" statement made by Stalin:

> . . . the most significant . . . reversal of the recent trend towards open hostility has come from Marshal Stalin himself. In an interview to the Correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, he reversed almost every recent line in Soviet propaganda by stating that he did not believe "capitalist encirclement" to be either possible or intended, that there was no menace of atomic war and that the atomic bomb might be prohibited and that Communism and capitalist democracy could live peacefully side by side.
>
> . . . at least . . . for a brief time the spell of universal ill-will has been weakened, however slightly. . . . [September 28, 1946, p. 481.]

In contrast, the Politburo—if the situation were reversed—would not necessarily assume that a momentary reduction in its enemies' verbal violence against it indicated a favorable shift in their policy; nor would it permit itself to feel, or express, pleasure about a seeming momentary decrease of tension: the efficient politician must always prepare for supreme crises, however remote they may seem; he must assess their nature and their probability by an over-all estimate of the power relationships of the epoch, and not permit himself to be subjected to swings between insightless extrapolations of current stability and emotional visions of imminent crisis.

The Economist, however, became much more comprehensible to the Politburo in 1948.

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> The war scare which has followed the news from Prague is neither rational nor dignified. . . . The strategic situation . . . is no different from what it was a year ago. [March 6, 1948, p. 367.]

and:

> In these last few days, there has for the first time been something resembling a war scare. . . . One point that needs to be made is that the risk of war, whatever it may be, is no greater now than it was in June, or even earlier. Nothing new has now suddenly emerged. [October 2, 1948, p. 521.]

The Principle of Pursuit

In 1945 the Politburo presumably took it for granted that the Western leaders, in consenting to the occupation of various East European areas by the Soviet Army, had consented (at least for the time being) to the establishment of full Politburo control in these areas at its convenience. It is not likely that the Politburo interpreted its obligation to install "democracy" in these areas differently from the interpretation it gives to its "democratic" obligations under the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Presumably in 1945 the Politburo took it as a matter of course that in those areas where it held only certain "commanding heights" (e.g., the ministries of the interior and of the armed forces), it would in due time proceed to the liquidation of all actual and potential dissent according to the patterns developed in the Soviet Union; thus applying the principle of pursuit and putting itself in a position to apply, against any resurgent dangers, the rule of *principiis obsta*. However, in 1946 *The Economist* spoke of:

> The fear which wrecked the London Conference and haunted the Ministers' deliberations in Moscow—the fear of a Southeastern Europe dominated completely by Russia. . . . [May 11, 1946, p. 743.]

Thus *The Economist* presented as a mere probability something which must have appeared as a certainty to the Politburo, except in the case of a Western ultimatum or attack. Somewhat later *The Economist* wrote:

> Today, the Balkan states . . . are powerless. It does not follow that they will remain so. . . . It is not only a modification of Great Power

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policy that can upset the present delicate equilibrium of forces. It can be disturbed by upheavals in the smallest state. [July 13, 1946, p. 43.]

While Yugoslavia proved to be a case in point, the passage still seems to deny the strong tendency of the Moscow Politburo to establish full control in the "satellite" areas. So does the following statement:

> . . . the idea of a new Concert of Europe . . . is one . . . which will surely find some response in countries within the Soviet orbit. . . . [October 19, 1946, p. 612.]

In a similar vein *The Economist* commented in 1947 on the refusal, on Politburo orders, of all "satellite" governments to participate in the Marshall Plan:

> This united Eastern European reaction, coupled with fresh evidence of Russian leadership, will naturally reinforce in the Western mind the picture of a closed *bloc* lying in captivity behind the Iron Curtain. . . . And from this picture, the conclusion will be drawn that Europe has reached a decisive parting of the ways and that Eastern Europe must be written off as an integrated, exclusive and captive client of Russian state power. But is this conclusion a fact warranted? . . . A careful examination of Eastern European development in the last two years suggests a far less uniform—and less depressing—picture. The broad fact of Russian influence is not in doubt, but the vigor and variety of the Eastern lands are equally real.
>
> . . . There can be little doubt that, in the event of a war, Russia would be able to count on the co-operation of its neighbors. It does not follow, however, that they would be parties to aggression. [July 19, 1947, p. 91.]

Later in 1947, however, *The Economist* began to express a view similar to the one suggested here. Recalling the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Territories, it wrote:

> The Russians were apparently unable to imagine how anyone could take it seriously; it appeared to them merely a face-saving formula for American acquiescence in the partition of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, on which an understanding had already been reached between Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill. When the Americans, basing their policy on the Declaration, protested against the Vishinsky *coup d'état* which put M. Groza in power in Rumania, the Kremlin regarded it as a double cross. [November 1, 1947, p. 711.]

And in an article entitled "The Fall of Prague," in the issue of February 28, 1948, *The Economist* said:

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> There was absolutely no need for Communist domination [in Czechoslovakia] as a guarantee of Russian security. But . . . the men in the Kremlin do not want friends. The human race is for them divided into enemies and slaves. Not until power is monopolized by a Communist clique . . . can the Kremlin be satisfied with any country. The *Gleichschaltung* of South-Eastern Europe had already provided some fairly convincing examples. But there was still hope that this technique would not be applied in Czechoslovakia. Now the hopes are shattered. The process will take time to complete, just as the process initiated at Munich was not completed until March 1939. But the decisive step has been taken. [p. 332.]

The article does not indicate on what beliefs about the Politburo the "hope" for Czechoslovakia had been based.

In 1950 *The Economist* presented a view more fully coinciding with the one suggested here:

> The Russians have never made any secret of the fact that, for them, there are only two kinds of state—Communist states under complete Russian control and anti-Communist states to be treated as hostile. The policy of imposing Russian control on as many states as possible . . . dates back, in execution, to the middle of the war, and in conception to the earliest days of the Bolshevik régime. The creation of an all-Communist government for Poland began in 1943. . . . The rest of the process . . . has developed inexorably from that first deliberate act. Yet this first step was taken at the height of Russia's wartime alliance with the West.
>
> Similarly, the suppression of the German Socialists in the Eastern zone—which set in motion the sovietization of Eastern Germany—was undertaken in the winter of 1945-46. . . . The process of absorption had already begun by the time of Yalta. It was in full swing during the Potsdam meetings. What followed thereafter was simply the unfolding of a policy already determined, and, as the last five years have shown, in every country within the reach of Soviet arms—except Finland . . . the "third force" elements . . . or the "neutrals" with Western sympathies . . . have been steadily eliminated. [May 27, 1950, p. 1154.]

Prior to the autumn of 1947 *The Economist* had implied that a Politburo retreat from East European positions was possible, short of a Western ultimatum or attack. In 1946 *The Economist* spoke of

> . . . British and American unwillingness to accept the iron curtain and to see Europe permanently divided . . . [May 11, 1946, p. 744.]

—without indicating the extreme means necessary to make this "unwillingness" effective. On the contrary, *The Economist* showed:

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> . . . certain small but significant changes in Russian policy in Europe as pointers towards a potential slackening of Russia's grip on the Danubian countries. . . . The transfer of the whole of Transylvania to Rumania at the Peace Conference can be interpreted as a sign that in the long run the Russians might, if the present internal and external pressure were maintained, withdraw from Hungary completely. [May 25, 1946, p. 826.]

—implying that they would withdraw without having established alternative channels of control. At that time, *The Economist* recalled developments since 1945:

> . . . by the time the London Conference [of foreign ministers in the fall of 1945] opened, one of the chief aims of British and American diplomacy had become to lessen the grip of Russia's "managed revolutions" and political predominance in Eastern Europe. Russian resistance to this pressure has created the diplomatic duel on which the Powers have since been engaged and which led to the breakdown of the Paris Conference. [June 1, 1946, p. 874.]

Again, it is implied that the Politburo might withdraw under merely "diplomatic" pressure. Late in 1947 *The Economist* assumed the possibility of a voluntary Politburo retreat from Eastern Germany in discussing the Moscow Conference of early 1947:

> Over the political shape of Germany . . . there were chances for negotiation, greater here than anywhere else. British and Russian ideas about Germany's form of government were not fatally far apart. . . . [November 29, 1947, p. 867.]

Thus, according to *The Economist*, during that period the Soviet Army might, under conditions unspecified, have withdrawn from areas in Eastern Europe without first setting up an alternative for control of the structure of the state by the Politburo. In 1946 the periodical had recommended certain Anglo-American policies which, it had predicted, could lead to separate Soviet peace treaties with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and added:

> . . . if those treaties also led to the withdrawal of the Russian occupying forces, the result might not be wholly unfavorable to the chances of democracy—or at least of toleration—in those countries. [April 20, 1946, p. 627.]

Later in the year *The Economist* wrote about a foreign ministers' conference:

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> . . . the Foreign Ministers have . . . broken the log jam on a number of points, and the concessions have come, as concessions should, from all the contestants. . . . Mr. Bevin accepted a clause guaranteeing the withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy not more than ninety days after the conclusion of peace, and Mr. Molotov gave, in return, a similar guarantee for Bulgaria. [June 29, 1946, p. 1040.]

Among the moderate means by which, according to *The Economist*, the Western powers might be able to induce Politburo retreats in Eastern Europe were these: the Politburo regarded agreed-upon peace treaties as valuable and would make concessions to obtain them; also, the Politburo would feel bound in its operations, at least in Europe, by something near to the Western interpretation of the content of such treaties. To these factors *The Economist* attributed a significant role in influencing the power distribution in the area—an estimate presumably not shared by the Politburo. In 1946 *The Economist* said about the delay in the drawing-up of peace treaties for the European satellites of Germany:

> It is clearly very damaging to any prospects of reconstruction and recovery to leave seven states in Europe without a definitive political or economic framework. [May 25, 1946, p. 826.]

—a statement which overestimated the role of peace treaties in the construction of the "definitive political and economic framework" which was proceeding in Eastern Europe under the control of the Politburo.

In the same article *The Economist* mentioned the argument that the Politburo might be induced to take an acceptable position on the European peace treaties by the threat of separate treaties on the part of the West. Then, however, *The Economist* commented:

> Separate peace settlements in Italy, separate policies in Germany and Austria [on the part of the Western powers], might give the Russians an even freer hand in their own zones and relieve them of the pressure for moderation and conciliation which they must [*sic*] now feel. [*Ibid.*]

In the same year *The Economist* predicted sequels to an overt breakdown of the Politburo-Western attempt to agree on peace terms in Europe:

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> The Russian zone in Europe would then become in reality a closed world. The influence of the West, which, even now, is considerable in Eastern Europe, would be forcibly eliminated. The existence of different political parties, the degree of freedom of the press (which is great according to Russian standards), the ability of Western journalists and visitors to come and go—all these . . . advantages might be swept away in the wave of war scares which would follow an open breach between Russia and the West. [June 1, 1946, p. 875.]

Conversely, *The Economist* had already predicted:

> . . . above all, better relations between the Big Three offer the only hope of restoring constitutional government and legitimate opposition in Eastern Europe. [May 4, 1946, p. 707.]

These predictions, however, implied an overestimation of the weight which the Politburo would attribute to "legal" obstacles in applying the principle of pursuit and also of the degree to which the application of this principle would depend on the prediction of imminent crises. In reality, the Politburo seems to require of itself that it push as far ahead as possible at any given time, regardless of whether the moment is near or distant at which its recent conquests will become a glacis to be used in case of an attack.

In the same article *The Economist* expressed particularly clearly its belief that Politburo behavior could be substantially influenced by moderate, and not only by extreme, pressure:

> A breach would mean the abandonment of any attempt to use Western influence and pressure to modify Soviet policies, either in Russia or elsewhere—and the amount of modification they have undergone is probably far larger than is realized in the West. [June 1, 1946, p. 875.]

This cryptic remark was not further amplified. In a similar vein *The Economist* wrote:

> On the vexed question of the freedom of the Danube, progress away from the deadlock has been made by the proposals put forward by Britain and Russia according to which the Four Powers would formally state their confidence (Russia's version) or determination (British version) that the Danube should be open to the trade of all nations. [June 29, 1946, p. 1040.]

This again implied that Western modes of pressure falling far short of ultimatum or attack might induce the Politburo to renounce total control of the Danube within its domain.

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Advance and Retreat

The Politburo orientation on expansion is, I believe, not limited, and aims at objectives primarily for the power they will bring. In contrast to this, *The Economist* has tended to assume that Politburo advances after the Second World War have had limited and substantive aims. Thus *The Economist* wrote in 1946 about conferences of the foreign ministers of the Big Four:

> At no time, probably, have the Foreign Secretaries sat down together to discuss . . . what their inalienable interests are or to find out whether there is any social and political order in Europe on which they can agree. . . . Between the line of Russia's absolute interests and those of Britain and America there is a fairly wide . . . ground where . . . compromise could . . . be usefully carried on. [April 20, 1946, p. 627.]

More specifically:

> Italy lies quite clearly to the west of the dividing line, but sufficiently close to it to provide some justification for Russian interest in Italian affairs. For this reason it might be wise to make some concessions on certain points to Russian views. They might, for example, be given some measure of reparations. . . . [*Ibid.*]

In later years, *The Economist* sometimes went to the opposite extreme in estimating the nature of Politburo expansionism. In 1948 it reviewed the course of negotiations on Berlin:

> They dispel any last lingering illusion about the possibility of talking the Russians into a peaceful settlement. They will talk, they will go through the motions of negotiation, but they make no concessions themselves and each concession made to them is simply the prelude to a further demand. [September 25, 1948, p. 481.]

Politburo attempts to advance are apt to have both offensive and defensive motivations. Sometimes *The Economist* seemed to feel that one had to choose one of these possibilities, or that the choice was difficult. Thus the issue of March 16, 1946, contained the passage:

> The ultimate purpose of Russia's technique in Persia is an enigma. Is it vaulting ambition? [p. 407.]

On the other hand, it was pointed out in the issue of March 30, 1946, that the Politburo would have maximized its chances

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of obtaining an oil concession in northern Iran by withdrawing their troops from Iran as promised:

> The only conceivable explanation why it [Moscow] did not proceed in this way lies in fear of the British—or, more accurately, the Anglo-Saxon—economic hold on the Persian Gulf (and, therefore, at least potentially, on the Persian Government) and in anxiety lest this should develop into a drive northwards and a threat to Baku. [p. 482.]

The same issue also spoke of:

> . . . the uncertainty whether Russian policy in Persia is born of a genuine persecution complex, or whether it is part of a plan to use UNO as a cloak for intentions which, though they may be limited, are aggressive. This is still, as it always has been, the crucial issue. [p. 481.]

In 1947, *The Economist* wrote about the creation of the Cominform in a vein approaching the conception suggested here:

> Is it a declaration of war? Or is it a declaration of defence. . . ?
>
> These alternatives go to the root of the Western world's difficulty in understanding Soviet strategy. It is possible to interpret the . . . record of the last year in terms of a terrified Russia throwing up . . . defences. Marxist theory compels the Russians to believe in an America which is . . . only awaiting the favorable moment for intervention (and armed with the atom bomb). From this conception everything follows. . . .
>
> Equally, however, every line of this strategy can be interpreted in the exactly opposite sense. Marxism . . . believes itself incompatible with any other [orthodoxy]. . . . the Russians are imposing their rule on Eastern Europe. They eliminate all opposition. . . . They oppose the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan fiercely because they [*sic*] set boundaries to their ambitions. . . . Finally the Cominform will use every instrument of propaganda and pressure to ruin any efforts of non-Communist reconstruction.
>
> But which version is true? The difficult fact is that both are true. . . . no useful guide to Russian intentions will therefore ever be yielded by analysis. [October 11, 1947, p. 591.]

The last statement, however, seems to be a *non sequitur.*

That the Politburo will advance until it comes up against prohibitive obstacles was repeatedly—and, I believe, correctly—affirmed by *The Economist* throughout the period we are dealing with. In 1946:

> The ultimate purpose of Russia's technique in Persia is an enigma. Is it vaulting ambition? Or is it—as seems more likely—a determina-

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> tion to secure some prepared positions during the period in which, the Russians feel sure, neither the American nor the British public would tolerate entry into war? [March 16, 1946, p. 407.]

But the Politburo presumably did not share *The Economist*'s high estimate of the impact of Western "publics" on their governments.

In 1948:

> . . . if the Soviet leaders believed that no Western opposition would be encountered, whatever they did, they too might succumb to the temptation to expand. [September 25, 1948, p. 482.]

It would, according to the conception advanced here, have been more correct to say that in the situation indicated the Politburo would feel that it was required to expand.

In 1950:

> If the Atlantic Pact were rescinded, American troops and interests withdrawn and a "neutral" Germany and a "neutral" Europe left to face alone . . . their *tête à tête* with the Soviet Union, every evidence of recent history suggests that their fate would be no different from that of President Benes. . . . [May 27, 1950, p. 1154.]

The associated point that the Politburo ceases its attempts to advance when it does come up against prohibitive obstacles was also generally—but not always—acknowledged by *The Economist*. In 1946 *The Economist* enumerated various offensive moves of the Politburo and commented:

> How is it possible, in these circumstances, to pretend that the Russians wish for friendly co-operation? What conclusion can be drawn but that their policy is built on invincible hostility and implacable distrust? Why, then, should Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes undertake yet another fruitless pilgrimage? Is it not better that the British and Americans should face facts realistically and, abandoning the search for an agreement that is never reached, concentrate on their own rights and interests?
>
> This, however, is the reaction not of statesmanship but of irritation, and the stakes are too great for petulance. [April 20, 1946, p. 626.]

The implication seems to be that the probability of an offensive move being undertaken by the Politburo is reduced by a "friendly" reaction by its target. In a related vein, *The Economist* said in the same article:

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> It is precisely during this year, when . . . the armies of the Powers are still not finally demobilized, that the threat of war must be held at bay. [*Ibid.*]

—thus not recognizing that the incompleteness of Western demobilization reduced yet further the probability of war in 1946, which was slight in any case. However, somewhat later *The Economist* did argue in the opposite (and, I believe, more correct) sense:

> There is . . . [an] argument in favor of independent Western action [on the European peace treaties blocked by the Soviet Union] which springs from . . . the desire to secure an agreed policy even at the eleventh hour. It is based on the belief that a strong American threat to end the effort at negotiation and, if necessary, to make a separate peace would jolt the Russians into a realization of how far they had stretched the patience of their allies. . . . They might then return to the conference table on June 15th ready to negotiate on a basis of genuine concession and agreement. [May 25, 1946, p. 826.]

Again somewhat later, *The Economist* noted an "easing of the international situation" and mentioned as one of its causes:

> . . . probably a growing Russian conviction that a "forward policy" in the Mediterranean is, given Anglo-American hostility, too expensive and risky for the returns it might yield. Accordingly, the Russians have progressively retreated from their claim to a Mandate for Libya, for bases in the Dodecanese or for almost exclusive Yugoslav control, by way of Trieste, in the Adriatic. [July 6, 1946, p. 8.]

However, the passage continued:

> They will probably expect an equal abatement of Anglo-American pressure in Eastern Europe.

—which not only overestimated Politburo concern with the moderate "pressures" then exerted by the West in the matter of Eastern Europe, but obscured by introducing *quid pro quo* considerations the fact that the Politburo had ceased its attempts to advance because it had encountered superior obstacles. Hence a statement made in the subsequent issue appears more correct. *The Economist* discussed how, at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Politburo had abandoned certain attempts to expand beyond the sphere in fact allotted to it at Yalta:

> Probably neither Great Britain nor the United States would go to war, say, for Trieste, but the risk of a complete breakdown in Allied

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co-operation, leading to a possible atomic struggle in which for the time being the Western Allies would enjoy preponderant strength, has had the same deterrent effect. [July 13, 1946, p. 42.]

Here again the term "co-operation" introduced a false note. Somewhat later again, *The Economist* lost the clear awareness that superior obstacles—the presence of which may well be indicated, under certain conditions, by released or simulated "anger" and "recriminations"—are the only antidote to Politburo attempts to advance:

Mr. Jordan, of New Zealand, last week became the mouthpiece of the impatience widely felt among the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference at what are regarded as the "filibustering" tactics of the Russian *bloc*. . . . But peace-making is a business at which statesmen must work until it is finished without watching the clock. . . . Tactically, impatience is disastrous, because it gives the advantage to the negotiator who is in no hurry to agree, with the result that the hasty one either makes unnecessary surrenders in bargaining in order to get agreement quickly, or else becomes angry and indulges in futile recriminations at what he regards as malicious delay.

A peace conference should be a leisurely proceeding, as it used to be in the old days. . . . there is much room for improvement in tempers at the Luxembourg, and the world might well feel reassured at the news that the Foreign Ministers, instead of another round of ideological backchat, had spent a summer day bathing in the Seine, or had been seen on a merry-go-round at a fair in Vincennes. The prospects of peace would be better if the delegates, instead of wondering whether they can get their work finished before UNO is due to meet, were to prepare for several months of good, hard, unemotional horse-trading varied by as much incidental diversion as Paris can provide. [August 24, 1946, p. 288.]

But toward the end of the year *The Economist* said, in accord with the view presented here, about the Soviet concessions at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in New York:

This may . . . be due to the traditional methods of Russian diplomacy in which bargaining is pressed to the uttermost limit, until it is clear that the opponents will not budge another inch. Then, at this point, the concessions—often surprising concessions—are made. Mr. Molotov may have at last become convinced that neither Mr. Bevin nor Mr. Byrnes would give way further. Accordingly, he has surrendered. [December 7, 1946, p. 899.]

Similarly, in 1948, *The Economist* affirmed:

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> . . . that it may be necessary to carry firmness to a quite dangerous stage before the Russian representatives in Berlin can inform Moscow that they have reached sticking point . . . [April 3, 1948, p. 535.]

—a reaction, one might add, which would deprive extreme "firmness" of its apparent "dangers."

Recognizing this, *The Economist*, throughout the period considered, discussed the advisability of indicating explicitly to the Politburo, in advance, which offensive moves on its part would induce war. In 1946 it said:

> The weakness of the Western Powers, hitherto, is that they do not appear to have decided where their paramount interests lie, or at least they have been chary of committing themselves. The result has been a Russian advance . . . into the no-man's land of international debate and on into dangerous proximity to the Western forward line. The only way of avoiding direct collision now is to state . . . where the collision would inevitably occur. . . . If Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes could bring this degree of clarity into Great Power relations, there would be less danger of their stumbling on each other and falling to fighting in the dark. [April 20, 1946, p. 627.]

In 1948:

> . . . the Western Powers' best hope of peace lies in making it perfectly clear at what point Russian action might precipitate war.
>
> . . . The line must be clearly drawn and the world—including the Russians themselves—must be given the conviction that any infringement of it will be resisted to the utmost. [September 25, 1948, p. 482.]

On the other hand, *The Economist* was less clear on the point that only an ultimatum or an attack would induce the Politburo to consent to any impairment of its control over any part of its domain. It would follow from this point that, since 1945, the Politburo has at no time been prepared to accept any reduction of its potential or actual control over Eastern Germany on any terms the West might offer. *The Economist*, however, wrote in 1946:

> The opening salvo in the Foreign Ministers' discussion of Germany was fired by Mr. Molotov. . . . most of his points are ones on which Allied unity should not be too difficult to achieve. . . . As soon as the Russians agree to an Allied Commission of Inquiry to cover not only military establishments but also munitions factories, a regular system can probably be set in motion. [July 13, 1946, p. 48.]

And in the week following:

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It remains true that a policy of organizing the Western zones [of Germany] in isolation from the East is preferable to an indefinite continuation of the present vacuum of policy, in which the Russians, in substance, do as they please in their own zone but exercise a veto on British and American policy in the West. . . . Meanwhile, however, it would be surely worth their [the Western powers'] while to examine once again the question whether a measure of agreement with the Russians is not still possible and whether a compromise cannot still be achieved. . . .

. . . Mr. Molotov wants a central government [in Germany], a unified Reich, . . . and disarmament. Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes want . . . a long period of control over German disarmament. Indeed on disarmament, the chief difference is that Mr. Byrnes has offered twenty-five years of control and Mr. Molotov wants forty. [July 20, 1946, p. 84.]

In 1947:

The empirical, not to say contradictory, character of Russian diplomacy has been more apparent in recent weeks than perhaps at any other time. At one time, agreement and understanding appeared to be the basis of Soviet diplomacy. The Russian concessions on the satellite treaties, the agreed agenda for Moscow, the series of interviews given by Mr. Stalin to the Press, all couched in conciliatory terms, have not only broken the prolonged diplomatic log jam of 1946; they have even led to better hopes for agreement over . . . the settlement with Germany.

Yet in recent weeks it is precisely over the settlement with Germany that the other face of Russia's Janus head has pulled its worst grimaces. [February 15, 1947, p. 271.]

About the impending Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers:

The British and Americans . . . will want a definite answer from the Russians whether they intend to observe the Potsdam Agreement, whether the food and industrial resources of Eastern Germany are to be pooled with those of the West. [March 8, 1947, p. 316.]

However, in 1948, *The Economist* said about the *de facto* partition of Germany:

There is nothing particularly new in this melancholy situation. Russian tactics have been pursuing the same ends since the firing stopped in 1945. But the Anglo-American hope of greater co-operation has lingered on, obstructing the formation of fresh policy and clogging the wheels of thought. The *coup d'état* in Prague . . . should banish once and for all the idea that the Russians in their present mood can share the political and economic control of anything. . . . [February 28, 1948, p. 332.]

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But in 1949 *The Economist* again lost awareness of the fact that Politburo retreats can be induced only by extreme means, the use of which *The Economist* was not considering:

> . . . the prize [for the West] . . . is now clearly coming within sight—all Germany for the West. [May 14, 1949, p. 875.]

In 1950, realism (according to my construction) expressed itself anew in a discussion of the possibilities of unifying and neutralizing Germany:

> There is nothing to suggest that the Russians are prepared to dismantle their police state. Their unavowed aim is . . . to extend its control. [April 8, 1950, p. 754.]

By 1950 *The Economist* had moved far beyond its position in 1946—when it described Soviet objections to international atomic control as related to Soviet secretiveness—to a greatly increased awareness that the Politburo would resist anything but extreme pressure:

> . . . there is likely to be strong pressure in Moscow for a firm stand on "national sovereignty" and no Paul Prys on Soviet soil. Yet there have recently been some signs that the unanimity of opinion in ruling circles in Russia is not quite as monolithic as it should be in Communist theory, and it may be that if world opinion outside Russia is strongly aroused in favor of international atomic control with inspection, even the NKVD may be unable to keep out the influence. . . . [October 12, 1946, p. 572.]

Negotiating with the Enemy

That the Politburo does not sentimentalize over "agreements" or "settlements" as certain Western policy-makers tend to do, remained for a long time unrecognized, or unexpressed, by *The Economist*, as previously quoted passages have shown. An additional instance can be taken from *The Economist* in 1946, when it said about the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers:

> . . . it would be untrue to say that maneuvering for strategic position against the possibility of future conflict was the only characteristic of the Paris Conference. . . . towards the end of last week . . . the Foreign Ministers . . . fell again to informal negotiation which, in two days, produced two striking results. . . . It did seem . . . that the wheels of genuine negotiation were at last moving. [May 18, 1946, pp. 790-91.]

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Thus *The Economist* was unable to recognize the strict impossibility of "genuine negotiation" with the Politburo, even while stressing its extreme difficulty and rarity. The passage continued:

> All hopes that these mutual concessions would open a phase of genuine negotiation were, however, dashed when Mr. Molotov refused to consider . . . Thereafter, the conference . . . returned to a sort of political *rigor mortis*. [*Ibid.*]

However, in the autumn of 1948 *The Economist* wrote:

> . . . what was suspected years ago by a few, and what was apparent months ago to many, has now been proved to the public—namely, that agreement with the Russian Communists is impossible. It is only the proof that is new, not the fact. Moreover, it is important to note what it is that is now proved—that the Russians are not interested in international harmony. There is no more proof than there ever was that they mean to make war. [October 2, 1948, p. 521.]

And in 1950:

> The fallacy in the idea of a limited agreement [on armament control] at this stage lies in supposing that the Soviet Union is interested in friendship. It is . . . concerned with the creation of a Communist world order, and agreements and failures to agree alike are regarded simply as stepping stones to this final end. [February 18, 1950, p. 353.]

In the negotiations from the autumn of 1945 to the spring of 1950, the Politburo presumably felt that the penalties of nonagreement were light—merely a failure to advance beyond the Yalta-Potsdam positions which, in any case, the Politburo probably did not expect greatly to improve by diplomacy (so that the rewards of success in negotiation were also likely to be minor). In contrast to this, *The Economist* tended to attribute very considerable significance to success or failure in international conferences, and tended to imply that such estimates were shared by the Politburo. Thus they wrote in the spring of 1946, treating with much importance agreements which hardly touched the world distribution of power:

> For the time at least, the winter of discontent seems to be fading in the Councils of the Great Powers. After the autumn deadlock of London and the Christmastide disappointments of Moscow, Paris in the spring seems to promise better things. . . . For the first time in its history, the Security Council has reached what was very nearly a unanimous decision on a controversial subject. On April 28th, ten of the eleven members voted for the Australian resolution, which

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repeats the Great Powers' moral condemnation of the Franco regime and appoints a committee to enquire into the question whether and how much Franco's Government represents a threat to international peace. The Russians decided not to block this resolution by exercising their right of veto, and for the occasion the proposal for a committee of enquiry was tacitly accepted as a question of procedure. Everyone knew that in fact it was a question of substance, but everyone knew equally that if it were so regarded, a Russian abstention would amount to a veto. . . . it seemed better to allow the anomaly to pass. . . .

On the other side of the Atlantic at the Paris Conference, the Russians in their new mood of conciliation have already ended the deadlock which brought the London Conference to a standstill—the question of France's participation in the discussion of all the peace treaties—and have suggested a way around the other—the future of Tripoli. . . .

Why the change? Why so long a diplomatic deadlock ending in so mild a resolution? It is difficult to find a really adequate reason. . . . if optimism be permitted to break in for a moment, may not the new atmosphere give some hope that at last the immediate post-war tensions are beginning to relax? [May 4, 1946, p. 703.]

And:

. . . the arguments against risking an open breach between the Allies are . . . cogent. To accept a permanent rift, to base the post-war settlement on two worlds—a Russian and a non-Russian—must make for friction and endless rivalry, and if the unhappy history of the past is any guide, lead ultimately to war. [May 25, 1946, p. 826.]

According to the Politburo, on the other hand, the very structure of the era was that of a "permanent rift" between "two worlds" with "endless friction" between them. Whether an "open breach" occurred or not, would, in the presumable estimates of the Politburo, have but little influence on the occurrence of war. It was this attitude which *The Economist* approached in an isolated passage in the spring of 1946:

. . . it is melodramatic to the point of absurdity to suppose that a failure to agree on the peace treaties means an inevitable and early war between East and West. . . . it would do nothing to alter the existing balance of forces upon which the chances of peace and war depend. [June 1, 1946, p. 875.]

However, *The Economist* soon resumed its habitual high appraisal of the significance of success and failure in negotiations between the Politburo and the West:

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At last, after months of inconclusive bargaining, the Foreign Ministers appear to be on the verge of reaching agreement on the draft of the Italian Treaty. . . .

This easing of the international situation is all the more remarkable when it is compared with the mood of pessimism and even the war scares which followed the breakdown of the first Paris Conference in May. Then it seemed that no resources of diplomacy and no last reserves of good will could prevent Europe from falling into two hostile spheres and the international community from degenerating into "two worlds." Yet, furnished with new instructions, the Foreign Ministers returned to Paris to show more flexibility and ability to compromise at the renewed conference than at any time in the last nine dreary months. [July 6, 1946, p. 8.]

And:

What can be said of the settlement which is now to be considered by the general Peace Conference? The most hopeful and most important thing about it is not perhaps its content, but the fact that it exists at all. The deadlock between the Powers was so long and so dreary and apparently so unbreakable that their ability finally to compromise, to keep open the channels of diplomacy and to remain, however nominally, united nations is a matter for some . . . gratitude. [July 13, 1946, p. 42.]

Also:

. . . the outlook for the peace of the world will be poor indeed if the Great Powers can do no better in their future negotiations than barely fail to disagree. [July 13, 1946, p. 43.]

As to the discussion of Germany at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris:

The Russians' intolerable obstinacy and secretiveness had obviously reduced Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes by the end of the discussions to the desperate desire to cut loose from their infuriating Ally at any cost. Two factors ought, however, to persuade them . . . to postpone a drastic break. The first is the grimness of the alternative policy. . . . [July 20, 1946, p. 84.]

For:

. . . patient negotiation on a Big Four basis is the only means by which . . . the rivalry of the Great Powers [can be] kept from deteriorating into dangerous hostility. [October 19, 1946, p. 611.]

Later in the year, however, *The Economist* approached the view of the situation taken here:

In a process of bargaining . . . it may be that one party really is unwilling to buy or sell except on his own terms, and in that case the

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> other party has either to accept his terms or give up the transaction. In the present international situation it is necessary to reckon with the possibility that the rulers of Russia feel they can do without any settlement at all better than can the Western Powers. [November 30, 1946, p. 863.]

—or rather, than the Western powers *feel* they can.

In negotiation, the Politburo does not consider issues on their "merits," but solely from the point of view of power—an attitude which for a long time seemed, as it were, abnormal to *The Economist*, which wrote in 1946 about the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers:

> . . . suspicion has grown to such a pitch that no single issue could be considered on its merits. [May 18, 1946, p. 790.]

Later in that year *The Economist* said about the draft treaties with Germany's satellites:

> Each clause has been discussed not as the component part of a rational European order but as a pawn in the . . . struggle between East and West. . . . [December 14, 1946, p. 939.]

According to the Politburo a process of negotiation is apt to be filled with expressions of hostility, after which an agreement may be reached. However, according to a frequently expressed view by *The Economist* there is a negative correlation between the level of hostility during negotiation and its success. Thus *The Economist* wrote in 1946:

> At no time, probably, have the Foreign Secretaries sat down together to discuss with complete frankness what their inalienable interests are or to find out whether there is any social and political order in Europe on which they can agree. Temperamentally, the present Foreign Secretaries are too far apart to make the attempt and probably suspicion and hostility have gone too far to make agreement possible. [April 20, 1946, p. 627.]

And:

> The Foreign Ministers have returned to Paris and the preliminary bouts in their diplomatic wrestling match do not bode well for final agreement. [June 22, 1946, p. 999.]

In the week following, *The Economist* noted the achievement of certain compromises by the Foreign Ministers' Conference, but went on to say:

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> But having listed the new compromises, we must admit that the psychological auguries are bad. Irritation and frustration have quickly replaced the evident good will of the first days. In such an atmosphere, the patient search for the inch of extra compromise gives place to the gesture of irritability that brings all search to an end. [June 29, 1946, p. 1040.]

Again:

> The Paris [Peace] Conference is only in its second week; but already from the first week, almost from its first ceremonial session, it has been gripped by a queer and, at first sight, baffling psychosis—the psychosis of an uninterrupted and unmitigated rivalry between the Western Powers and Russia. [August 10, 1946, p. 217.]

What appears to the Politburo as the essence of world politics in this era appears here as the sudden outbreak of a "psychosis."

According to the Politburo, pressure (apart from *quid pro quo*'s) is the only device by which the behavior of negotiation partners can be favorably modified. But in 1946 *The Economist* advocated toward the Politburo "the policy of patience" as against "the policy of a breach":

> . . . time may show that . . . at the expenditure of infinite labor, agreed solutions can be achieved. [June 1, 1946, p. 875.]

The implication seems to be that by "labor" other than pressure the Politburo can in some way be reformed—e.g., its level of "suspicion" somewhat reduced.

In the same year *The Economist* affirmed that the Foreign Ministers' Conference might be able to find a compromise on the question of Italian reparations to the Soviet Union, and added:

> And concessions at this point could perhaps ease the way when the much more difficult issues on the agenda come up for discussion. [June 22, 1946, p. 999.]

Yet here, as elsewhere, it seems clear that such a statement involves an assumption about Soviet behavior which does not coincide with what I consider at present to be the operational code of the Politburo.

It may be argued, of course, that the hypotheses which I have set off against the comments of *The Economist* are erroneous or dubious. The point nevertheless remains that the effectiveness of

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foreign policy depends upon the accuracy of the assumptions made about the conduct of other participants in world politics. The basic goals of American policy may be the same today as they were seven years ago, but the means to their realization have undergone great transformation. A reason for this is the changed position of the Soviet Union.

As the preceding pages may show, one of the most difficult issues on the internal agenda of the West has been, and still is, the correct construction of the operational code of its antagonist. Indeed, these pages seem to suggest that the construction of such a code should not be left to the necessities of a particular situation, or to intuition, however illuminating. It should rather be the result of continuing research, to increase the chance of avoiding the dangerous temptation to view the other in one's own image.

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INDO-CHINA:
A MILITARY-POLITICAL APPRECIATION*

By Maj. EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, Jr., USMCR

I

THE war in Indo-China, sinister, bloody, and seemingly endless, presents as curious a farrago of paradoxes and incongruities as any in recent military history. For one thing, its character has changed from a colonial to a civil war. It has changed from a war fought for the restitution of French sovereignty by a professional, traditionally colonial army to a war in which the same army is still fighting, but now side by side with native troops for the avowed purpose of securing the former colony's independence against the threat of Communist imperialism. Thus, in a sense, it has also become an international war, with Indo-China one of the areas ignited by the friction between the free and the Communist worlds. Indeed, it may be argued that the French forces in Indo-China are fighting the flank action of another and greater conflict, the main line of resistance of which lies somewhere between the 38th Parallel and the Yalu River in Korea. It is a war whose present costs preclude repayment by any return on colonial investment in the foreseeable future. As such it has been anathema to the very politicians in France who have had to vote its support. It is a war that has been fought with relentless, if at times subdued, fury over a period of five years by soldiers who, until very recently, have sworn that there could be no such thing as a real victory. The final and perhaps insoluble paradox is inherent in the fact that without a political solution to the problems of Indo-China, there can be no definitive military one; yet without a military victory there can be no political peace. In the juxtaposition of the political and the military lies the dilemma of Indo-China.

* These are the private opinions of the writer, and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large.

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Before 1941 Indo-China lay virtually outside the strategic consciousness of the Western powers, just as it lay on the periphery of political and social revolution. But through the years the tactical situation in Indo-China has become of critical strategic importance to both Asia and Western Europe: Indo-China now lies at the geographical center of the great revolution of these times. It is at once the bastion of anti-Communism at the gates of Southeast Asia and the quicksand which is pulling down French military strength in Europe. With Indonesia to the south and the Philippines to the east, both now politically free, independent Thailand and Burma to the west, and Communist China to the north, it is astride a knife's edge—politically and geographically. It is teetering between revolutions which are essentially political and one which is essentially social, between revolutions which were sponsored by the United States in the name of freedom, and one which has the blessing of Soviet Russia. Indo-China's unique position makes its military situation urgent and its political situation chaotic. The interplay between the two will determine its future.

From the strategic point of view, Indo-China—the Associated States of Laos, Cambodia, and, most important of the three, Viet Nam—is a crucial link between East and West, between the Atlantic Pact and the war in Korea. It is intimately connected with them both. Furthermore, its loss would be a prelude to that of all of Southeast Asia: Malaya first, then Thailand, Burma, and eventually Indonesia. That pattern of conquest was laid out by Japan, who invaded by sea at the beginning of World War II and then proceeded to use Indo-China as a base for operations against the rest of that part of the world.

Vulnerable by sea, Indo-China is also open to invasion by land. The passes through the mountains of Yunnan and Kwangsi provinces in southern China on the border of Viet Nam's northernmost province, Tonkin, form the land route by which Red China would find it most practical to invade Southeast Asia. This is Indo-China's advantage over critical Burma as a target area. At the moment, these passes serve as an efficacious route by which the Communist Viet Minh receives supplies from

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China and through which rebel troops trained in China return to fight the French-Vietnamese army presently holding a greater part of the economically worthwhile land in Tonkin. This geographic proximity enhances the danger inherent in the political affinity between China and the rebel government of Ho Chi Minh; both are members of "the same intimate great revolutionary family."[1] This in turn gives added significance to Indo-China's precarious military position on the southern flank of a militant China, the momentum of whose northern push has at present been expended in the bleak hills of Korea. If the Chinese become contained in Korea, or if the war there grinds to an indecisive halt, Communist China may well turn its attention to Indo-China. Support is given to this conjecture in that the two fronts seem closely associated in Chinese strategy and political thinking. This first became evident in September 1950.

At virtually the same moment that the U.S. Marines landed at Inchon in mid-September to turn the flank of the North Koreans—thus relieving a difficult, if not desperate, situation on the Pusan peninsula—Ho Chi Minh's Communist Viet Minh attacked French outposts first at Dong Khe, then at Lao Khe. The new attack seemed to be timed to coincide with a final victory for the Communists in Korea, as a logical next step in the conquest of the Far East. By the end of October the posts of Cao Bang, That Khe, and Lao Khe along the Chinese border had been abandoned to the invader. All in all, it was a defeat of the first magnitude. The French no longer controlled the frontier. This observer doubted that they could hold any of the rice lands of the Red River Delta. There was real danger that the Communists would get the rice which trade could so easily turn into bullets. Communication facilities with China were immeasurably strengthened. Finally, it was the first time that the Communists had launched a co-ordinated attack in broad daylight, thus causing a slowly smoldering war of ambushes, raids, and kidnappings to flame suddenly into open warfare. This sobering defeat gave pause for thought, and thought,

[1] "Background to Chinese Intervention in Korea," *Times Weekly Edition* (London), August 15, 1951.

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in turn, for revision; just as did the invasion of South Korea. That is why this last year has been one of high decision in Indo-China.

Although the danger of a Chinese invasion was constantly in the back of everyone's mind—carefully fostered by the broadcasts of Radio Peking—the direct relationship between events in Korea and those in Indo-China was not yet understood. The pattern did not become clear until later. But what was immediately evident was that Ho Chi Minh was now, as many considered that he had not been before, a trusted Communist comrade-in-arms. It was also clear that the aid which the Viet Minh was being given was effective. Their troops possessed some artillery, a good number of mortars, some as large as 120 mm., and adequate small arms. Their fighting on the battalion and even on the regimental level indicated that they had been well trained. Yet these unpleasant discoveries were in themselves no great surprise; rumor had taken them for granted for so long that they had gained credence as fact.

Indeed, there was even relatively little surprise at the magnitude of the defeat as, despite official assurances that the French positions were reasonably secure,[2] everyone more or less expected the attack and, in a sense, the result. The French Army, therefore, and French civilians and even the Vietnamese had the dubious satisfaction of having their prophecies fulfilled. Each of these elements, of course, pointed the finger of accusation at the other.

French Army personnel and those who sympathized with their point of view sought the cause of the disaster in the refusal of the politicians in France to grant them the wherewithal to achieve victory, and of the local civil authorities to jail French Communists passing out subversive literature and otherwise attempting to disrupt the war effort behind the front lines. From the point of view of the military, it was "the fault of the capital. Governmental instability, . . . vagueness on the subject of Indo-China, the scattering of responsibility among four ministries

[2] "The Communist Threat to Southeast Asia," Doc., Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, April 1950.

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are at the root of our troubles."[3] Certainly there is enough truth in this accusation so that, even granting that the various French positions were simply the end products of indecision rather than of bad faith, French policy is difficult to defend. Between metropolitan French ministries and colonial officialdom there has been all the disparity possible between declaration and implementation. Furthermore, from government to government in France there have been changes in basic decisions. To take just one example: in order either to assuage the separatist sentiments in Cochin-China, the southernmost province of Viet Nam, or to limit the power of the latter, a separate Cochin-Chinese state was actually set up in 1948. However, it was speedily liquidated once Bao Dai, whom the French had decided to make Emperor, told them bluntly that he would have no part of a Vietnamese state of which Cochin-China was not an integral part. Thus a state solemnly created was as solemnly dissolved in the course of a few months: unfortunately, this was only one instance of the constantly changing pattern of the kaleidoscope of French policy. Certainly that policy has been such that the military can find much to criticize in retrospect.

When, however, as in the case of the defeats in the autumn of 1950, the civil authorities claim that the blame should rest squarely upon the military, they too have adequate evidence to make a strong case. They can point to the fact that French military policy has been quite as inconsistent as French political policy. There was General Valluy who in 1947 ordered his troops to forget pacification through humanitarian means and to throw themselves into the operations to the north of Tonkin "without economy of munitions or personnel . . . for this is the final blow."[4] But on another occasion, after he had tried sending his troops out into the guerrilla hinterland, the same general maintained that it would take twenty divisions on the

[3] J. Raphael-Leygues, "L'Union française au petit bonheur ou la stratégie française depuis cinq ans," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, 52e Année, No. 602 (November 1950), 242-51. See also Ed. Frédéric-Dupont, Deputé de Paris, "Faut-il rester en Indochine?", *ibid.*, No. 595 (February 1950), 113-19.

[4] Raphael-Leygues, *loc. cit.*, p. 244.

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part of the French and 100,000 Vietnamese to end the rebellion.[5] Likewise, General Leclerc, who, when he first landed in Indo-China fresh from victory in Europe, spoke of his having come "to reclaim the French inheritance,"[6] said two years later, "There can be no military solution."[7] His successor, General Carpentier, then declared that the rebels "must be given a lesson."[8] But the attacks of September 1950 found the majority of his forces penned up in towers and forts like those of the Romans in the mile houses along Hadrian's Wall. He had apparently decided that the best policy, except for an occasional sortie, was that of maintaining a *cordon sanitaire* between China and Indo-China, and that the only possible policy, considering the size of his forces, was to control the land by day and turn it over to the enemy with the coming of the evening mists. Perhaps General Revers, Chief of Staff of the French Army, summed up basic military opinion when he said in a secret report in 1949 that the problem should be turned back to the diplomats.[9]

Nor was criticism of the French Army confined to the conduct of field operations. It was also directed at the discrimination, if not the very honesty, of the Chief of Staff, who allowed the secret report on affairs in Indo-China mentioned above to leak to the Communist Viet Minh. Generals Revers and Mast and a host of political personalities created a scandal which shocked both France and Indo-China during the winter of 1949-1950, and tended to exacerbate distrust of the military who, by very token of their being military, were already disliked and distrusted by a portion of the civil administration.

Finally, the French Army was accused of having failed to create a Vietnamese army. As late as November of 1950, one conservative French writer complained that ". . . after five years Vietnamese cadres have not as yet been organized." While the Americans in Korea had organized four R.O.K. (Republic of Korea) divisions, the French had only one division of Viet-

[5] J. R. Clementin, "The Nationalist Dilemma in Viet Nam," *Pacific Affairs*, XXIII, No. 3 (September 1950), 294-310.
[6] Quoted in Robert Payne, *Red Storm over Asia*, New York, 1951, p. 250.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 193. [8] *Ibid.* [9] *L'Année politique 1949*, Paris, 1950, p. 84.

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namese.[10] But whether this was the fault of the French or the Vietnamese was debatable.

The Vietnamese, naturally enough, felt that the French and the French alone were responsible for the defeats and, as a matter of fact, for the war itself. Their Premier Tran Van Huu, returning in October 1950 from an exasperating five months in France where he had been attempting to add to the minimum independence granted the year before, said with all the bitterness of long frustration: "Many people are dying every day because Viet Nam is not given (real) independence. . . . If we had independence the people would have no reason to fight"; there would be no struggle between Viet Nam and Viet Minh.[11] The Premier's attitude seemed the more significant because he had been considered particularly pro-French and is, as a matter of fact, himself a French citizen. Yet the vast majority of Vietnamese were unaffected by the disasters in the north because they and theirs were not connected with them. These were disasters for the French, not the Vietnamese. The latter had no stake in the outcome, because although they had soldiers, they had no army of their own in the field.

Yet such an army had been legislated into existence, and had been for long a topic of conversation, conjecture, and platitude. In May 1950 the Emperor Bao Dai had pronounced the truism, "The independence of Viet Nam lies in a modern army."[12] For a long time, however, while the battle raged in the north, preparations for an actual army were typified by the series of articles run by the leading newspaper in the south, *L'Echo du Viet Nam*. These articles faced the problem of training and equipping a national army by arguing, with all the dialectical subtlety of a nineteenth-century military columnist, the perennial question of how best to combine the massive power of numbers with the flexible tempered strength of the highly trained few. The tone was one of studied detachment, and as such was distinctly out of date.[13]

After September 1950, the question of armed force assumed

[10] Raphael-Leygues, *loc. cit.*, p. 249. [11] *New York Times*, October 20, 1950.
[12] *L'Echo du Viet Nam*, September 6, 1950. [13] *Ibid.*, and ff.

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such importance that more action became immediately necessary. Vituperations gradually subsided, and pertinent facts came generally to be recognized as such by competent authorities. From the military point of view it was evident that there were neither enough arms nor enough men. Likewise, it was evident that French troops deployed for political pacification would have to be redeployed to meet the threat of open warfare. From the political point of view it was generally conceded that an effective end must be put to the antipathy between French civil and military authorities. Even more important, it was finally realized that measures had to be taken to give the Vietnamese that degree of political self-respect without which their military self-reliance would continue virtually nil. Now, at last, the French recognized the validity of the axiom that success in arms follows only from an inherent sense of political satisfaction. On their side, the Vietnamese seemed to perceive through the miasma of resentment of a century's domination that a new life for them was possible only with the aid of their former rulers. Both agreed that the end product of their new understanding had to be the formation of an effective indigenous armed force.

The solution to certain of these problems was simply a matter of making clear-cut decisions. Certain others, however, could be solved only with patience, understanding, sacrifice, and time. Of these four elements, the first three had seldom before been used, and the fourth, time, was running out in Indo-China.

II

The slaughter of several thousand French troops during the defeats of September and October 1950 at last aroused the French people at home to action and decision. This was no mean triumph for the cause of Indo-China. For years, the whole problem had been an embarrassment to French governmental majorities, both because it had been a showy bit of tinsel in the mouth of the Communists' dove of peace and because it had been the incinerator of French capital in terms of both men and money.

The Communists had long made a *cause célèbre* of the prob-

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lem (despite the fact that they themselves had originally been in favor of the reoccupation of Indo-China). Their stand was designed to win them new support, for it appealed at once to the historic minority who opposed colonialism and to those who felt that the restoration of French sovereignty was not worth the candle. The Socialists had also opposed the effort expended in Indo-China. They had taken a position somewhat reminiscent of that of the left Republicans in the 1880's and held that colonialism was an evil *per se*. Then in 1949 they decried French recognition of the Emperor Bao Dai, and in press and National Assembly pointed to his role as former puppet of the Japanese, as an advisor to the "Republican" government of Ho Chi Minh, and to his predilection for the life of a *bon vivant*. They pointed out that Bao Dai had no stature in the East and predicted with wisdom that he would not be recognized there. They wanted to turn the problem over to the United Nations. At the same time, despite the fact that their party had swung noticeably to the right since 1945, they joined other Frenchmen in sympathy for Ho Chi Minh, himself seeking recognition in France at that time. The new Communist leader then impressed many, including the American press, as being a sincere, if "leftish," patriot. His earlier diatribes against French imperialism, his Moscow training, and his long connection with the Communist underground in the Far East seemed forgotten.[14]

Then there were those who, while not opposing government policy in Indo-China, nonetheless felt that the strain on French military strength was endangering France's position in Europe. There was much to justify that argument. Second lieutenants fresh from St. Cyr were to a man being sent out to Indo-China, thus depleting the ranks of new young officers in France, of whom there were too few in any case. Furthermore, graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, traditionally dedicated to the army, were refusing to join up for the reason, among others, that they would probably be shipped out immediately. From the point of

[14] On French public opinion regarding Bao Dai, see Ellen J. Hammer, "French Views Clash on Indo-China Policy," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, XXIX (July 14, 1950), 3-4.

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view of non-commissioned officers, the situation was equally bad. The war in Indo-China had the dual effect of draining off into the Far East anyone who re-enlisted and of discouraging re-enlistment in the first place. There were in 1950 quite literally no non-commissioned officers to train French recruits in metropolitan France.[15] As for the state of military materiel, the effect on it of war in a hot and humid climate can be easily imagined by anyone who fought in the Pacific during World War II. Even more disastrous, in 1950 it was still much the same equipment which had landed with General Leclerc in 1946, and was thus considered virtually unusable.[16] It has been estimated that the war has been costing the French budget all told an amount roughly equivalent to the entire Marshall Plan aid sent to France herself. In manpower, the total reported killed and missing in November 1950 was larger than that reported by the United States after six months of fighting in Korea. If the proportionate cost in wounded and sick be added to the total, its immensity can be appreciated, and the point of view of those who in the fall of 1950 wanted done with this "dirty war" readily understood.

Finally, there were those who held to the time-worn slogan, "Turn your back on Asia and face Africa!", and those who had ridden the seemingly endless roller-coaster of victory and defeat in Indo-China to the point of exhaustion. Investment offered little lure. There were a few who, on the basis of a pegged piaster and brisk trade both legitimate and not, were making fortunes,[17] but still Indo-China had the most unfavorable balance of trade of any country until the outbreak of the Korean war,[18] and hence could hardly be considered attractive to a financier. Even the Bank of Indo-China was turning elsewhere to invest.[19]

However, despite these deterrents, decisive political action was taken in France. The majority of politicians and the majority of the French people believed then and believe now, as Georges Manue put it in an issue of *Képi blanc* (July 31, 1950), that

[15] *Le Monde*, February 11, 1950.
[16] See *Le Monde*, February 12-13, 1950.
[17] *New York Times*, January 3, 1951.
[18] *Ibid.*, November 10, 1949.
[19] *Le Monde*, June 25-26, 1950.

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"lack of success . . . indicated by a withdrawal . . . from Viet Nam will proclaim the beginning of the decomposition of the French world," and that therefore this bloody war must be continued at any cost. There is in France among a large segment of the population a firm conviction that the future of France as a great power politically, economically, and even culturally lies in her colonies. As Ramadier once remarked, "The problem of the Union has become the problem of the very liberty and existence of our country." Perhaps, in the light of French colonial troubles, this is more wishful thinking than a reasoned conclusion, but this belief is, nevertheless, a potent force. Indeed, it is not too much to say that it is this belief, grown into a sense of mission and reinforced by the pressure of a strong body of colonials, that made political decisions possible in 1950, that keeps the French fighting in Indo-China today. And, notwithstanding frequently expressed American sentiment to the contrary, the sentiment is genuine. It is quite impossible to doubt that many of the French genuinely believe that they are doing in Indo-China what the United States is doing in Korea, that they are fighting in the vanguard of the free world.[20] Most certainly it is true that French defeat in the East would have disastrous effects on French military psychology in the West. These factors were taken into consideration when French authority in metropolitan France was called upon to lay a new course in Indo-China.

The nature of these decisions was determined as the result of a visit to Indo-China during the last week of October 1950 by Jean Letourneau, the energetic Minister of the Associated States, and General Juin, then Governor of Morocco and long-time colonial soldier and administrator. When M. Letourneau and General Juin returned to France, they felt they knew what should be done. A manifest necessity was a commanding general of such stature that he could wear the cloaks of two offices, that of the civilian French High Commissioner and that of the

[20] See Jacques Soustelle, "Indo-China and Korea: One Front," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX, No. 1 (October 1950), 56-66; "Indo-China: A Key to the Far East," Supplement to *L'Economie*, No. 294 (March 29, 1950); and *Indo-China (A French Point of View)*, Paris, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1950.

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military Commander-in-Chief. Such a man was available, and was eager for what most people considered a painful job: General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was appointed.

General de Lattre had been Commander-in-Chief of the ground forces of the First French Army in World War II, and was, at the time he was called to Indo-China, Commander-in-Chief of the ground forces of the Western Union. It might be said that his roman nose and aristocratic profile are indicative of his character: he is a firm-handed, self-assured, convinced and convincing staff officer. His jutting chin attests to the fact that he is a hard-driving field officer, offensively minded and tenacious. His bearing and his neat, almost natty, uniforms convey a sense of pride which comes from a worship of the tradition of the professional soldier and a deep devotion to a clearly defined ideal of duty.

General de Lattre's transfer to the Far East accomplished three things: it gave Indo-China the man it needed; it cleared the slate in Europe for General Eisenhower, almost simultaneously appointed Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and it relieved De Lattre of the thankless task of trying to rearm a Europe at that time both physically and psychologically incapable of rearming itself.

Apparently General Juin and M. Letourneau had also come to a number of other conclusions. The most far-reaching of these was that any projected military expenditures would be wasted if not linked to the granting of greater political independence. Hence, at virtually the same moment that General de Lattre was given his command—and he may have demanded this as a prior condition of his acceptance of it—the French brought to a close the Pau Economic Conference (November 27). Since June 29 it had been in continuous session while its members argued with feverish futility from irreconcilable positions: the French that the cost of protection and development which they had underwritten should be repaid by the Indo-Chinese if only by reserving certain privileges and prerogatives for Frenchmen, and the Indo-Chinese that the French had already received a more than just recompense for whatever they had done from

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their exploitation of the colony for a period of almost a hundred years.

Nevertheless, concessions were made finally for turning over to the Associated States a large number of the economic emoluments of French control such as customs, communications, immigration, and foreign trade control.[21] The convention was ratified when M. Letourneau accompanied General de Lattre to Indo-China in mid-December. Sadly enough, much of the value of this new policy was lost, for just as the modicum of independence granted Indo-China in the agreements of March 8, 1949, seemed a direct result of the victory of the Communists in China, so the rapid dissolution of French objections at the Pau Conference seemed closely related to the defeats of the autumn. The course of events appeared to follow the time-tested syllogism that French political concession is consequent upon French military defeat.

Yet there was a very real difference in the agreements that the French were willing to make in the autumn of 1950 and those which they had been willing to make previously. This time they gave a guarantee of good faith. They were willing to create a national Vietnamese army and they were, moreover, willing to give complete control of it to the Vietnamese themselves. Such a gesture was testimony that the Pau agreements were made in all honesty. It also marked an about-face in French colonial policy, and a milestone in French colonial history.

As has been pointed out above, the idea of a national army, or armies, for Viet Nam and the other states of Indo-China is by no means a new one. It had been bruited about in 1938, and was at the time much favored by the military as the only possible way of helping the Vietnamese and others to help themselves against the Japanese, but the idea was never actually put into practice. After the war, and particularly after the rebellion had gotten under way in 1946, the talk was resumed. Little came of it, however. Against it, there was the European colonial soldier's traditional conviction that native troops needed . . .

[21] Doc. No. 44, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, May 29, 1951.

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"stiffening," for one thing, and hence natives were used only as *supplétifs*, as auxiliaries to swell French troops. (The idea, incidentally, was patently absurd, for the fighting qualities of the Annamese had been tested both in the wars against the French and with the French against the Germans in World War I.) Against it also was the hard fact of the natives' past unreliability. Since the last war there have been numerous cases of desertion to the Viet Minh, and, on occasion, units have been reported to have murdered their officers and decamped with the resistance.[22] Hence the French were far from anxious to arm Vietnamese who were not under close supervision. General Carpentier even went so far as to tell a reporter of the *New York Times* that he would resign rather than submit to direct U.S. military arms aid being given to native forces.[23] The fact that so many of Ho Chi Minh's arms are of American manufacture, having passed from the Chinese Nationalists to the Chinese Communists to the Viet Minh, is in itself emphatic warning as to the end result of an unfortunate arms policy.

However, it was quite obvious that without the Vietnamese being armed, no matter how great the danger, there could be no victory in Indo-China in the foreseeable future, and even a continuing stalemate seemed uncertain. Furthermore, it was no secret that unless such an army were completely out from under the thumb of the French officer it would receive no support from local authority—support without which it would continue a military nonentity. Hence, on December 8, a new Franco-Vietnamese military convention was signed which abrogated that of the year before (December 30, 1949) and recognized that the army when formed would come under the exclusive and direct authority of the Emperor instead of the French High Command. Even the French cadres of Bao Dai's army were to be under his command and would wear his uniform. Still, despite the future benefits which might be expected to accrue from this legislation, what was seriously needed in Indo-China at the time was a miracle, and miracles cannot be expected as by-products of legislation.

[22] Clementin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 296-97.

[23] *New York Times*, March 9, 1950.

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To anyone who had followed the situation in Indo-China for any length of time, the defeats of the autumn of 1950 seemed a sort of just retribution for all the mistakes which had been made and all the things which should have been done and were not. Above all, the final outcome seemed as inevitable as the coming of nightfall. Hence the fact that the French were in Tonkin Province a year later must be explained in terms of the remarkable.

III

From the moment of his arrival in Indo-China on December 9, 1950, General de Lattre was a marked success, despite the fact that a forceful personality such as his was bound to worry and to irritate, initially, both the military and the civil, not to speak of the Vietnamese, to whom any reassertion of French power poses the threat of a recrudescence of French supremacy. He brought his wife to Indo-China and countermanded the order evacuating families from Tonkin. He made little speeches calculated to appeal to the heart of a soldier by calling on his pride in himself as a man. Simultaneously he cracked the whip of military discipline. A certain juggling of command positions had already taken place. He instituted others.

De Lattre's chief contribution, however, lies in the fact that he instituted a military policy in line with military reality rather than political fiction. In a semicircle around Hanoi and Haiphong he dug a peripheral defense in much the same way that the U.N. forces had around Pusan a few months before. Controlling the interior lines of communication with adequate fields of fire across the rice paddies and having the motorized strength and heavier firepower, he was able to organize mobile units which could be thrown into a threatening breach in a short time. These defenses he has been strengthening ever since, and has presently completed 600 of a planned 1,200 units of fortified bunkers. When he visited the United States in the autumn of 1951, many of the materials which he requested were to be

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used in further strengthening these defenses.[24] But that does not mean that he is one who suffers from a Maginot Line mentality. On the contrary, he thinks of his panoply of fortified positions on the Red River Delta as a springboard from which he can launch attacks against the enemy in much the same way in which the enemy have launched attacks against him from the security of mountain hide-outs. This policy is in line with his philosophy of war, which he had translated into action when he helped to form French military thought after World War II along radically different, tactically aggressive lines. He simply brought his ideas on the utility of the *corps d'intervention*, or task forces, to Indo-China. Almost from the first he has sent amphibious troops up the rivers, ground forces through the jungles and into the hills, and paratroops out of the sky to harass the enemy and to destroy its well-scattered supplies. With meticulous care De Lattre has managed to rid much of the countryside of the Viet Minh-held villages to which the previous command seemed to have become accustomed, and which, besides being a lair for snipers and terrorists, were important as "dramatic demonstrations of enemy resolve and belief in eventual victory," an attitude the effect of which on the prestige of the Viet Nam hardly needs an explanation.[25] Again, the materiel which he has requested from the United States is indicative of his tactical thinking. He has asked for landing craft and for transport planes as well as for artillery and bulldozers.

General de Lattre, however, had scarcely had an opportunity to put his ideas into effect when his policies were severely tested by a second all-out attack.

Chinese intervention in Korea was recognized as such on November 26, 1950. Shortly thereafter the fresh Chinese divisions were forcing the United Nations' forces back into South Korea once again. Just as the situation in Korea seemed on the brink of disaster for the second time, and after ample warning

[24] *New York Times*, September 14, 1951; and Doc. No. 61, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, September 1951.

[25] *Times* (London), March 7, 1951.

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on the part of Radio Peking as to what disasters were about to befall the French, the Viet Minh jumped off on the attack once more on December 26. But this time they were thrown back with high losses by the now smoothly working mobile units of tanks amply supported by infantry.

The attacks of December were important not simply because they revealed the pattern of strategic warfare in the Far East, and not only because their outcome gave time for the French and Indo-Chinese to implement their new concepts for the winning of the war. They also served to remind General de Lattre that this was a different enemy from any he had fought heretofore. This enemy was not simply a band of guerrillas or "bandits," as they are called in the parlance of colonial wars. This was not just a popular uprising like the wars with the Riffs in Morocco in the late 1930's, wars in which General de Lattre himself had served with the greatest of all France's colonial soldiers, General Lyautey. While General de Lattre was not facing a modern army in the sense that it was highly mechanized, he was facing one in that it had adapted modern tactical concepts to fit the ideology and potentials of a people's war, and had done so with ominous success. This army, which the lawyer Vo Nguygen Giap developed under the over-all direction of Ho Chi Minh, has gained many of the tactical advantages for which the Western armies rely on mechanization. It has done so through a careful co-ordination of front-line and secondary troops while on the offensive; while on the defensive it has developed camouflage into a tactical principle—so that partisan groups transform themselves into seemingly peaceful farmers—thus negating the advantages of firepower. Human pack animals are substituted for motor transport along the mountain trails, and woman labor for road-building machinery. In other words, the training and tactical use of the Communist armies of Ho Chi Minh are one further reminder, if such is needed, that tactical principles stem from political philosophy, and that the tactical thinking of democratic nations with a liberal tradition is not that of the Communist world. In the former the individual is the measure, the machine an expendable item;

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in the latter men are used and expended as munitions and machines.

Actually, the December attack started several weeks before the first blood was drawn. It began with a vicious attack upon the French in the Peking *People's Daily*, charging them with violation of Chinese territory. Viewed in the light of what had just happened in Korea, it was an effective opening barrage. Had this psychological preparation not come up against the infectious optimism of the new Commander-in-Chief, it might have had a stultifying effect upon the will of the already weary troops. Then Communist pressure was applied around the perimeter of the defense, while within acts of sabotage and terrorism increased, having an effect both psychological and physical, resembling that of sporadic air raids. Simultaneously, in the south, a wave of terrorism struck which was designed to pin down French forces there while those in the north were defeated separately. (It was the fact that General de Lattre unexpectedly took the risk of flying these troops to the north, instead of leaving them to chase the shadows of the insurrectionists in the south, that made the Viet Minh defeat in the north so conclusive.) The new Communist campaign demonstrated that radio communication in conjunction with a striking force that is both well disciplined and omnipresent can be used for the same purposes and achieve the same effect as a heavily armed diversionary task force. Moreover, the Viet Minh use of terrorists behind their opponents' lines necessitates such a strong police force on the part of the latter in order to insure their defense in depth that front-line troops are seriously depleted. In theory and to some extent in practice, the over-all effect of this use of partisan forces in conjunction with front-line ones, with the front line advancing and gradually absorbing the auxiliary groups, is like that of an avalanche which, as it hurls itself forward, gains in size and destructive force. The phenomenon is typical of the Communist view of the essential inseparability of front-line and partisan troops, and in an area like this in which the native population is loyal to Communism, the concept is singularly suitable.

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Of course, in order to wage a war of this sort, intelligence must be accurate and must be received with the greatest rapidity. The Viet Minh intelligence service is terrifying in its efficiency. Speaking of the rebel army, one observer wrote: "The army uses a closely meshed intelligence service which covers all the territories of Indo-China and pushes its antennae into the French civil and military organizations."[26] Hence, without aerial photographs and other technical aid the army and partisan groups are nonetheless able to strike with devastating accuracy. When the reservoir of Hanoi was blown up early in 1951, it was done with the efficiency of modern aircraft using torpedoes for the same job.

Other factors are also necessary for the prosecution of a successful classic Communist insurrection such as this. One is devotion and another organization. The Communists have both. Essentially they are complementary, as both spring from the same source—the unique position of Ho Chi Minh as leader of a warlike people.

In these matters, Ho Chi Minh started with certain advantages that his fellow revolutionary to the north, China's Mao Tse Tung, did not have. Instead of soldiers whose traditional place on the social ladder was on the bottom rung, as was the case in China, Ho Chi Minh commands soldiers many of whose fathers and grandfathers were proud to fight both with and against France. The profession of arms has always been an honorable one in Indo-China. Furthermore, these men have been psychologically prepared for war by systematic propaganda as well as by tradition. The Communists have minced no words about the fact that it will be war and war alone which will bring "freedom" to Southeast Asia. This ideological line was established at the Regional Meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth at Calcutta in February 1948, and was endorsed by the Asian and Australian Trade Union Conference at Peking late in 1949. In the opening speech at Peking, Liu Shao-chi himself told the delegates, "It is necessary to set up wherever and when-

[26] Colonel Marchand, *L'Indochine, dans le cadre de l'Asie et ses problèmes actuels*, Paris, 1949, p. 204.

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ever possible a national army which is led by the Communist Party, and is powerful and skillful in fighting its enemies. . . ." In the Communist scheme of things, war in the colonies is of immeasurable value in that it weakens the Atlantic powers, whose economic structure, so the theory goes, is based on exploitation of colonies, "the rear bases of world imperialism, on which it relies for its existence."[27]

Moreover, Ho Chi Minh has the double advantage of being a Communist, and hence having the support of Red China, and of being considered by many of the Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians as the real heart of the nationalist aspiration of each of these states. The situation is the result, first, of the fact that the French have never encouraged, or even allowed, any moderate constitutional party comparable to the Indian Congress Party to exist; hence the Communist Party has absorbed nationalist aspirations without competition. Second, whereas extreme nationalism was sponsored elsewhere in Southeast Asia by the Japanese during World War II, Indo-China's colonial status was preserved in the interests of Japan's Vichy ally, and French soldiers were allowed to suppress Vietnamese nationalism. Third, Indo-Chinese nationalism developed in conjunction with Chinese Communism rather than with narrow Kuomintang nationalism. The London *Economist* of November 4, 1950, summed it up neatly this way: "Because of these factors in the situation it is not enough to regard the Viet Minh as a nationalist movement whose leaders happened to have past Communist associations; it was rather because of the Communist predominance in it that Ho Chi Minh emerged as the leader." In other words, Ho Chi Minh has a stronger position in Southeast Asia than any of the other Communist leaders because he gained strength in a period when he was the incarnation of nationalism and when there was no alternative to him.

Ho Chi Minh's own genius plus that of Vo Nguygen Giap have created an organization which, all told, according to General de Lattre, has some 360,000 soldiers, roughly a third of

[27] Quoted in Milton Sacks, "The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia," *Pacific Affairs*, XXIII, No. 3 (September 1950), 232-33.

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which are front-line troops. The rest are organized into guerrilla bands and village militia which are divided into sectors under a committee and given orders by courier and radio. Control is further centralized by the armies' political commissars whose particular responsibility is the direction of political orientation within the army and the co-ordination of materiel supply between army and populace. That there is, all things considered, an efficient supply system is amply demonstrated by the amount of goods which the French raiding parties have from time to time been able to confiscate. But, of course, in the realm of supply this would be an army of sticks and stones were it not for the Chinese across the border.

In 1944 Vo Nguygen Giap was reputed to have approximately 10,000 men at his command armed with some United States weapons. In 1945 he was able to get hold of supplies belonging to surrendered Japanese, but it was not until recently that China began to give the Viet Minh the wherewithal to attack in strength. The French report that serious Chinese assistance began with a military assistance agreement which was signed in April 1950 during a trip of Ho Chi Minh to Tonkin. By August unarmed Viet Minh troops were seen crossing the border into China to return armed shortly thereafter, and supplies were crossing to the Viet Minh troops in Central Annam by junk from the island of Hainan. It was estimated that 20,000 Viet Minh troops were trained in China and armed for the September offensive. Divided into light and heavily armed battalions, they were equipped with bazookas, light artillery, all sizes of mortars, heavy machine-guns, and light anti-aircraft. Training schools prepared officers and non-commissioned officers with a cadre of Chinese officers,[28] apparently assisted by German deserters, although long before that the Viet Minh had had schools of its own. In addition, there was every effort being made to increase the literacy of the people, a valuable asset in that it makes them the more susceptible to propaganda, and simultaneously the more valuable in war. And in village organiza-

[28] Doc. No. 26, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, November 10, 1950. For further detail, see London *Times*, March 8, 1951.

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tions within the Viet Minh area, young men and old, women and children, were learning by association the ways of the guerrilla. It is perhaps too often forgotten that there is nothing to which the human mind takes more readily than the simpler methods of destruction, and that therefore under proper geographic conditions guerrilla warfare, like crime, is self-perpetuating.

Such in briefest outline is the organization against which General de Lattre was fighting. It was tough, experienced, intelligent in the ways of war. It was being given psychological and materiel aid from the north. Yet, although it seemed virtually indestructible, General de Lattre was convinced that sooner or later the war in Indo-China would be won. The first step was to see to it that Ho Chi Minh was not in Hanoi on New Year's Day as he had boasted he would be. He was not.

IV

There was, however, little respite for the Commander-in-Chief or, for that matter, the High Commissioner. De Lattre was busy in both capacities, and in both he must have found the local scene bitterly disheartening.

On the Communist side there was enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. That had been evident in the manner in which the attacks were carried out. Among the Vietnamese there was none. They were waiting. On the enemy side there were trained officers. On the Vietnamese there were none. Above all, on the side of the enemy there was political unanimity, and in Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos there was almost none. Military disunity was therefore the order of the day.

It would be very difficult to imagine a more heterogeneous group of fighting men than General de Lattre found in Indo-China. Conscious of military history, he undoubtedly noted that his position was not unlike that of a feudal king and his problem was in essence that of creating a feudal army out of such disparate elements as independent bishops, lords, and freebooters. In all, as of January 1951, there were some 250,000

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assorted troops, of which perhaps 100,000 had to be watched to be sure that they did not desert to the Viet Minh. They ranged from local militia, armed village guards, and armed plantation guards to excellent regular troops such as those of the Caodaists. Furthermore, their loyalties were as diverse as their armament and state of training. There were the troops of the Emperor and those of the kings of Cambodia and Laos. There were conglomerate tribal groups such as those of Thais, Maus, Meos, and so forth. More important by far, there were also the troops of the various religious groups: those of the Caodaists and those of the Catholic bishops. But although these were anti-Communist forces, to be sure, they were not necessarily by the same token in favor of the Emperor Bao Dai. And finally there were certain chieftains who were apparently against everyone and who with their personal following were ready to fight all comers. Such a one is Colonel Trinh Minh Te, at one time acting Chief of Staff of the Cao Dai sect who, falling out with them, marched with 2,500 men to an area one hundred miles north of Saigon where he set up his own regime and even his own radio station—which still broadcasts nightly against both sides.[29] It follows of course that these troops fight with spirit or without it in direct ratio to their enthusiasm for the cause at any particular moment. For example, even the military correspondent of the Catholic newspaper, *Figaro*, disparaged on one occasion the solidity of the Catholic forces of the Bishop of Phat-Diem. The history of the political equivocation of the Bishop, who was once an advisor to Ho Chi Minh, seems to serve as an explanation for the military indecision of his troops.

In the darkness of this situation, it might seem that the Vietnamese would themselves make efforts in the direction of unity against a common enemy. Yet what political strides have been made were in the direction of wiping out political opposition rather than in seeking to unite all parties in a common cause. It appears therefore that the steps taken have been in the wrong direction. Explanations for this state of political myopia are easily found, but they do not suggest a cure. There is no political

[29] *New York Times*, October 2, 1951.

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tradition of unity, particularly in Viet Nam, and there are localisms—religious, tribal, and sectional—hoary with age. Northerner and southerner do not see eye to eye even in the matter of loyalty to the Emperor, hence political co-operation is not possible without outside pressure. Yet outside pressure actually has little effect, for it must be remembered that in Asia Communism is viewed less as a threat than as a proposition. Until recently this has been particularly true of the Viet Minh, for while being "socially aggressive," it has also managed to appear quite moderate.[30] In addition, in its advocacy of extreme racial propaganda the Viet Minh steps beyond Communist Party limits, and makes a strong appeal to certain rightist groups. Finally, there is the intangible that although people get tired of war, they also get used to it. Chaos in time comes to assume the guise of the normal, and the appeal to unity loses its enchantment. It is not difficult then to understand why it is that political rivalries continue in Indo-China, why the position of Tran Van Huu, President of the Viet Nam Council of Ministers, is such a difficult one.

After the December 1950 successes, President Huu was ordered to dissolve his cabinet and constitute a new one more representative of the land. (There could be no question of elections, of course, for the Viet Minh would probably get a majority in any free election.) For weeks, however, the matter remained in abeyance; it was obvious that President Huu was having difficulties. Apparently there were two good reasons why: he was considered too pro-French by some of his colleagues, and he had the air and the political manners of a man too ambitious, too domineering, and perhaps too unscrupulous to be liked or considered reliable. There was firm foundation for the first conjecture at least, for it was the French who had given Huu the nominal reins of power by insisting in April 1950 that Bao Dai replace the then Prime Minister with the more reliable Huu. But the second is largely a matter of point of view: his friends call him energetic rather than ambitious,

[30] Richard J. Coughlin, "The Republic and Viet Nam," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIX, No. 19 (November 8, 1950), 203-17.

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forceful rather than domineering. At any rate, his inability to work out a *modus vivendi* with the other political parties and particularly with the Dai Viet—while obviously not a matter of immediate importance, in view of the lack of arms and money—could not and cannot but harm the creation of a national army.

Briefly, what has happened has been that President Huu has had to take over more and more of the important offices of state in his own person. No one will or can fill them. To take one example, Nguyen Huu Tri was prevailed upon to take the post of Minister of National Defense. He was a man of much energy who commanded considerable respect, particularly in the province of Tonkin of which he was governor. But quite suddenly at the end of February 1950 he left office and went off to Hong Kong. By no means unique, the story behind his departure is a typical example of the close relationship between the military and the political in Indo-China. It seems that the Dai Viet party either was or was thought to be building up an army of their own in Tonkin where their party is strongest. Certainly they were doing all in their power to exercise tight control of the province, and by so doing had incurred the wrath of Catholic elements.[31] Hence, apparently Huu felt that to maintain centralized control he had to rid himself of Tri first, then the Dai Viet party.

The sordid situation among the political parties convinced General de Lattre that it would be best to leave them to their own devices and concentrate his attention on immediate things, things which both had to be and could be done. Early in March he went to Paris and demanded military reinforcements despite the fact that France had only five divisions on the continent of Europe, while she already had eight in Indo-China.[32] Possibly through a combination of threatening to resign and holding out real promise for the future, he managed to secure the 12,000 men for which he asked. He then flew back to Indo-China to repel a new attack by the Viet Minh, a desperate one designed

[31] *New York Times*, February 22, 23, 1951.

[32] Doc. No. 33, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, January 1951.

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to defeat the French before the reinforcements came. (As before, this was co-ordinated with a drive by the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans.) Once more the Viet Minh failed. This time Ho Chi Minh announced that he would return to guerrilla warfare. In addition to suffering reverses, he also expected to be hobbled in the matter of supply, for in the north at the time the situation was grim indeed for the North Koreans and their Chinese allies. In all probability he was told that the flow of supplies which had been coming south would have to be diverted to Korea.

From the end of March until the end of September, there was only one sharp attack in Indo-China, and that took place at the end of May and the beginning of June. For De Lattre it was a tragic action because in it he lost his only son, but from an over-all point of view it was not serious. Aside from directing this one defensive operation, the General has spent his time preparing for the future. He has applied pressure in three directions. First, he has exerted military pressure through raids and bombing attacks with napalm—the jellied gasoline which ignites on contact. The raids have given a modicum of confidence to the peasant who has seen the Viet Minh being driven out of the lairs which have been theirs so long. The napalm has played havoc with the supplies of the Viet Minh as well as with the villages of the rebels. Also on the village level, De Lattre has continued the work of his predecessors in establishing local auto-defense units, organizations similar to those of volunteer firemen. Second, he has seen to it that schools have been established to create officers and non-commissioned officers for the Viet Nam Army. Third, however belated the action seems, he has finally been able to persuade the government to order the complete mobilization of Viet Nam. Although general military service could not be put into effect immediately because of a lack of cadres and arms, the order does mean that the army can call up certain needed specialists—doctors, for example, of which there was not a single one with the Vietnamese forces

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who was himself a Vietnamese.[33] Finally, because he has been a successful military man and because, as High Commissioner, he has insisted that the Pau agreements be carried out to the letter, he has been able to persuade a number of the fence-sitters to join the forces of the Emperor and a good number of the predominantly anti-French youth of the country to join the army and defend *their* country.

Thus General de Lattre has had the satisfaction of being able to organize three light infantry divisions and one light mountain division. (Of the former, one is currently being used to carry out the pacification of the Transbassac region, the second has been taking part in the defense of the Red River Delta, and the third, only partially formed, is in central Viet Nam.) Of these the light mountain division is the most developed, for besides being up to strength, it has its own staff and services. In addition to these organized units, the auxiliary troops or *supplétifs*, not counting the forces of the Catholic bishops, the Caodaists, or the Hoa Hao, members of local religious sects, have increased from 29,000 to 43,000 men. Finally, there is a draft of 60,000 men which the Emperor has called up.[34]

All these troops need more arms and munitions than are presently available in Indo-China. Thus it was that in September 1951 General de Lattre called upon the United States for aid. Of course, the United States has for some time been helping the French in Indo-China. Enthusiasm for the task has increased in direct proportion to the willingness of the French to concede freedom to the Associated States and to organize natives into fighting forces. Policy has been based on the philosophy expressed by President Truman, "Freedom cannot grow and expand unless it is protected against the armed imperialism of those who destroy it"—a philosophy which he implemented when, two days after the invasion of South Korea, he promised that military supplies to Indo-China would be increased. Hence funds for rehabilitation have gone along with military supplies, and to as great a degree as possible they have been given directly

[33] Doc. No. 52, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, July 19, 1951.
[34] Doc. No. 29, *ibid.*, September 5, 1951.

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into the hands of the Vietnamese. But because of the Korean War, the promised supplies to Indo-China have been behind schedule. General de Lattre recognized that United States aid, particularly in the line of aircraft, had contributed vitally to the holding of the Red River Delta, but he felt that Korea was being given priority over Indo-China. Contending that he was fighting the same war against China that the United Nations were fighting in Korea, he sought an equal priority in supplies. He expressed this hope when he came to the United States in September 1951 at the invitation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a series of conferences and visits to American military posts.

Testimony that De Lattre's appeal was well received came out in a State Department dispatch on September 23. It announced that the military aid program had been re-examined with the result that considerable improvement would be made in the rate of delivery of various items. It announced further that consideration would be given to the matter of additional aid to the French and Vietnamese forces in the year 1952. Then, as though in direct answer to General de Lattre's plea, rifles for four of the eight divisions for which he had requested equipment arrived in Indo-China on October 1.[35]

V

While the crisis in Indo-China may well be worked out with arms and equipment, with co-operation and economic aid, and although there is presently no doubt that the Franco-Vietnamese forces can hold off the Viet Minh indefinitely, there is always the guillotine of Chinese intentions hanging over General de Lattre's head. In the vanguard of unanswerable questions is what will China do next. A Communist victory in Korea would, after all, mean little in the form of material gain, On the other hand, victory in Indo-China, or even in Tonkin alone, would mean coal and rice for starving China, and would have the double value of taking these products away from Japan, to which much of each is being exported at present. Moreover,

[35] *New York Times*, October 2, 1951.

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Red China might not find it too difficult to win in Indo-China. The naval forces which have contributed so much to United Nations success on the Korean peninsula would do less harm to any enemy in Viet Nam. Even more important, for Indo-China there would be no base such as Japan has afforded for the war in Korea. A final worry lies in the thought that were the Communists defeated in Korea, they might well turn to Indo-China, hoping to find in victory there a balm for wounded pride.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Communists gain much from having the war drag on and on. Sudden victory might be the gust which would spread the conflagration into general war. It is perhaps to Communist advantage to avoid this: slowly burning wars in the East keep a million men fighting in an area far removed from the areas of primary importance in the great struggle. Furthermore, the Chinese have suffered incalculably in the slaughter of North Korea, and may well be loath to see more die in Indo-China. There is also the point that the Chinese, despite the protestations of Ho Chi Minh to the contrary, are not and never have been popular with the Vietnamese or the other Indo-Chinese. They have been the middle men in Indo-China, the moneylenders and the shopkeepers. The consequent dislike of the Chinese was exacerbated when they occupied the northern part of Indo-China at the end of World War II. Recently the *New York Times* noted that a French newspaperman had been assassinated just after running an article pointing out that should the Viet Minh win, the Chinese peasant would surge south and expropriate the land of the Vietnamese.[36] Thus it is not improbable that the Chinese would hesitate to move in on Indo-China. A final possible deterrent to Chinese attack is the fact that one of the tenets of Communist doctrine seems to be that indigenous Communists should bring about the revolution with a minimum of help from the outside. Whether the Chinese would actually stand peacefully by while the government of Ho Chi Minh was destroyed by a new Vietnamese Army is another and perhaps academic question.

[36] *Ibid.*, January 13, 1951.

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Barring another eruption of Red China, the outline of the immediate future in Indo-China seems clear—even through the haze of war: At Sadek, a little town south of Saigon, at a public reception on July 31, Brigadier General Charles Marie Chanson, French Commissioner in southern Indo-China, and Thai Lap Than, the governor of South Viet Nam, were killed—blown up, to be precise, by an assassin. . . . In August, it was reported that fresh partisan groups were infiltrating behind the French lines to take the place of those which the French had expelled or destroyed. It was said that young men were being taken away to the hills for military training.[37] . . . On September 18 a landing craft proceeding through a mine-swept channel was blown up with 68 dead and 56 wounded. Released from the bottom of the channel by "Viets" (as the French call the Communists), a mine had sprung up into the craft's line of passage. . . . On October 30 the French High Commissioner in Cambodia, Jean de Raymond, was slain by one of his houseboys while taking an afternoon siesta. . . . More and more news came out of Saigon in the autumn of 1951 to the effect that the Chinese were increasing their aid to the Viet Minh despite their concurrent difficulties in Korea. . . . It was reported that a camp at Nanning across the Chinese border was capable of handling 20,000 troops, and that a railroad was being built from Nanning to Langson, the largest town held by the Viets and an important former French garrison. Possibly these developments were the result of the visit of a large Viet Minh delegation to Peking early in August. . . . In the late spring of 1951 the Communist Party in Indo-China had been openly reconstituted. It emerged from behind the gauze curtain of Marxist study groups, and with new Moscow-trained leaders began a tougher, more intransigent policy as the Lao Dong, or Workers' Party. It was designed as an antidote to the poison of defeatism which was spreading through the Viet Minh: it will doubtless be effective. . . .

The dark memories of a hundred years of warfare seem to persist. It is unlikely that they will be dispelled by the bright

[37] *Times Weekly Edition* (London), August 8, 1951.

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rays of liberal legislation. It is unlikely that the recollection of cruelties perpetrated by such traditionally tough soldiers as the Legionnaires and the Senegalese will be rubbed out by a change of policy. Vo Nguygen Giap will never forget that his wife died in a French jail. Others will nurse other wounds.

Viet Minh attacks began again when the dry season started at the beginning of October. They were thrown back, but they will be renewed. One conclusion to which any observer must come is that while the Chinese supply the coals of war, the draught of hatred will keep them burning. And until France is strong enough and Viet Nam willing enough to face China's troops, many of the people will stand on the edge, and, waiting, will try to survive till a happier day.

On the other side, there is cause for optimism: Out of the doldrums of inactivity a national army is slowly coming into being in Viet Nam; by the middle of September 1951 upwards of a thousand junior officers were being or had been trained for it. . . . In late August Ho Chi Minh admitted that his troops were not adequately fed. . . . Almost simultaneously, French and Vietnamese forces destroyed or captured stores amounting to 1,400 tons of rice, 900 tons of paddy, 80 tons of salt, and 20 tons of miscellaneous foodstuffs. . . . A military camp was destroyed, together with workshops.[38] . . . On September 22, for the first time since the beginning of the war in Indo-China, a military post was established in the forest of An-Nhon-Tag in South Viet Nam in a region considered one of the most important redoubts of the Viet Minh. . . . On October 1 the completion of a typical operation, one christened "Operation Lemon" because of its squeezing nature, was announced. Using 12,000 troops, air, and artillery on the village of Thanh Vein, it had killed 428 rebels and arrested 3,000 persons. . . . On that same day, in a formal ceremony, the French turned over the administration of the Viet Nam Treasury to the Bao Dai Government. It was the last major government department remaining in French hands. . . . More important than anything else as an indication of what the future holds is the increasing number of persons

[38] *Ibid.*, August 22, 29, 1951.

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who are deserting the cause of the Viet Minh. More and more frequently, Ho Chi Minh's men are turning against him and coming over to the other side. . . . United States economic aid is still arriving, as is United States technical assistance. Despite certain disagreements with the French as to how the money should be spent, it is nonetheless being put to work. United States military aid will continue to grow in proportion to the increase in the size of the Viet Nam forces. . . . A military conference held in May 1951 at Singapore co-ordinated the military efforts in Southeast Asia of the British, the French, and the Americans, just as the earlier Colombo Conference had been a step in the direction of co-ordinating the economic efforts of that whole area of the world. . . . The over-all conclusion which may be drawn from the facts is that lassitude is being overcome and the military establishment is not going to disappear completely as seemed possible in the fall of 1950.

The great drag on the military renaissance of the country continues to be the political lopsidedness of the government of Viet Nam. It remains a body which not only does not represent the people as a whole, but, rather more important just at the moment, does not represent the various political factions. Sparsely settled Laos need hardly detain us here, except to remark that any real political control has never been possible among its wild and mountain-dwelling tribes. The situation in Cambodia has seemed rather more serious in that there appeared to be no end to the lapse of authority there. Its government has been tied up in an almost perpetual cabinet crisis. However, elections have taken place recently in both Laos and Cambodia, so there is reason to hope that the situation in these countries will improve. Because of the lack of strong governments the military contributions of these states have received little notice. No attempt has been made to integrate the troops of the Associated States as a whole, and there is no imminent possibility that such an attempt will be made. There is little Communist activity in Laos, and the Cambodian Army is involved at present with its own Communist problem, the Cambodian Issaraks, as they are called locally.

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However, a survey of these governments from the upper levels only gives one an unnecessarily pessimistic picture. Actually the turning-over of the various administrative offices to the Vietnamese, while it may not produce a high standard of efficiency due to their lack of training, will build up a solid core of natives who are loyal to constituted power. These in time will help to stabilize the government.

Thus, although there is room for vast improvement, the outlook is not wholly dark in Indo-China today. The past year has watched the scene change from black to gray, so that at present the situation may be viewed with a certain circumscribed hopefulness. The irresistible force of military necessity may yet overcome the immovable object of political inertia—if time does not desert the cause of Indo-China.

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STALINISM AND THE MEANING OF TITOISM

By ROY MACRIDIS

I

THE Soviet-Yugoslav dispute and the subsequent defection of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the ranks of the Cominform early in 1948 took the world by surprise. This surprise was in itself indicative of our belief that Stalinist control was to be taken for granted at least in the areas where the local Communist parties had come to power through direct or indirect help from the Soviet Union and particularly from the Red Army. Even when no such help had been given, the ideological affinities of Communist states and their need of alliances to preserve the Communist power structures would lead, it was believed, to a tightening of relations with the Soviet Union and to Soviet predominance. In other words, we tended to accept without question the premises of Stalinism.

Yet a more careful study of the nature of Stalinism in its domestic aspects as well as in its foreign policy should have led us to the conclusion that the potentialities of Soviet control were to be measured not in terms of revolutionary or ideological affinities, but primarily in terms of power relations between the Soviet Union and the local Communist parties; and that the nature of these relations was bound to be affected substantially (a) by the inner cohesion, strength, and discipline of the national Communist parties, (b) by their attitude toward the nationalist ideology of their respective countries and by the intensity of this ideology, and (c) by the existence of a Marxist anti-Stalinist ideology. The origin and significance of the Titoist movement in Eastern Europe today can be understood properly only when put in the context of these three factors. Paradoxically enough, the first two factors—the organizational discipline and cohesion of the Communist parties and their attitude toward nationalism—were shaped, as we shall see, in accordance

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with the theory and practice of Stalinism,[1] which we shall have to discuss briefly before we turn to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute.

(1) The first element of Stalinism is an intense parochialism closely associated with the traditional patterns of Russian history: a fear and suspicion of the West—even with Western Communist parties and socialist regimes—and a belief in the self-sufficiency of the Russian society. The initial internationalist impetus of the Revolution was followed, not unlike the cosmopolitanism of the Jacobins, by an intense nationalism. The fruits of the Revolution were to be cherished as something primarily Russian and were to furnish a model to be imitated in a servile manner and never questioned.

(2) The second element of Stalinism follows from the first. Slowly the idea of world revolution gave place to the idea of Soviet national security, Soviet defense, and Soviet national strategic considerations. The difficulty that emerged at the outset was due to the fact that such considerations were ideologically incompatible with the broader aspirations of the Third International, in which Western Communists were prepared to argue on a footing of equality in favor of socialism and revolution. No doubt concessions were to be made for the protection of the Soviet socialist reality—but the Comintern leaders were not willing to see Stalin appropriate to himself the right of the ultimate decision.[2] A curious dilemma emerged which had to be resolved. The Stalinist leadership was interested in the security of the Soviet system, whereas the Western leaders and many Soviet Communists considered the Soviet experiment to be only the beginning of the road toward world socialism—an unfortunate beginning at that, for unless the West was to become socialist and come to its aid, socialist growth in Russia would be stunted. The way in which the contradiction was resolved is too well known to merit any comment. Gradually the Comintern lost its internationalist orientation and became a tool in the hands

[1] Bertram Wolfe's *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York, 1948) and Isaac Deutscher's *Stalin: A Political Biography* (New York and London, 1949) are good introductions to the study of Stalin and Stalinism.

[2] Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948.

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of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[3] The idea of revolution became subordinated to the exigencies of national security and defense of the Soviet Union.

(3) Again, the third element of Stalinism follows from the second. To be able to shape the policies of the Comintern, direct control of the Communist parties of Europe and the world was necessary. As the contours of common revolutionary ideology became dimmer, the Soviet leaders resorted to organizational discipline and in many cases to direct personal control. Even in countries like France[4] and Italy, countries with a rich background of individualism and liberal nationalism, Communist party discipline and conformity to the ever-changing party line began to bind together an ever-increasing number of people.

(4) Finally, the most significant element of Stalinism both at home and abroad has been the growing centralization of authority and power within the party and the Soviet state and the slow erosion of internal party democracy. The Leninist conception of the party found its ultimate fruition in the years after Lenin's death through the establishment of a small self-perpetuating elite concentrating in its hands all decision-making powers.

The period of consolidation of Stalinism lasted well into the late thirties. It involved serious domestic problems: the party had to be periodically purged and reorganized from above; dissident and wavering members had to be removed; reforms had to be instituted for the purpose of building up the economic and military strength of the nation; efficiency and leadership were stressed and institutionalized at the expense of the original Marxist ideals of equality and democratic participation. It meant a foreign policy motivated primarily by considerations of security and self-preservation to which Marxian revolutionary ideology became subordinated. During the war years Stalin resorted to a policy of spheres of influence that would have done credit to the Tsarist secret diplomatic treaties.

[3] It met only three times after Lenin's death and was disbanded during the war.
[4] Gerard Walter, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Français*, Paris, 1948.

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There may be two objections to this sketchy presentation of Stalinism: first, that it underestimates the importance of Marxian ideology and considers Stalinism as a power system operating within the context of secular Russian forces; secondly, that it tends, to the extent to which Marxian ideology is introduced, to relegate it to being a mere instrument or a technique for the execution of policy rather than a significant contributory element in the shaping of policy. In this sense, my interpretation may appear to differ with the one currently given by a number of authors who stress the significance of Marxian ideology with reference to Soviet foreign policy.[5] George Kennan, for instance, points out that Soviet hostility to the capitalistic regimes is due to a great degree to the Marxian ideology, which has taught the Soviet leaders "that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders."[6] Dr. Moore seems to concur entirely, attributing the lack of a *modus vivendi* between the United States and the Soviet Union primarily to the ideology of the Soviet leaders.[7] However, the significance of Marxian ideology must be defined a little more clearly before we attempt to assess its significance in shaping the mentality of the Soviet leaders as well as their policies.

Marxian ideology can, for this purpose, be divided into three broad categories: (a) the Marxian body of "science" which has provided the Soviet leaders with the tools of analysis on the basis of which future developments and trends in the capitalistic world can be predicted; (b) the Marxian and Leninist revolutionary doctrine which, though deduced from the "scientific" body of Marxist thought, can be dissociated from it; and (c) the Marxian utopian ethic which constitutes only a remote goal with little bearing, despite its tremendous propaganda value, upon the actual formulation of policy by the Soviet leaders. This interpretation of the nature of Marxian ideology

[5] Particularly George Kennan's article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, No. 4 (July 1947), 566-82; Barrington Moore, *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power*, Cambridge, Mass., 1950; and Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York, 1951.

[6] *Loc. cit.*, p. 569. [7] *Op. cit.*, Chapter 17.

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makes it apparent that it is not my intention to underestimate its importance, but rather to put it in its proper place and examine it with the proper perspective. There is little doubt that the Soviet leaders continue to use Marxism as a "science" without, however, subordinating revolutionary policy and revolutionary doctrine to the conclusions derived from it. The scientific aspects of Marxism are retained for the purposes of analysis and prediction, but revolutionary action follows only with reference to the strategic and power considerations of the Soviet system. Even Dr. Moore, for instance, admits that "Russian expansion can be explained very largely without reference to Marxist ideological factors" and that revolutionary ideology has "from a goal become a technique."[8] Technique for what? For the preservation and even the expansion of the Soviet system.

Nothing illustrates this better than the manner in which "revolutions" took place in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. As Isaac Deutscher puts it so well in his *Stalin*, the pattern evolved was that of a "semi-conquest and semi-revolution," Marxian revolutionary ideology being used as a tactical weapon for the consolidation of Soviet power over the national Communist parties of these countries. The suspicion and vigilance of the Soviet leaders, which, if we were to follow the broad interpretation of Marxian ideology given by Kennan and Moore, should have been reserved for the capitalistic world, was redoubled for the brother Communist parties. The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, the fate of the veteran Polish Communist Party leader Gomulka and so many others, cannot be explained on any revolutionary ideological grounds.[9] They reveal an inherent insecurity, as well as a concern for domination rooted in the very nature of Stalinist party organization and control, Soviet exclusiveness, and Soviet nationalism. Marxian ideology continues to be a guide for action, but the purpose of action is no longer related to the Marxian revolutionary doctrine, but to the preservation and, under propitious conditions, to the expansion of the Soviet

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 393 and 394.

[9] Adam B. Ulam, "The Crisis in the Polish Communist Party," *Review of Politics*, XII, No. 1 (January 1950), 83-88.

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system. In other words, the revolutionary aspects of Marxism and Leninism are used to promote and to rationalize the defensive or offensive positions of the Soviet Union.

There are a number of contradictions in the Stalinist ideological system as outlined here, contradictions which, with the passage of time and under certain conditions, were bound to come into the open and endanger the whole Soviet power edifice. Soviet patriotism was emphasized in the name of socialism and the socialist fatherland, while every effort was made to establish what amounted to an international control of all national Communist parties. But the Soviet appeal to patriotism and the introduction of traditional values, particularly immediately after the declaration of the war, could not leave the national Communist parties unaffected. The mentality of their leaders was shaped in parochial and national terms, so that it was inevitable that Stalinist nationalism would sooner or later create analogous forms of Communist nationalism in the individual countries of Europe and Asia. When the Germans occupied the whole of Europe, the contradiction was at least temporarily resolved, since each local Communist Party received what amounted to *carte blanche* to fight its own patriotic war against Germany. In so doing, they were of course fighting for their countries and the Soviet Union as well as for a dimly seen socialist future. But slowly the idea of nationalism and national Communism of the Stalinist type gained ground, until finally, with the victory of the Red Army against Germany in Eastern Europe and the Balkans and the "liberation" of these countries, the contradiction between Soviet-inspired nationalism and Soviet international control came once more into the open far more clearly than ever before in the past. Tito was talking the language that Stalin could understand only too well when he wrote, "No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love his country less which is also developing socialism."[10] A great number of

[10] *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute: Text of the Published Correspondence*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1948, p. 19.

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Balkan and European Communist leaders expressed the same thought in practically identical words.

This national aspiration on the part of Communist leaders corresponded to a national Communism of the Stalinist type. In fact, it was an inverted form of Stalinism and as such it appeared, at least to the Soviet leaders, a far more potent foe than the prewar regimes in the same areas of Europe. The possibility of a conflict with the Anglo-Saxon countries made it necessary that these Communist parties and countries be brought quickly under control and the Cominform was established for this very purpose.[11] Significantly enough, the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute occurred at this juncture.

Little need be said about another equally significant contradiction in Stalinist policy. By emphasizing centralized party leadership both at home and abroad, Stalinism came to rely almost exclusively upon a small loyal elite of leaders commanding local support and obedience. As long as the reins of Soviet control could be held tightly by manipulating such leadership, there was no serious danger of defection. But if and when—as happened during the war—local party leadership emancipated itself even to a moderate degree from Soviet surveillance, the dangers of successful defection were great.

So, in essence, two of the three factors which account for Titoism—nationalism and the existence of a strong disciplined party leadership—are derived from Stalinist theory and practice. Under propitious conditions such as war or a relaxation of Soviet international control, these forces were bound to come into the open and challenge Soviet nationalism with the very weapons that were prepared for them by Stalin and his followers. The third factor referred to—the existence of anti-Stalinist Communist ideology—would naturally play a prominent role only when the power friction had reached the final stage of open conflict.

[11] Adam B. Ulam, "The Cominform and the People's Democracies," *World Politics*, III, No. 2 (January 1951), 200-17.

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II

The literature on the history of the Titoist movement[12] has adequately covered the popular origins of the resistance movement in Yugoslavia, its national appeal and strength, and its successes. Tito as a national leader would sooner or later have had to face Stalin—we are told in retrospect. One might have gone a step further and said that two national Communist countries were bound to show the same incompatibilities that bourgeois nationalist countries have showed in the past. The student of Marxism probably could have gone even another step further and raised the question that has been haunting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ever since the expulsion of Trotsky: Might it not be conceivable, in the event of a conflict between two national Communist states, that the weaker of the two would appeal to the hidden store of Marxist literature and revive the two fundamental ideas of Trotskyism—namely, a criticism of Stalinist socialism in the Soviet Union, and a policy of world revolution for the purpose of establishing equality among the socialist nations and developing an economic system consistent with the demands of all the socialist peoples?

As we shall see, Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party followed a policy which slowly shifted from one position to another. In the years from 1944 until well into 1947, the regime had all the characteristics of Stalinism. It was based on strong party leadership which controlled the People's Front, was imbued with a strong ambition to establish socialism in Yugoslavia and industrialize as fast as possible, it was hostile to the West. After the establishment of the new Constitution and the abandonment of the Tito-Subasich agreement, there was no doubt whatsoever that the road to national Communism had been definitely traced by the Yugoslav Communist leaders. Yet, despite strong ideological affinities and despite the adulatory tone

[12] This is only a selected bibliography: Claude Bourdet, *Le Schisme Yougoslave*, Paris, 1950; Josef Korbel, *Tito's Communism*, Denver, Colo., 1951; Stephen Clissold, *Whirlwind*, London, 1949; Hamilton F. Armstrong, *Tito and Goliath*, New York, 1951; Doreen Warriner, *Revolution in Eastern Europe*, London, 1950, particularly Chapters II, III, and IV.

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of the Yugoslav leaders and the Yugoslav press for the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, incompatibilities in the existence of two autonomous Communist states began to appear.

Already in May 1945, Tito had said in a speech at Ljiubljana: ". . . we demand that everyone shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in a policy of spheres of interest."[13] This speech, though directed primarily against the Western powers, was interpreted by the Soviet leaders as an act of defiance of Soviet foreign policy, and we are told that the Soviet Ambassador raised strong objections.[14] Serious difficulties appeared also during the period of Yugoslav resistance. Out of deference to the Allies, the Soviet government maintained diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav government in exile, delayed recognizing Tito, and forced him to disclaim any socialist ambitions.[15]

If such a policy was motivated by considerations of expediency dictated by the war, particularly for the purpose of alleviating the fears of the Western Allies, no such justification could be seriously advanced after the end of the war. Yet events within the satellite countries gave to Tito and to the leading circles of the Community Party of Yugoslavia grounds for concern. The line of the Politburo continued to be very cautious. The French Communists had allowed themselves to be disarmed, General de Gaulle was proclaimed the savior and first resistant of France; the same conciliatory attitude was displayed by the Italian Communist Party, the same hesitation about the fate of the Rumanian king. But what was even more important was the Soviet social policy in the countries "liberated" by the Red Army. In these countries, hybrid regimes known as People's Democracies had been established which were advancing very cautiously in matters of social and economic policy. What was ominous was the definition of the nature of these regimes given by the Soviet authors and leaders. A People's Democracy was

[13] *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, op. cit.*, p. 35. [14] *Ibid.*
[15] Armstrong, *op. cit.*, Chapters IV and V; also Clissold, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIV.

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not considered originally to be a proletarian dictatorship in the Marxian sense. It was not in itself a transitory stage toward socialism, though socialism might be arrived at peacefully. Though a form superior to the bourgeois parliamentary form, since the working class was assuming the leading role and private property was being restricted, it was not socialist and could not be considered as a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was a social form varying in character according to the historical conditions of each individual country.

The leaders of the different Eastern European and Balkan countries repeated this theme with many variations: Dimitrov claimed in September 1946 that in the Bulgarian Republic there would be no dictatorship of the proletariat. "The functions of government were to be performed by an enormous majority of people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, and the people's intelligentsia."[16] The Polish Communist leader Beirut stated that the specific model of the People's Democracy in Poland was not similar to the Soviet socialist model—it was a system "best adapted to the social structure created in our country as a result of the changes caused by the war."[17] A Soviet author wrote that a People's Democracy is not "a proletarian [socialist] democracy. Proletarian democracy is identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat which does not share its power with any other class."[18] The idea of "harmony of classes," of "co-operation" and "gradualism," was emphasized and re-emphasized by the Soviet leaders.

There was probably nothing objectionable in this definition of People's Democracies other than the pretension of the Soviet leaders and authors of maintaining and using arbitrarily the monopoly of Marxist interpretation. In fact, the theories advanced appeared to correspond to the Marxist theory of self-determination[19]: here we had a number of fraternal socialist

[16] Quoted in Edward Kardelj, *On People's Democracy in Yugoslavia*, New York, 1949, p. 13.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[18] I. D. Tzainin, "Democracy of a Special Type," *The Soviet State and Law*, No. 1 (1947), p. 12.
[19] See Wolfe, *op. cit.*, Chapter XXXIII.

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countries striving to establish socialism in accordance with their individual historical conditions. But the truth was somewhat different, for the Soviet definition gave to the Soviet Union the tactical advantage not only of deciding at will the social and economic policies of these countries, but also of deciding the fate of the brother Communist parties depending upon its relations with the West. In case relations with the West deteriorated and the Anglo-Saxon countries showed themselves to be prepared to engage in war, the theory of "harmony" and "collaboration between classes" would serve the purpose of sacrificing some of them to the West, thus giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to prove its pacifist intentions. In the same eventuality, however, the Soviet Union might find it expedient to consolidate its hold upon these countries—an alternative which could hardly be more pleasing to the national Communist leaders. For it meant that such a decision would be made by the Soviet leaders with the following stipulations, which were already being elaborated in theory:

(a) Unswerving allegiance to the Soviet Union.

(b) Realization of the necessity of accepting Soviet military control and economic and political guidance, since by liberating these countries the Red Army had provided the proper conditions for their revolution.

(c) Acceptance of the preponderant role that the "leading socialist nation" or the "largest socialist state"—that is, the Soviet Union—was to play in the consolidation and the economic integration of the socialist world.

(d) Realization that the Soviet form of society, being the most advanced, was the goal towards which each national Communist regime had to strive by following the same path the Soviet Union had followed in the past.

These stipulations were, as has been pointed out already, formulated in theory. By 1947 the Soviet leaders reversed their previous stand in favor of the freedom of each individual country to develop its own way to socialism, and advanced the theory that the Soviet pattern of revolution was to be followed as if it

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were law. The Soviet experience was to be "binding upon all countries."[20]

Taking the cue, the leaders of the satellite countries also reversed their stands. Dimitrov stated that Bulgaria's People's Democracy was after all a dictatorship of the proletariat corresponding to a transitional stage toward socialism,[21] while the Hungarian Communist leader Rakosi defined Hungary's regime as a "dictatorship of the proletariat without the Soviet form."[22]

These changes in definition corresponded to a shift in Soviet international tactics. By 1947 the Soviet Union had decided to consolidate its power and to launch an appeal for resistance on the part of the Communist parties of the Western powers. The Cominform, founded in September 1947, corresponded to this effort at consolidation of the Soviet sphere, and significantly enough its first act was to accept the confession of the Communist parties of France and Italy of their mistake in allowing themselves to be disarmed and in collaborating with conservative parties. The holy war against all parties, including the Socialists, was launched once more. At the same time, a dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed in the satellite countries, the supporting role of the Red Army was underlined in practice, the economic plans of the satellites co-ordinated with the economy of the "leading socialist nation," and leadership was concentrated in the hands of safe Communist Party members. In the traditional Stalinist way, the revolution was controlled from above; the various parties were to be purged before they were trusted; the Russian Soviet example was to be closely followed until the Soviet form was realized; and the principle of self-determination was to mean solidarity with the progressive proletarian Soviet State. And, looming above all, we find the same suspicion toward the West, the same exclusive reliance upon direct Soviet leadership and control, the same exaltation of one national form at the expense of all others.

[20] Burdzalov, "On the International Significance of the Historical Experience of the Bolshevik Party," *Bolshevik*, No. 17 (1948), p. 51 and *passim*.

[21] See his "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Workers' Party," in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (1st Quarter, 1949), pp. 32-34.

[22] Quoted in Kardelj, *op. cit.*, p. 30, from *Sbap Nep* (January 16, 1949).

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III

It was six months after the establishment of the Cominform that the Yugoslav leaders advanced cautiously into a position which could not mean anything else but an open rift with the Soviet Union. Though maintaining friendship for the Soviet Union, they now asserted the need for autonomy and national independence and refused to be integrated in the Soviet bloc under the direct control of the Soviet Communist Party. From 1948 to November 1949, they adopted a compromising attitude and seemed willing to come to terms on a footing of equality. They showed great reluctance, even after their expulsion from the Cominform on June 28, 1948, to undertake any direct criticism of the Soviet Union, and were satisfied to address their remarks and protestations to the other Cominform members. However, after the second Cominform meeting, held in November 1949, when it was realized that no possibility of *rapprochement* remained, the Yugoslav leaders passed on to their third and final position—a frontal attack on the Soviet Union and Soviet leadership. At this stage, the power conflict between the two national Communist states had to be rationalized by Yugoslavia in terms of an ideological position which was both Marxist and anti-Stalinist.

There is hardly any need here to trace the development of the conflict in its historical or even ideological setting.[23] We shall try rather to analyze the major ideological aspects of the controversy as it appears to have evolved in its present form. The literature is indeed immense and the Yugoslav pamphlets[24] and articles show a freshness and vigor unparalleled since Trotsky's

[23] See the bibliography given in note 12.

[24] The most important in chronological order are, for 1948: *The Report of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia*, New York; Tito, *On Nationalism and Internationalism*, Belgrade; Kidric, *On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the FPRY*, Belgrade. For 1949: Melentije Popovic, *Des Rapports Economiques entre Etats Socialistes*, Paris; Edward Kardelj, *On People's Democracy in Yugoslavia*, New York; Milovan Djilas, *Lenin on Relations Between Socialist States*, New York; Tito, *Political Report to the Third Congress of the People's Front*, New York; Edward Kardelj, *Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy*, Belgrade. For 1950: Ales Bebler, *La Classe Ouvrière et le Principe de la Souveraineté du Peuple dans les Rapports Internationaux*, Paris; Milovan Djilas, *On New Roads to Socialism*, Belgrade; Tito, *Les Usines aux Ouvriers*, Paris.

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opposition in the years following Lenin's death. They follow the great lines of the "Marxist-Leninist science." Not for a moment is there a wavering or a conscious departure from Marxism.

Two main themes evolved during the controversy and were fully developed by the Yugoslav leaders: the nature of national independence in a socialist revolutionary period, and the nature of Stalinism as compared with genuine Marxian socialism.

SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE

Yugoslav leaders assert that their People's Front represents the transitional stage of proletarian dictatorship suitable to the particular conditions of their country, and reject both of the theses developed by the Soviet leadership which have already been discussed. According to them, the People's Front corresponds to the specific historical conditions of the liberation struggle in Yugoslavia, in which the middle-class farmers, the poor farmers, and even members of the bourgeoisie as well as the intellectuals participated. This popular mass—representing, according to Tito, over seven million people—is being led by the Communist Party toward socialism. They furthermore assert that each nation should be free to decide on its own form of proletarian dictatorship without having to imitate the Soviet pattern, and every effort is made to show the differences between conditions prior to the Russian and to the Yugoslav revolutions. Yugoslavia is portrayed as a politically more advanced nation: its agricultural system is based upon small farmers; its intellectuals, it is claimed, joined the liberation struggle and the social revolution. "Dogmatic" Marxist interpretations are rejected: "The Hungarian Party did not go through the flames of revolutionary practice in which it would have freed itself of professorial dogmatics and idealist schematism."[25] The Yugoslav Party did! It is maintained, in fact, that the genuineness of the Yugoslav Revolution adds to the socialist experience and provides for new insights which would be lost had one accepted the Soviet allegation that the Soviet experience constitutes a single

[25] Kardelj, *On People's Democracy, op. cit.*, p. 13.

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law that must be followed blindly. Furthermore, the Soviet claim that the proper conditions for the Revolution were created thanks to the intervention of the Red Army is rejected with scorn: the conditions were prepared by the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav Liberation Movement.

The arguments presented above assume special significance with reference to the economic policy to be pursued by the individual socialist states. Again the Yugoslav leaders reject the thesis of the "leading socialist nation," of the "largest socialist state," which is to lead the socialist countries and direct the policies of the socialist world. They advance arguments in favor of autonomy. Each nation, they say, should follow its own road to socialism without interference from outside, though the Soviet state is duty bound to come to the assistance of individual states and help them to build socialism. Needless to say, the first years of economic co-operation disillusioned the Yugoslavs. Every effort was made by the Soviet to retard socialist development: machinery was not delivered; Yugoslavia was asked to concentrate on the extraction of raw materials and the production of foodstuffs, and the exchange arrangements between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union benefited the latter because of its superior economy. So, indirectly at least, surplus value, we are told,[26] was extracted from the Yugoslav worker by the Soviet state.

Finally, in the social field they claim that collectivization of the land was a matter to be decided in the light of concrete Yugoslav conditions, not in the light of dogma or the Soviet experience. As the Minister of the National Economy pointed out,[27] it would have been sheer folly to collectivize the land and to alienate the farmers who were the temporary friends and allies of the working class, instead of concentrating on the very citadels of the capitalistic economy first. Besides, was not Yugoslavia collectivizing faster than the other People's Democracies? If there was a uniform way to socialism, as the Soviet leaders were now asserting, then why was the peasant problem in Yugoslavia to be given a differential treatment?

The crux of the matter is, of course, the question of national

[26] Popovic, *op. cit., passim.* [27] Kidric, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

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independence in a socialist world. The Yugoslav position is that a socialist state is an independent political entity, free to enter into agreements with other socialist states, to become part of a socialist confederation, or to secede. Tito has been hailed with justice as a nationalist and was in fact accused of a nationalist deviation by the Soviet leaders. The difficulty, however, is that he himself has only too often proclaimed his internationalist leanings: "We are nationalists inasmuch as this is necessary to develop among our people a healthy socialist patriotism, and socialist patriotism in its essence is internationalism."[28] To understand this statement fully, one should be reminded of some of the voluntaristic aspects of Marxism, according to which the genuine development of socialist societies automatically brings about the end of national barriers. Socialist patriotism reaches out for the universal elements of human and social behavior. By cultivating the one, we bring about the other. It has nothing to do with the traditionalist or reactionary nationalism of the Burkian type which insists upon the specificity and uniqueness of the national experience. A Socialist is, at least in Marxian theory, an internationalist in the same sense that the Jacobin zealot fighting for the French Revolution and France was fighting for human kind. This idea of self-determination in a socialist world became, of course, a dogma in the hands of Stalin,[29] who saw only its revolutionary potentialities—primarily among the colonial peoples—according to which self-determination or secession from the socialist fatherland was anti-Marxian and Revolutionary, but self-determination and secession from a capitalist country was revolutionary. The principle of self-determination was turned inside out, so to speak, and the Soviet leaders assumed the monopoly of interpreting it to their strategic advantage. It is primarily to this that Tito and the Yugoslav leaders seem to object, and their objection was so well received by the other countries that the Soviet leaders stopped accusing Tito of nationalist deviations. With this, we come to the second major

[28] Tito, *On Nationalism and Internationalism, op. cit.*, p. 14.

[29] Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (Marxist-Leninist Library, Vol. XXXIII), New York, 1935.

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topic of the controversy which, naturally, has gained prominence in the last two years—namely, the study of the nature of Stalinism in contrast to Marxist socialism.

THE NATURE OF STALINISM IN CONTRAST TO SOCIALISM AND THE SOCIALIST WORLD

Among the satellite countries, the repercussions of the Yugoslav-Soviet exchange of letters and the Cominform resolution of June 28, 1948, was so serious that no Cominform meeting was held until November 1949. In the course of a year and a half, the Soviet leaders undertook a vast campaign of purging the Communist parties of the satellites to eliminate all dissident elements. In some cases, as in Poland, direct command of military personnel was entrusted to Russians. By the time the second meeting of the Cominform was held, there appeared to be perfect unanimity in branding Tito a Nazi and Anglo-American spy, an imperialist stooge, a new Trotsky, a militarist, etc., etc. It was at this stage that the Yugoslav leaders passed to a study of the nature of socialism which led them to a frontal attack upon Stalinism, in its domestic as well as in its foreign policy. And it was precisely at this stage that one of the greatest protagonists of revolutionary Marxism, whose ghost had been daily slain in the Soviet Union, re-entered the picture. In the very moment of victory and triumph following the war against Germany, Stalin was once more face to face with his lifelong adversary. For the criticism against the Soviet Union that the Yugoslav leaders advanced came almost literally out of Trotsky's *Revolution Betrayed* and *The Real Situation in Russia.* The concrete experience they had in their dealings with the Soviet power led them to a position which vindicated, even if twenty years later, the Trotskyite opposition.

The criticism of the Soviet leadership is put succinctly by one of the Yugoslav leaders in a pamphlet called *On New Roads to Socialism.*[30] The indictment is long indeed: unequal relations with and exploitation of the other socialist countries, un-Marxian

[30] Djilas, *On New Roads to Socialism, op. cit., passim.*

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treatment of the role of the leader, inequality in pay greater than in bourgeois democracies, ideological promotion of Great Russian nationalism and subordination of other peoples, a policy of division of spheres of influence with the capitalist world, monopolization of the interpretation of Marxism, the abandonment of all democratic forms, etc., etc.[31] The conclusion is obvious: Stalinism represents a deviation of Marxism and must be combated as such. It is nothing else but a deviant social form caused by the backward conditions of Russia, and its essence can be summed up in that magic word that Trotsky employed so often: bureaucracy. "The development of dictatorship of the proletariat," writes Djilas, can ". . . go in two directions: in the direction of its own disappearance . . . or in the direction of transformation of the bureaucracy into a privileged caste which lives at the expense of the society as a whole."[32] It is obviously the latter that has happened in the Soviet Union: a bureaucratic control has been established and gradually extended over all other Communist parties of the world. "If one looked for the cause of weakness of the working class movement," writes Tito, "it is certain that a number of symptoms would lead him to those who claim to be infallible."[33] The result is a bureaucratic control which has stamped out all life from the party, in which leadership has been perpetuated with remarkable monotony, in which the repressive machinery of the state has been developed not so much for purposes of defense but for the purpose of internal control and foreign domination and conquest of brother socialist states, a bureaucratic control, finally, which leads the Soviet ruling caste to an internal economic policy inconsistent with the potentialities of the means of production and which pushes them at last into foreign adventures—since the search for a scapegoat is always the surest way of diverting the people's revolutionary inclinations. Under existing conditions, the future of a socialist world composed of politically

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-18: ". . . the internal contradictions between bureaucratic centralism and the direct producers, that is, the people, inevitably developed into conditions of socialist encirclement, into external contradictions, into a conflict between bureaucratic imperialism and the aspirations of the people for a free and equal life" (p. 18).

[33] Tito, *Les Usines aux Ouvriers, op. cit.*, p. 21.

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independent, democratic nations has become an impossibility and the Soviet Union under Stalin has become an obstacle to the very end for which it claims to stand. Hence the ineluctable conclusion is that, under present conditions, a revolution within the Soviet Union and by the working classes of the satellites is desirable and even necessary. This is the Yugoslav position today, and it is needless to repeat that it is identical to the Trotskyist position.

It is a conclusion that is bound to startle the average observer. When is such an objective to be realized? By what means is Tito proposing to bring it about? For how long is his "arrogance" going to be tolerated? Besides, is this demand for revolution a genuine one? Does not Tito's concept of "socialism in Yugoslavia" come dangerously close to the Stalinist idea of "socialism in one country"? If so, won't Tito be constrained ultimately to put Yugoslavia above socialism and revolution, as Stalin put the Soviet Union in the past? Only speculative answers to these questions can be given, since the development of Titoism as a revolutionary philosophy will ultimately depend upon over-all world relations.

Historically, Titoism can be explained in terms of the nature of Tito's national prestige and power. The Yugoslav Communist Party acted for a long time without direct Soviet interference. It developed into a powerful organization, difficult to break, as has happened with the Communist parties of the other satellites. Furthermore, the People's Front of Yugoslavia was far more popular than the regimes established in the other satellite countries by leaders most of whom came in the wake of the Soviet Army. Conceding all this to be true, we must still admit that it does not explain the present ideological trends of Titoism. For Titoism, in advocating a revolution in the socialist sector of the world at least, is restating Trotsky's idea of world revolution—something which appears to be a negation of the national roots to which he owes his very existence. His ideological position, in other words, transcends the narrow sociological roots of his power and pushes him toward a revolutionary

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position that may lead to his annihilation *or* to the decline of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and the world. And it is precisely at this point that the significance of the factor mentioned earlier —the existence of an anti-Stalinist Communist ideology—becomes apparent. For though Tito and his party have been nourished in Stalinist philosophy, though the roots of their power are to be found in the strong nationalist movement of Yugoslavia, in the cohesion of his party organization, and in the relative autonomy of his party during the war—a coincidence of circumstances which has not as yet occurred elsewhere—he has been forced by the very nature of his position to appeal to a revolutionary ideology which seems to be inconsistent with the nature and source of his power. Isolated from both the East and the West and urgently in need of support, he was forced while maintaining high hopes for a "Titoist" development in China to appeal to the anti-Stalinist Communist forces of Europe and revive the idea of revolution as a strategic weapon and direct it against its main protagonist—the Soviet Union.

Yet this may appear as too optimistic a conclusion. For the exigencies of national power and national security weigh heavily and they constitute concrete realities that cannot be too easily sacrificed. Tito's Stalinist mentality and training, his ambitious plans to develop socialism rapidly in Yugoslavia, the intense nationalism which his movement has generated, are all factors which may in the last analysis outweigh the revolutionary ideology which was evoked by the conflict with the Soviet Union. Such considerations may force Tito into a more definite alliance with the West and may lead him to the same traditionalist concessions that were made by Stalin during World War II.

It is, however, both premature and risky to make any predictions. For Tito has launched a new movement that threatens the ideological and organizational front of the Soviet power and which has demonstrated with unprecedented urgency to the rank and file of the Communists and Socialists of Western Europe the perils of a close alliance with the Soviet Union, particularly in time of victory. And the West might draw its own conclusions from Tito's experience.

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THE HISTORICAL ALTERNATION OF MOODS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By FRANK L. KLINGBERG*

THERE seems little doubt that the defense and strengthening of the "free world" in our time depends largely upon American leadership. Confidence that America will continue to play this role in world affairs is weakened by the memory of America's political isolation following World War I, and by certain currents of American opinion noted by observers since World War II.[1] Barbara Ward warns the peoples of the West that "we shall certainly fail unless our effort is at once sustained, calm and supremely positive."[2]

The American *mood* (including that of the Administration, Congress, and the electorate) has supported deep world involvement for the United States since 1941.[3] Such a policy could not be followed without strong emotional support—connotated by the use of the word "mood." We can characterize this mood as one of "extroversion"—a term applied here to refer to a nation's willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other nations, to exert positive pressure (economic, diplomatic, or military) outside its borders.

The American mood in the 1930's can be called, by way of contrast, one of "introversion"—when America was unwilling to exert much positive pressure upon other nations. Barbara Ward asks: "Would anyone, looking at the mood of the United States

* The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago for advice at various stages in the development of the study; and to Dr. Lewis A. Maverick of Southern Illinois University for guidance in preparing the charts.

[1] Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1950, Chap. 9. The author identifies five special types of "isolationists": Communists, non-Communist "Wallaceites," reactionary-nationalists, pacifists, and extreme internationalists (pp. 224-25).

[2] Barbara Ward, *Policy for the West*, New York, 1951, p. 81.

[3] Many writers use the word "mood," or its synonyms, to describe the "spirit" of a time. E.g., Dexter Perkins, in describing the British-American crisis of 1895, writes that ". . . the whole episode expressed a national mood for which it would be difficult to find a parallel at any time in the twenty years preceding."—*America and Two Wars*, Boston, 1944, p. 7.

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in 1939, have prophesied that only ten years later in 1949 it would be proposing the Atlantic Pact and leading a coalition of nations in a program of effective defense?"[4]

This shifting of moods from introversion to extroversion in the 1940's has been widely recognized. But a question is immediately raised as to the persistence or permanence of the new mood. The very use of the term *mood* suggests a "temporary or capricious state . . . of mind." Can any pattern be observed in America's introvert and extrovert moods?

It is the thesis of this paper that such a pattern is discernible throughout our history as an independent nation—that there has been a rather regular alternation of these moods since 1776. In the first place, a *dominant* mood (introvert or extrovert) can be detected at a certain time, unless it is a period of transition. Secondly, such a dominant mood appears to have persisted for two decades or more, once firmly entered upon. And finally, the alternation or change of mood has occurred before three decades have passed. It appears that this alternation of moods has already taken place seven times since 1776, with four introvert phases (averaging about 21 years in length) and three extrovert phases (averaging about 27 years). The fourth extrovert phase is regarded as having begun in 1940 or 1941. This apparent alternation of introvert-extrovert moods calls to mind the liberal-conservative tides described by Arthur Schlesinger.[5]

These cycles by no means suggest a detailed repetition of American history every fifty years or so. They do seem to describe the emotional pattern or method followed by the American people in the development of the United States from a small nation on the Atlantic seaboard to the active world power it has become. The phases of extroversion have seen expansion and the extension of influence; the phases of introversion have been years

[4] Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[5] In an article on "Tides in American Politics" (*Yale Review*, XXIX [December 1939], 217-30), Schlesinger tentatively predicted that the liberal mood of 1939 would be replaced by conservatism in 1946 or 1947. In his recent book, *Paths to the Present* (New York, 1949), he uses the year 1947 as the "turning point." Schlesinger pointed out six liberal phases (averaging about 16 years each), alternating with conservative phases (about 15 years). His liberal phases began in 1765, 1801, 1829, 1861, 1901, and 1931; the conservative in 1787, 1816, 1841, 1869, 1919, and 1947.

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of consolidation and preparation—"plateaus" preceding the "mountain climbs" ahead.

Furthermore, these cycles do not imply that the American mood has the same "intensity" throughout a phase. Over a twenty-year period there will be many temporary "ups-and-downs"—of more or less introversion in an introvert phase, or of more or less extroversion in an extrovert phase. Any study of the American mood for a short period of time will probably find the temporary fluctuations of opinion more impressive than its stability or consistency. Gabriel Almond's study of American public opinion since World War II stresses what he calls the "instability of mass moods, the cyclical fluctuations which stand in the way of policy stability."[6] In the study of long periods of American history, however, the general or average stability of an introvert or extrovert mood seems more evident.

To explain the thesis more fully, the following topics will be covered, in order: (1) general evidence for the alternations of mood; (2) statistical evidence; (3) a tentative analysis of the thesis (in terms of possible "causes" and a general interpretation of American history); and (4) the possible significance of the thesis.

General Evidence

A rapid survey of American foreign relations will present the general picture of the alternation of moods between introversion and extroversion, with approximate dates. The acts or utterances of the Government are regarded as the basic indices—events such as treaties, wars, armed expeditions, annexations, diplomatic warnings, Presidential messages, and the like. The popular mood can be judged by such means as political platforms, election results, and contemporary writers and speakers. Only the broad pattern will be presented, with the emphasis upon the "positive pressure" (outside our borders) which is regarded as the basic characteristic of extroversion.

[6] Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 239. See also pp. 53-55, 66-67, 88-91. The author suggests, however, that "the era of great fluctuations in American opinion may have passed" (p. 239).

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The American Revolution can be regarded, almost by definition, as the beginning of a phase of introversion (the "Revolutionary" period is unique in our history, but the aim was "withdrawal"). If we begin with the Declaration of Independence in 1776, it may be significant to note that the only attempted invasion of Canada (outside "our borders," so to speak) occurred in 1775 and early in 1776. Although an alliance with France was secured in 1778, its spirit, at least, was violated when peace negotiations with Britain were conducted independently. Following the Revolution, America concentrated largely on internal political and economic problems. Washington's first notable action in foreign affairs was his proclamation of neutrality on April 22, 1793, when Britain and France had gone to war. In his Farewell Address of September 17, 1796, Washington warned against foreign "entanglements and war." Throughout the whole period following the Revolution, we submitted to the enslavement of our sailors by the Barbary States and paid the tribute demanded.

A new "positive attitude" in world affairs was first apparent in 1798, when the undeclared naval war with France began over French interference with our shipping. Tension mounted in 1799, but the treaty of September 30, 1800, ended the immediate difficulty and secured French consent to the abrogation of the treaty of alliance.

With Jefferson's inauguration as President, the new extrovert phase was strengthened. One of the characteristics of extroversion appears to be confidence in the "destiny" and influence of America. In his First Inaugural Address, Jefferson called the United States "a rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich products of our industry, engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye."[7] Reversing our previous response to the challenges of the Barbary States, Jefferson adopted the bold course of sending warships to the Mediterranean to protect our commerce. T. A.

[7] James D. Richardson, *Mess . and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1902*, Washington, 1904, I, 321.

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Bailey notes that "Jefferson's courageous action inaugurated a policy that freed American commerce, strengthened American nationality, and awakened a new respect for the United States."[8] Other typical events of the extrovert phase were: the annexations of Louisiana (1803) and of West Florida (1810), the War of 1812 (motivated in the West by the desire to annex Canada), and the pressure upon Spain which resulted in the transfer of East Florida (1819-1821).

The spirit of the time is illustrated in various Presidential messages. President Madison told Congress in his annual message, December 17, 1813, that "the war, with all its vicissitudes, is illustrating the capacity and destiny of the United States to be a great, a flourishing, and a powerful nation. . . ."[9] In his First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1817, President Monroe stated that "the sentiment in the mind of every citizen is national strength," and "if we persevere in the career in which we have advanced so far and in the path already traced, we cannot fail, under the favor of a gracious Providence, to attain the high destiny which seems to await us."[10]

The end of the first phase of extroversion can be dated near the time of the statement of the Monroe Doctrine (December 1823), and the treaties with Britain and Russia which followed it in 1824. The nation was also thrilled by the struggle of Greece for its independence, and President Monroe announced "our most ardent wishes" for Greek success. During the whole extrovert period the standards of our diplomacy and our diplomatic service were very high.[11] The results were impressive: we had gained vast territories, and had ended the danger of interference by the great naval powers (Britain, France, and Spain), the Holy Alliance, and Russia.

For the next twenty years (1824-1844), the dominant mood was that of introversion. President Adams failed to follow up the friendly gestures of Monroe toward Greece, and the recogni-

[8] T. A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, New York, 1940, pp. 92-93.

[9] Richardson, *op. cit.*, I, 540. [10] *Ibid.*, II, 7, 10.

[11] See, e.g., J. Rives Childs, *American Foreign Service*, New York, 1948, p. 4.

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tion of Greece did not actually take place until 1833.[12] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was opposed to American participation in the Panama Congress of 1826, and our delegates failed to reach the conference in time—the opportunity did not recur until our own invitation of 1889.[13] Andrew Jackson had little experience in foreign affairs, and did not even refer to foreign relations in his Inaugural Address of 1829. Typical events of the period were: Jackson's relatively moderate attitude toward France in the face of the provocative French attitude over the payment of claims (settled in 1836); neutrality during the war between Texas and Mexico (1835-1836), and rejection of the request of Texas for annexation (1837-1838); and compromise settlements of the boundary disputes with Britain (1837-1842).

In 1841, the new spirit of "Manifest Destiny" was given an unexpected stimulus by the accession of John Tyler to the Presidency, following the death of William Henry Harrison one month after his inauguration. By 1843, President Tyler's attitude demonstrated the rise of "expansionism," particularly in his claim to the whole Oregon territory. Tyler's treaty for the annexation of Texas, however, was defeated in the Senate on June 8, 1844, by an adverse vote of 35 to 16.

The nomination and election in 1844 of James K. Polk, an avowed "expansionist," may be regarded as the beginning of a new age of extroversion. When Texas was admitted as a state on December 29, 1845, the first overt act of expansionism since 1821 was consummated. Among the notable events which followed were: the annexation of Oregon (1846); the Mexican War (1846-1848); the annexation of California and New Mexico (1848); the movement to help Hungary during the so-called "Whig Interlude" (1849-1853); the opening of Japan (1853-1854); and the expansionist pressure in the Caribbean, Mexican, and Central American areas under Presidents Pierce (1853-1857) and Buchanan (1857-1861). President Pierce's Inaugural Ad-

[12] Malbone W. Graham, *American Diplomacy in the International Community*, Baltimore, 1948, pp. 87-88, 97-100.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 62-79.

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dress was the first in American history to declare that territorial aggrandizement was an aim of the incoming administration.[14]

During the Civil War, President Lincoln, aided by Secretary of State Seward, handled our foreign relations in general in a masterful and successful fashion. Following the war, the United States continued to play an active positive role in foreign affairs until about 1871. The climax was reached in 1867, with the French withdrawal from Mexico, the purchase of Alaska, and the occupation of Midway Island. Efforts to annex Santo Domingo failed (the treaty was defeated by the Senate on June 30, 1870, 28 to 28). The tension with Britain over the Alabama Claims dispute was dissipated by the Treaty of Washington, signed on May 8, 1871. During the preceding quarter of a century, the continent had been rounded out, national unity had been preserved, and American possessions were reaching far into the Pacific.

A new introvert phase in American history can be dated approximately from 1871. Carl Fish refers to the period from 1872 to 1898 as "the nadir of diplomacy."[15] More logically perhaps, T. A. Bailey uses the same term to cover the period from 1877 to 1889.[16] The new spirit was shown in 1873, when the Spanish seized the *Virginius* and executed fifty-three "pirates" on board, including some Americans. Secretary Hamilton Fish moderated his first demands, and worked out an amicable adjustment.[17]

Bailey uses the phrase "spirited diplomacy" to characterize the administration of Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893), with James G. Blaine as Secretary of State.[18] During these years, the groundwork was laid for the new extrovert mood (which might be dated in a general way from about 1891). Alfred T. Mahan's influential book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, was published in 1890. American marines were landed in Chile in

[14] Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny*, Baltimore, 1935, p. 190.

[15] Carl R. Fish, *American Diplomacy*, 4th ed., New York, 1923, p. 3.

[16] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

[17] See Allan Nevins, *Hamilton Fish*, New York, 1937, pp. 674, 689. Nevins expresses the belief that "had the event occurred twenty years earlier, when the Southern slave-barons were in power, Cuba would immediately have been conquered."

[18] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

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1891, while in January 1892 Secretary Blaine sent an ultimatum to Chile regarding our claims for damages from the death of two American sailors in a Chilean brawl. Blaine also arranged for the appointment of the "annexationist" John L. Stevens as Minister to Hawaii. Following a pro-American revolution in Hawaii in January 1893, Stevens "recognized" the new government, and, on February 15, President Harrison submitted a treaty of annexation to the Senate.

Although the anti-imperialist President Cleveland (elected in 1892) withdrew the Hawaiian treaty from the Senate, he was unable to change the revolutionary government, which waited for another chance. The new activist spirit finally seemed to overwhelm President Cleveland also, however, for he and Secretary of State Olney brought the United States to the very verge of war with Britain in 1895 over the Venezuelan boundary dispute. The move to intervene in the Cuban Revolution, which began in 1895, steadily mounted during the next three years. The Republicans devoted nearly half of their 1896 platform to foreign relations, writing in a vigorous, expansionist tone. The brief Spanish-American War of 1898 electrified the American people. Archibald Coolidge wrote in 1908 that "suddenly, and without warning, the whole situation changed, and the country found itself engaged in a foreign war, and presently, without preparation or design, launched on a career of conquest and expansion."[19] America was again in the mood to march, and the direction was west; in the often-quoted words of George Berkeley, about to set sail for Rhode Island in 1726, "Westward the course of empire takes its way."[20] Senator Albert J. Beveridge stated his belief in 1900 that God had "marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world" and that before the clock of the century had struck

[19] Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, New York, 1908, p. 39. See also pp. 132-33, 325. For analogies to the late 1840's, see Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, New York, 1943, p. 670. S. F. Bemis, however, has referred to the annexation of the Philippines as "the Great Aberration," and Charles A. Beard decries the action as a "breach with the past" in his *Foreign Policy for America*, New York, 1940, p. 61.

[20] Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present*, New York, 1949, p. 257.

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the half hour, America would be "the sought-for arbitrator of the disputes of the nations."[21]

America continued to play an influential role in world affairs up to World War I, under Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson; and this role reached an unprecedented climax with America's entry into the war in 1917. Woodrow Wilson demonstrated a new approach to diplomacy, however, which presaged the coming of a new introvert phase. His aim was domestic reform and nonintervention; he moved quickly in the direction of reversing Taft's policy of "dollar diplomacy." But even in the first two years of his administration, Wilson seemed to be impelled by the "course of events" to take an active, positive role in international affairs, particularly in the Caribbean. Bailey states that "it is an ironical fact that his Administration carried out more armed interventions in Latin America than that of any of its predecessors."[22] Wilson was guided by a moral fervor which he ultimately applied in stimulating Americans to respond vigorously to the German challenge in 1917. The United States annexed the Danish West Indies (Virgin Islands) also in 1917—an event which points to the end of the "expansionist" period which began with the treaty for the annexation of Hawaii in 1893.

Once the die had been cast for war in 1917, the American people responded to the challenge with great energy and fervor. But the groundwork was already being laid for the turn to introversion in 1919 and 1920.[23] In 1919, it must have seemed to many that the main developments in our history (especially in the two previous decades) had all paved the way for our full

[21] Quoted in Weinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 459. [22] Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 596.

[23] The editorials of the *New Republic* are an excellent source for this period. On the 1916 election, see Vol. IX (November 4, 1916), pp. 2 and 34. Many editorials, in 1916 and 1917, clearly presage the criticism of European power politics which led the *New Republic*, among others, to repudiate "Wilson's League" in 1919. Instability of the American mood at this time is suggested by the *New Republic's* claim that the "intellectuals" of the country had "willed American participation" in the war (X [April 14, 1917], 308-9). Republican opposition to Wilson began to mount following the address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, when Wilson appealed to the powers for a "peace without victory." An editorial of February 3, 1917, criticized the Republican party as "the defender of American isolation" (X, 1-2).

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participation in the great postwar experiment for peace. Wilson appeared to be supremely confident when he submitted the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate:

> There can be no question of our ceasing to be a world power. The only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept or reject the confidence of the world.
>
> The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.[24]

But the American mood was shifting. President Wilson, at least, would not be able to lead America into the "promised land" of world leadership. Bemis describes the pattern of United States foreign policy, following the rejection of the League of Nations, as one of "satiated contentment, peace and pacifism."[25] The new introvert mood was intensified with the coming of the Great Depression. Secretary of State Stimson endeavored to play a more active role in world affairs under President Hoover (1929-1933), but he pointed to the difficulties involved, in an article written in 1947:

> I have served as Secretary of State in a time of frightened isolationism, and as Secretary of War in a time of brave and generous action. I know the withering effect of limited commitments, and I know the regenerative power of full action. . . .[26]

The depth of "isolationism" was reached during President Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term (the passage of the Neutrality Act of 1935 is especially noteworthy).

Beginning with his suggestion of October 5, 1937, that aggressor nations should be "quarantined," President Roosevelt helped prepare the American mood for its next shift to extroversion. The year 1940 appears to mark the turning point in

[24] Quoted in Weinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

[25] Samuel F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, rev. ed., New York, 1942, p. 879.

[26] Henry L. Stimson, "The Challenge to Americans," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVI, No. 1 (October 1947), 7.

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American opinion toward the war, following the sudden fall of France. But the "isolationists" remained strong in Congress until the attack on Pearl Harbor. As John C. Donovan recently summarized it: "President Roosevelt left his own great mark on history as an influential world leader, but he was also representative of, and reflected, the wills and efforts of millions of his fellow-country-men, and he was unable to move except in the direction, and largely at the pace, they wanted to go."[27] The typical events, however, in which the United States demonstrated the new mood of "positive pressure" were: the executive agreement of September 2, 1940, by which the United States traded fifty overage destroyers for 99-year leases of naval bases on eight British territories between Newfoundland and British Guiana; the naval and air expansion programs of 1940, combined with selective service; the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941; the landing of American troops on Greenland, Iceland, and Dutch Guiana in 1941; the blocking of Japanese credits and the embargo against Japan in July 1941; and the order of September 1941 to fire on German submarines "at sight" in North Atlantic waters. Since Pearl Harbor, the United States has maintained a strong position in world affairs, with a brief letdown in 1946. Notable events include: Senate approval of the United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2 (1945); the Truman Doctrine and the Rio Pact (1947); the European Recovery Program (1948); the North Atlantic Treaty (1949); the Korean War (1950); the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its armed forces (1951); and the defensive pacts with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines (1951).

It may be helpful to show the introvert and extrovert phases, by approximate dates, in tabular form. It should be kept in mind that the shift in mood between phases normally occupied several years, although specific events in definite years sometimes heralded the new policy of the government.

[27] John C. Donovan, "Congressional Isolationists and the Roosevelt Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, III (April 1951), 316.

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TABLE 1

INTROVERT AND EXTROVERT PHASES

INTROVERT DATES	EXTROVERT DATES
1776-1798	1798-1824
1824-1844	1844-1871
1871-1891	1891-1919
1919-1940	1940-

The special types of events which seem to show extroversion are: annexations (or attempted annexations) of territory, armed expeditions abroad, and strong diplomatic pressures (as Presidential warnings, declarations of war, and the like). The periods which include the great majority of these events, in rather close sequence, are shown in Table 2, along with the "average" extrovert phases of Table 1.

TABLE 2

DATES INCLUDING MAJOR TYPES OF EXTROVERT EVENTS

AVERAGE	ANNEXATIONS	ARMED FORCES	DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES
1798-1824	1803-1821	1798-1824	1798-1824
1844-1871	1845-1867	1846-1871	1844-1871
1891-1919	1898-1917	1893-1919	1889-1919
1940-	1940-	1941-	1940-

From a tabulation of those events in American diplomatic history showing "positive pressure," the number of items in the different phases (Table 1) is as follows: *annexations*—introvert, 0, and extrovert, 22; *armed expeditions*—introvert, 12, and extrovert, 102; *diplomatic pressures*—introvert, 23, and extrovert, 75; *total*—introvert, 35, and extrovert, 199.[28] These figures are weighted heavily in favor of the introvert phases—since many events listed in the latter are of much less significance than those in the extrovert phases.

[28] The events listed were taken in particular from Bailey, *op. cit.*; Bemis, *op. cit.*; James D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 12 vols., Washington, 1904 and 1908; and Lula Caine's comprehensive study from government documents, entitled "Conditions Underlying the Minor Wars and Interventions of the United States," doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1929.

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Statistical Evidence

The charts present further evidence supporting the hypothesis of the alternation of moods. Presidential statements are outstanding sources of information, for the President is uniquely responsible for the conduct of our foreign relations. The annual messages of the President to Congress on the "state of the union" present a regular series of documents which throw light upon the character and importance of our foreign relations as compared to domestic problems, at different times.

A rough quantitative measure of the degree of extroversion in American policy has been secured by calculating the percentages (in lines or words) of each annual message devoted to foreign policy in its various aspects, with the key type of statement (for the purposes of this paper) being concerned with descriptions of, or demands for, positive action abroad (as for expansion of territory or for the use of troops abroad).[29] The classification was made subjectively, yet it is believed that there would be wide agreement as to the meaning and implications of most of the Presidential statements.

Chart A (page 252f.) is a bar graph showing in particular the percentage of each annual Presidential message devoted to "positive political action" by America outside her own borders (this proportion is shaded darkest); also shown is the percentage of each message stressing the importance of foreign relations to the United States, and the percentage devoted to all other foreign relations (including the armed forces and tariff policy). The proportion of the Presidential message devoted to foreign affairs as a whole is the least significant for the purposes of this study, as Presidents have often discussed foreign relations in general at great length, with little or no mention of positive political

[29] The Presidential messages were found in the following sources: Richardson, *op. cit.*; 52nd Congress, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, 18 vols., New York, 1922; Calvin Coolidge, *Foundations of the Republic, Speeches and Addresses*, New York, 1926; William Starr Myers, ed., *The State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover*, 2 vols., Garden City, N.Y., 1934; *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933-1940*, 9 vols., New York, 1938-1941; B. D. Zevin, ed., *Nothing to Fear, The Selected Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1932-1945*, Cambridge, Mass., 1946; other messages in *Congressional Record*, newspapers, and separate official pamphlets.

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

LEGEND

TOTAL COLUMN: PERCENTAGE OF MESSAGE DEVOTED TO FOREIGN RELATIONS.

PERCENTAGE OF MESSAGE EXPOUNDING THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO AMERICA.

PERCENTAGE OF MESSAGE DEVOTED TO "POSITIVE ACTION" OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ABROAD.

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

Graph A. Percentages of Annual Presidential Messages Dealing with Three Aspects of Foreign Relations

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action outside America's borders. Tables 3 and 4 show the average percentages for each introvert and extrovert phase, using the dates of Table 1. A separate column shows the same for the quadrennial inaugural messages (see Chart B for graphs).

TABLE 3

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES DEVOTED TO POSITIVE ACTION OUTSIDE AMERICA'S BORDERS

INTROVERT PHASES			EXTROVERT PHASES		
INCLUSIVE DATES	% ANNUAL MESSAGES	% INAUG. MESSAGES	INCLUSIVE DATES	% ANNUAL MESSAGES	% INAUG. MESSAGES
1789-1797	0.0	0.0	1798-1823	32.8	23.7
1824-1843	3.3	0.5	1844-1870	22.6	9.3
1871-1890	1.8	1.1	1891-1918	13.8	15.7
1919-1940 (Jan.)	1.4	1.3	1941-1950 (Jan.)	45.6	82.0
Av.	1.9	0.8	Av.	25.3	24.5

TABLE 4

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES ON ALL PHASES OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

INTROVERT PHASES			EXTROVERT PHASES		
INCLUSIVE DATES	% ANNUAL MESSAGES	% INAUG. MESSAGES	INCLUSIVE DATES	% ANNUAL MESSAGES	% INAUG. MESSAGES
1789-1797	32.3	3.3	1798-1823	65.2	38.8
1824-1843	44.2	10.6	1844-1870	46.9	22.3
1871-1890	40.7	13.2	1891-1918	54.1	35.3
1919-1940 (Jan.)	27.9	22.1	1941-1950 (Jan.)	65.0	83.0
Av.	36.8	13.3	Av.	56.3	38.6

Chart B (page 255) shows bar graphs for the percentages of major party platforms devoted to "positive action" and also to all phases of foreign affairs, along with a similar analysis of the inaugural addresses of the newly elected Presidents.[30]

[30] Data on party platforms, up to 1924, came from Kirk H. Porter, *National Party Platforms*, New York, 1924. Later party platforms were found in the campaign books

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

CHART B. Proportions of Presidential Inaugural Addresses (1789-1949) and Platforms of Major Parties (1844-1948) Dealing

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Some of the percentages on foreign affairs in general are misleading, unless it is realized that portions of the platforms are sometimes devoted to opposing a strong stand on foreign relations. For example, the losing Democrats devoted the following percentages to such opposition: 1900, 44 per cent; 1904, 12 per cent; 1908, 2.8 per cent. The Republicans opposed a strong foreign policy by the following percentages: as the loser in 1916, 9.6. per cent; winner in 1920, 13.5 per cent; and loser in 1940, 9.6 per cent. Table 5 summarizes the averages of the percentages devoted to positive action, for each of the introvert and extrovert phases (both major parties had platforms for the first time in 1844).

TABLE 5

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF MAJOR PARTY PLATFORMS DEVOTED TO POSITIVE ACTION

EXTROVERT DATES	WINNER	LOSER	AV.	INTROVERT DATES	WINNER	LOSER	AV.
1844-1868	5.4	2.9	4.2	1872-1888	2.4	0.0	1.2
1892-1916	16.9	4.7	10.8	1920-1936	0.5	6.4	3.5
1940-1948	31.5	11.0	21.3				
AV.	14.7	5.0	9.9	AV.	1.5	3.2	2.3

Chart B and Table 5 show significant differences between the introvert and extrovert phases. The winning party figure is ordinarily the most important one, although the most significant sign of extroversion would normally be a period in which both parties devoted a high percentage of their platforms to such appeals, as in 1948. The relative emphasis to be placed upon the attitudes of the parties varies with the strength of the two parties in the election, as related to the degree of foreign policy difference between the parties. For example, in 1848, the more extroverted Democrats lost a close Presidential election to the Whigs, partly because of a third party (Free Soil Party, with Van

or textbooks of the parties, or in the proceedings of the national conventions. Election statistics for President and Congress were found in Theodore W. Cousens, *Politics and Political Organizations in America*, New York, 1942.

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Buren, a former Democrat, as candidate) which polled 9 per cent of the popular vote (the Whigs had 48 per cent and the Democrats 43 per cent). The Democrats, however, won both houses of Congress in 1848, and were swept back into the Presidency in 1852 with a clear popular majority. The relationship between party attitudes on foreign affairs and party success seems particularly important during extrovert phases—i.e., the more extroverted party normally wins during an extrovert phase. During the greater portion of the introvert phases, foreign policy seems to have played a subordinate role in determining the result.

Among the various statistical series which might be related to America's alternating moods in international affairs, the annual naval expenditures seem particularly appropriate. It would appear logical, for example, for the Congress to vote larger naval appropriations at a time when the United States was willing to use "positive action" abroad, although it is also possible that circumstances could arise which would induce naval expansion purely as a defensive measure. The annual naval appropriations are shown in Chart C (page 258) by periods, with the introvert phases at the left and the extrovert phases at the right (the scales are shifted for each period, in order that the expenditures may be compared more easily by phases). In Chart D (page 259), these annual expenditures are shown on a single line, with one scale throughout.[31]

These graphs show that naval expenditures normally increased at almost all times, as would be expected, perhaps, from America's growing population and from technological developments. But a significant difference between introvert and extrovert phases may be present in the relative *rate* of increase, which is considerably greater during the extrovert phases. The sloping straight lines on Chart C show the approximate average rate of increase for the introvert and extrovert phases, separately.

[31] Sources of annual naval expenditures: U.S. Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (Navy Dept.), *Statement of Appropriations and Expenditures of the Naval Establishment from July 1, 1876, to June 30, 1921*, Washington, 1925 (all figures before 1876 were also included); figures from 1918 to 1948 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1944-45, 1947, and 1949; for the year 1949, *New York Times*, January 10, 1950, p. 19.

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

CHART C. Annual Naval Expenditures of U. S. Government in Four Periods, 1795-1949 (in millions of dollars on logarithmic scales)

The slopes (sine of the "angle of elevation") of these lines for the introvert phases are, in chronological order: 18, approximately 0, and 6.8. For the extrovert phases, they are: 38, 28 (50 if the Civil War is included), and 45 (to be followed by the big increase since 1940). An effort was made, in drawing these approximate slopes, to disregard the abnormally high expenditures during the wars in which the United States was involved. Although many factors (wars, in particular) could be shown to have influence upon these naval expenditures, yet it seems probable that there is an important relation between the rate of increase of these expenditures and the presumed introvert-extrovert rhythm. And the total naval picture dramatizes the

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

CHART D (facing page). Annual Naval Expenditures of the U. S. Government, 1794-1949 (logarithmic scale)

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changing historical role of America—from a small country on the sidelines of world politics to the world's greatest power.

Tentative Analysis of the Thesis

possible "causes" of the cycles

The thesis for which evidence has been presented is that moods of introversion and extroversion have alternated with one another throughout American history, at long and fairly regular intervals. Three full cycles have been completed since 1776—each with an introvert phase (averaging 21 years in length) followed by an extrovert phase (averaging 27 years). A fourth cycle appears to have begun about 1919, and its second or extrovert phase was entered upon around 1940.

Do these alternations of mood appear reasonable? What explanation can be given? At this stage, one can only speculate on possible theories. Furthermore, we should remember that correct observations may sometimes be made without knowledge of causes. Some unknown factor might be involved. The proper explanation of tides would be very difficult to discover, it has been said, if the moon were constantly hidden by clouds. On the other hand, the usefulness and possible predictive value of the thesis depend upon a knowledge of associated factors or causes.

Cyclical tendencies have been observed in many fields of human behavior, in addition to the notable area of "business cycles."[32] Professor Schlesinger's study of the alternation between liberal and conservative periods has already been mentioned. Dr. Quincy Wright has pointed to a periodicity in war cycles, particularly in American and British history.[33] Dr. Louis H. Bean has shown the alternating strength of the major political parties in the House of Representatives and in the popular vote for the President.[34] Professor Arnold J. Toynbee has noted the long-term trends in the rise and fall of "civilizations," and has described a three-and-a-half beat rhythm (of rout and rally) in

[32] See E. R. Dewey and E. F. Dakin, *Cycles, The Science of Prediction*, New York, 1947.

[33] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols., Chicago, 1942, I, 227-32.

[34] Louis H. Bean, *How to Predict Elections*, New York, 1948.

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the disintegration of a number of civilizations.[35] Professor Pitirim A. Sorokin has traced long-run cycles in the succession of "ideational, ideological, and sensate" eras, and has made a special study of man's major cycle theories.[36] All of these authors discuss possible explanations, some of which may be applicable to the introvert-extrovert hypothesis.

Social change appears to be inevitable; and it is normally rather slow—probably because of the power of habit, tradition, and "inertia." A habit of thought or a mood appears to spread and stabilize for a time. Changes will appear continually, however, as a result of internal factors, external factors, and "supersystem" factors (Sorokin's term for changes in a larger system containing the variable being studied).

Internal Factors.—Professor Sorokin stresses the "principle of immanent change"—change as an inherent process of a functioning system. Theories of economic cycles likewise emphasize this point, showing how one act stimulates another, in succession—creating first a boom, and then a depression. Change is particularly easy in a free society. In a field where there are two major possibilities (as introversion and extroversion in national life), there will be natural opposition at all times between the two opposing schools. The minority need never lose hope of becoming the majority, if it keeps up the battle. Any dominant policy builds up further opposition—imperfect man cannot be completely successful in applying any principle; a thesis creates its antithesis, in the terms of Hegel. In a democracy, the two opposing schools may each have a solid core of strength, with independents holding the balance of power, as with American parties. As one group continues in power, more and more of the independents will turn from it, so that at a certain time a new majority is brought into being, and the policy shifts.[37]

[35] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridgment of Vols. I-VI by D. C. Somervell, New York, 1947, pp. 548-54.

[36] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality*, New York, 1947. All types of cycle theories are reviewed in Vol. IV of his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, New York, 1941, pp. 289-583.

[37] Sorokin describes the process as follows in *The Crisis of Our Age* (New York, 1941): "*No single system comprises the whole of truth; nor is it, on the other hand, entirely false*" (p. 104). "If, then, each system of truth is partly true and partly false, the

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Another cause of change and oscillation may lie in the relations between successive generations. Spengler attributed the often-noticed fifty-year war period to the passage of two generations.[38] Sorokin's "principle of limit" likewise seems applicable here.[39] Change can go only so far, or the whole society may suffer.[40] It seems logical that either introversion or extroversion, when carried to extreme lengths, would be dangerous to the nation—and that enough citizens grasp this fact, through intuition or reason, to turn the tide in time (by small correctives throughout a phase, and finally by a major shift).

Factors inducing change after a long period of extroversion would include: the reaction to a period of strain and tension—the need for a period of rest and relaxation following a period of intense activity[41]; and the need to "digest" the fruits of expansion and to consolidate or organize the wider world influence gained by America during the active extrovert phase. Among the factors which might stimulate the shift away from introversion are: general dissatisfaction with, or failure of, a policy of introversion (as illustrated by the growing American feeling against isolationism from 1939 to 1942)[42]; and a possible reaction to the "lack of tension" or to "boredom"—a desire for change, for activity, for "new experience" (one of W. I. Thomas' "four wishes").

Finally, in terms of inherent factors, it appears that the "prin-

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oscillation from one system to another becomes comprehensible. When one of them tends to become monopolistic and drives out the other truths, its false part begins to grow at the expense of its valid part. . . . This drift leads to an increase of theoretical and practical difficulties for such a society" (p. 114).

[38] As Quincy Wright (*op. cit.*, I, 230) summarizes it, "The warrior does not wish to fight again himself and prejudices his son against war, but the grandsons are taught to think of war as romantic." Furthermore, young people often feel that the world of their parents is being run on an unsatisfactory basis (see Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics, op. cit.*, IV, 515).

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 696; see also pp. 693 ff.

[40] The terms "critical pressure" or "critical temperature" probably have social analogies. Walter B. Cannon (*The Wisdom of the Body*, rev. ed., New York, 1939, Chap. 18 and pp. 303 ff.) shows how the human body is protected against extremes through corrective or compensating factors, and he suggests that social oscillations may perform a similar function in promoting social stability.

[41] In a broader context, Robert K. Merton, in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), makes "tension" the key concept in explaining changes (p. 116).

[42] Quincy Wright (*op. cit.*, II, 1318) calls attention to "the tendency of unsettled disputes to accumulate, aggravating the relations of states" and to "the lag of national policies and constitutions behind changing international conditions."

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ciple of rhythm" is perhaps a basic law of progress in human society. Schlesinger thus describes the contribution of the liberal-conservative alternation to America's development.[43] To use one of Sorokin's phrases, there appears to be an "exhaustion of creative impulses," in time, in following either an introvert or an extrovert policy, or in the men who are firmly wedded to the policy. Toynbee discusses the alternation of the "static" and the "dynamic" as an essential part of a progressive development in history, roughly analogous to the "alternation of a pair of legs" which "enables a walker to 'cover the ground'. . . ."[44]

External Factors.—Thus, it is seen that there is considerable support for the idea that alternations of mood may be inherent in a functioning, free society. But the great variation evident in the timing and intensity of action and reaction is doubtless due in part to external factors. We should note, however, that since an external challenge is usually associated closely in men's minds with their response, the challenge itself is probably given more weight than it deserves as a "cause" of the response. It is easy to overlook the importance of a nation's mood, and to ignore the wide range of choices which are usually open for consideration.[45] Yet we should not go to the other extreme by minimizing the stimulating role of external challenges and conditions.

In considering America's moods specifically in relation to introversion-extroversion, we may regard economic and political conditions in America as one type of "external" factor, while realizing that a more important type is related to the role of other nations. Many writers have stressed the role of depression and internal unrest in stimulating a nation to undertake foreign adventure. Beard, for example, emphasizes the importance of the depression which began in 1893 in promoting the expansionism of 1898.[46] There is little doubt that this was a factor which *stimulated* the growing mood of extroversion, but that it was

[43] Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present*, New York, 1949, pp. 91-92.
[44] Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 253; see also p. 51.
[45] Barbara Ward, for example, expresses her admiration for America's "free response" in meeting the challenge which gave rise to the "Marshall Plan" (*op. cit.*, pp. 60-61).
[46] Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-55.

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a decisive factor is brought into question by noting the apparent effect of the Great Depression in deepening the isolationism of the 1930's.[47] Similarly there seems to be no certain effect from liberalism or conservatism.[48] Although a political party often seems to be a "vehicle" for promoting the shift between introversion and extroversion, the Republicans and Democrats cannot be classified permanently—both parties tend to shift with the changing mood, although one will move more quickly. Strong leaders can crystallize policies and sentiments, but apparently cannot "turn the tide" except when the general mood is already shifting.[49] The "creative minority" (a term of Toynbee) probably plays a great role in stimulating the more passive portion of the society to undertake a new policy and to follow it for a considerable time.

When we look at the possible role of other nations in affecting America's international moods, it is noteworthy that the shift to the extrovert phase always occurred at a time of active European or world diplomacy. Toynbee stresses the important role of a challenge from the outside in stimulating action: "In the language of science we may say that the function of the intruding factor is to supply that on which it intrudes with a stimulus of the kind best calculated to evoke the most potently creative variations."[50] It seems impossible to imagine the United States playing the important role it has during extrovert phases without being presented with numerous problems and challenges from the world around it. This need not mean that the presence of such challenging conditions would necessarily provoke a positive response from America (in introvert phases we might ex-

[47] A number of significant depressions have occurred during introvert phases—as in 1827-29, 1837-38, 1842-43, 1873-79, 1884-85, 1921-22, and 1929-39; others have appeared in extrovert phases—as in 1819-21, 1857-58, 1893-97, and 1907-8. From "Business Booms and Depressions," chart published by the Century Press, Toledo, 1950.

[48] Using Schlesinger's dates for liberalism-conservatism and the introvert-extrovert dates of Table 1, the liberal periods show 32 introvert years and 48 extrovert; the conservative periods have 49 introvert years, and 44 extrovert.

[49] It appears that Presidents Tyler and Franklin D. Roosevelt perhaps speeded the shift to extroversion, and that Cleveland slowed the change in 1893, but could not halt it; Woodrow Wilson was "broken," in a sense, on the new tide which followed a quarter of a century of extroversion.

[50] Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

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pect no positive reaction—as shown by America's negative response to the aggressors' expansion during most of the 1930's).

In the early and later stages of America's history as an independent nation, great world wars have occurred. Contrary to a fairly common impression, the effect upon the American mood has not always been to promote extroversion.[51] The two middle phases of extroversion were not associated with world wars. True, we were disturbed by British policy in Texas and Oregon in the middle 1840's, but perhaps other nations had more reason to be concerned about American expansionism. In the 1890's no wars disturbed us, although we watched the colonial expansion of the European powers with some apprehension. Weinberg points out that we used virtually nonexistent threats to justify the treaty for the annexation of Hawaii in 1893.[52]

Another type of "external factor" is suggested by the British-Venezuelan boundary dispute which had been "simmering" for many years before 1895. Then President Cleveland decided to make an issue of the affair by sending a warlike ultimatum to Britain. America seemed psychologically ready for war in support of his strong stand. Thus, a major function of the external factor may be to accelerate or retard an attitude trend, or to furnish the opportunity in which to display a new mood, or actually to precipitate in action a pent-up desire for change.

America and World Politics.—Looking at the larger world political system in which the United States has participated since colonial days, it is possible that great world political cycles have occurred, somewhat analogous to the introvert and extrovert phases. The following periods, at least, saw intense diplomatic pressures and wars among the Great Powers, as some of them, at least, pressed for expansion: 1798-1823, 1846-1871, 1893-1919, and since 1939. The "causes" of these cycles are perhaps largely inherent in the national and international political processes involved (including the "balance of power" principle), and per-

[51] We proclaimed our neutrality in 1793, and continued in the introvert phase for five or more years. Our involvement in World War I seemed later to have intensified the introvert phase which followed it. But the extrovert mood has remained dominant since World War II.

[52] Weinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

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haps have occurred somewhat simultaneously for many nations as a result of "contagion" as well as interaction. But it scarcely appears possible that world political cycles could be correctly regarded as the basic "cause" of the American alternation of mood; it is more likely that some larger factor or inherent tendency affected both. Another tendency which may have intensified America's introvert-extrovert pattern is the principle which Toynbee calls "withdrawal and return," as part of the process by which the "creative minority" prepares new successful responses to new challenges. America, until recently at least, has been in a geographic and economic position which has enabled her to withdraw from world politics more than any other Power.[53]

Length of Phases.—Although the alternation of moods between introversion and extroversion seems reasonable, it is more difficult to see why the major shifts should occur about every 20 or 25 years. A mood, once "well-started," seems to spread over the population, and to deepen in intensity (by "fits and starts") up to a certain limit.[54] One step often seems to lead to another in the same direction, particularly during an extrovert phase. A war early in the extrovert phase (each such phase has included a war near its beginning: the undeclared war in 1798, in 1846, 1898, and 1941) may suddenly break the chains of the past on men's minds, and open up new vistas. For example, the Spanish-American War led to the annexation of the Philippines, it dramatized the need for the Panama Canal, and it heightened the demand for a large navy. American history since 1941 illustrates even more clearly how this "chain of events" may cover many years.

The moderate "political climate" in America, including the

[53] The effect of modern technological changes on American attitudes is not yet clear. It is quite possible that the impact of the steamship and telegraph a hundred years ago was relatively as significant as the influence of the airplane and radio today. See, e.g., President Fillmore's message to Congress on December 6, 1852 (Richardson, *op. cit.*, V, 179-80).

[54] For possible analogies from economic cycles, see John Ise, *Economics*, New York, 1946, p. 319, and W. I. King, *The Causes of Economic Fluctuations*, New York, 1938, pp. 125, 162. King points to the spreading wave of optimism which helps promote the boom phase, while a contagious pessimism deepens the depression phase.

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two-party system, may also be responsible in part for the long phases of two decades or more. Further investigation would be necessary to verify the following hypothesis, but it seems probable that the average length of a "political generation" in America might be around 25 years (with an "extrovert generation" staying in power longer than the introvert, possibly, in part, because the "active" phase calls for dramatic leadership which may capture the public imagination).[55] The most influential years of a man's life are probably included in a quarter of a century. One notes, for example how Theodore Roosevelt's life parallels the extrovert phase before 1919. The normal succession of generations is doubtless also important: within 20 or 30 years a new generation will have obtained a majority among the politically active. The demands of a new political generation for recognition, combined with the natural skeptical attitude of youth toward the work of the immediately preceding generation, may account for the shift at these intervals. The older generation of leaders will be pushed out, except for those who adapt to the changing trend (we note that Senators Nye, Wheeler, and Borah lost their influence, while Senator Vandenberg was able to be an "elder statesman" who helped promote the new era). A new phase may also call from retirement someone with influence in the preceding similar stage: examples include Churchill as Prime Minister in 1940, and Stimson and Knox in the American cabinet. President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself tied the two extrovert phases of his lifetime together. In relation to the "education" of leaders, it may be significant that most of the Presidents, for example, lived the greater part of their formative years (say, from 3 to 21) under a phase similar to that of their Presidency—while in their early maturity they were able to see the opposite policy being followed. The world of their formative years was that of their grandfathers, while in early maturity it was the world of their fathers.

Why these phases of around 25 years should apply to the introvert-extrovert alternation, and not to others (as liberalism-conservatism), is not apparent. It may indicate that some feature

[55] See Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics, op. cit.*, IV, 520.

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of this alternation is more fundamental or basic in our society. Sorokin discusses the additional problem of finding where one "political generation" begins and another ends, since the change of generations biologically is continuous. He quotes O. Lorenz as suggesting that we must just observe historical facts, which will show such boundaries clearly by the social and political events.[56] If this be true, then 1776 is a logical year to use in American history—the year when the fundamental decision for independence was taken. If the cyclical tendencies operated earlier, then other significant events in the colonies or in England may mark the time.

AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY

Let us conclude this analysis of the introvert-extrovert rhythm with the outlines of a possible interpretation of American history, in the light of the hypothesis.

Let us begin with Sorokin's idea that the series of changes which a system undergoes is, to a large extent, an "unfolding of its inherent possibilities."[57] Professor Ralph Gabriel stresses three dominant ideas in American development: (1) belief in the existence of "the fundamental law"—a moral order which was not the creation of man; (2) the doctrine of "the free individual"; and (3) the doctrine of the "mission of America" in the world.[58] America "came from" Europe and the world, and has "returned."[59]

By what process has America grown to its present influential position? The idea of freedom and democracy, for others as well

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 520-24.

[57] Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality, op. cit.*, p. 5. De Tocqueville believed that America's destiny was implicit in its early social forms and ideas (see Max Beloff, "Tocqueville and the Americans," *Fortnightly*, No. 1017 [September 1951], 575-76).

[58] Ralph H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, New York, 1940, pp. 15, 19, 22. This actual moral emphasis in American policy is stressed by Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, although he deplores what he regards as its overemphasis (*In Defense of the National Interest*, New York, 1951, p. 114).

[59] Prof. R. M. MacIver characterizes our present position, in relation to the past, as follows: "Suddenly we are called to take the status of a world power. We cannot evade it any more. It has become our manifest destiny; it is indeed the inevitable consequence of what we are, what we have achieved, what we possess (*The Ramparts We Guard*, New York, 1950, pp. 107-8).

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as for ourselves, appears to have been the positive spark.[60] The dynamic factor in history, according to Toynbee, is found in the process of "challenge and response." The American idea of freedom and democracy has been powerfully challenged four times, at least, in our history. Each time we have met the challenge with a double response—first trying the "introvert" method and then the "extrovert." By the end of each introvert-extrovert cycle, the problem has been solved to a large extent, the world position of America has been strengthened, and a new challenge is faced (a challenge which has been developing in the previous extrovert phase). William Allen White, in 1925, identified the first three cycles in our history as the "Revolutionary Cycle" (to 1823), the "Anti-Slavery Cycle," and the "Populist Cycle" (up to 1917).[61] He saw the America of 1925 "pipping at the shell of a larger destiny" related to the new world age.[62] The dates he used correspond with the cycles described in this paper. The first great challenge to our concept of freedom was that of British "tyranny" and European interference. First, we secured our independence and established our constitutional government; then, still motivated by the goal of independence, we moved into the extrovert phase to end the threats of France, Britain, Spain, the Holy Alliance, and Russia. After the Monroe Doctrine, the challenge of slavery and secession had to be faced; in the extrovert phase, both South and North sought to expand (the South for slave territory, and the North for free territory) and the Pacific Ocean was reached. The solution came through the Civil War, in which "free labor" and democracy won and national unity was maintained (the 15th Amendment was adopted in 1870). The third challenge to democracy was created

[60] Prof. Ralph Barton Perry in his *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York, 1944) asserts that "democracy is compelled by its own universalistic-individualistic logic to seek the creation of an orderly and co-operative society in which the happiness of all is the duty of each" (p. 602). Prof. Frank W. Tannenbaum, in an article entitled "The American Tradition in Foreign Relations" (*Foreign Affairs*, XXX, No. 1 [October 1951], 31-50), presents convincing evidence to support the thesis that America's "permanent" foreign policy is based on the idea of the "co-ordinate state"—on the promotion of the "independence of nations." Prof. Dexter Perkins writes in the same vein about American foreign policy today ("Where the United States Stands Today," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* [September 15, 1951], pp. 1-2).

[61] William Allen White, *Some Cycles of Cathay*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1925, p. vi.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

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by America's great industrial development following the Civil War (and by the continuing problem of recreating the union of North and South). Domestically, the response came in the development of the West and the various "populist" and progressive movements; but, as before, an extrovert phase developed —stimulated in part by the desire for markets and raw materials abroad for the growing industrial machine, and by the new glory of naval power. By 1917, the challenge had been surmounted—a strong, democratic America stepped out on the world stage. As Gabriel has written, "Without knowing it the people of the United States had come to a turning point in their history."[63] The new and greatest challenge had come to American democracy—nations and new ideologies were openly challenging the democratic nations and the democratic faith in Europe and America. After the brief experience in World War I, America tried to meet the challenge of the new world age in the introvert mood—political isolation and, later, economic nationalism. But the crisis for world democracy in 1940 saw America getting ready to stride to the very center of the world stage and begin to direct many of the scenes.[64] The security of the whole "free world" was becoming America's major concern.

The Possible Significance of the Thesis

The introvert-extrovert hypothesis enables us to reinterpret some phases of American history in a new light, and to gain perspective on the past role of America in world affairs. Its special significance, however, should lie in its suggestions of future probabilities.

A point of major significance is the probability that America can be depended upon to continue to play a strong role in world affairs long enough, perhaps, to be decisive. If America's fourth phase of extroversion (which began around 1940) should last as long as the previous extrovert phases, it would not end until

[63] Gabriel, *op. cit.*, p. 362.

[64] Such power in the hands of one nation raises the possibility of "imperialist" domination as an aim. Herbert Feis is willing to state a "conclusive affirmation about American foreign policy: it is not imperialist in design, in fact, or in temper."—"Is the United States Imperialist?", *Yale Review*, XLI, No. 1 (Autumn 1951), 13.

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well into the 1960's. Many American leaders have been calling upon the American people to prepare to play a great role for another decade or more. But the spirit of confidence has been weak at times during the past few years. The signs of isolationism or neo-isolationism are often pointed out. It is probable that the long-run effort of the Europeans, the Japanese, and others, will depend largely upon their confidence in the "staying-power" of the American people. And the spirit and effort shown by Americans will depend in part upon their self-confidence. Within ten or fifteen years, the challenge of our generation should have been fully met—and our thesis indicates that America can be expected to face the challenge squarely, thereby leading in the erection of a structure of freedom and peace, durable perhaps for a century. In the 1960's, America's fifth historical cycle might be expected to begin—the second cycle of the "world age."[65]

But we should also remember that we may have entered upon a period in which certain basic factors, which may have promoted the introvert-extrovert rhythm in the past, have changed. A new age of insecurity seems to have begun for America, with Russia in possession of the atomic bomb in the air age. The old balance of power has disappeared for the time being in a bipolar world, dominated by the United States and Soviet Russia. Perhaps the United States can never again feel or be "isolated." Real "introversion" may never come again. In that case, our confidence in America's continuing world leadership is not diminished.

Another apparently new factor is the very intensity of America's present involvement. It is within the realm of possibility that this could provoke a reaction toward introversion somewhat earlier than has ever occurred before. But it seems improbable, in the light of America's record from 1947 to 1951, that this would happen at any early date.

All things considered—in view of America's past record, and of the presumed role of "internal factors" in promoting the

[65] It is quite possible that the major problem of this coming period will carry heavy moral implications—as in the case of the issue of slavery following the Revolutionary period (1776-1824). The aspirations of the people of Asia and Africa could well furnish the chief issue, along with special repercussions from America's own racial problem.

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introvert-extrovert rhythm—it seems logical to expect America to retreat, to some extent at least, from so much world involvement, and perhaps to do so sometime in the 1960's. It is a definite possibility which should not be ignored. It should remind leaders that the decade just ahead may really be the decisive one for this century in defending and strengthening the free world. If America should then tire of her prominent role, the world's best hope of peace and co-operation would lie in an effective United Nations. Leaders of opinion in America might well prepare the way for full American co-operation with the United Nations during a relatively "introverted" phase. After all, the trend to introversion might merely be a "recession," rather than a "depression," if opinion is "educated" in an international direction. It is reasonable, also, to hope for a general relaxation of world tension within a decade or so; it may be noteworthy that Russia's pattern of action has been somewhat like our own since the 1890's. Many nations must be hoping that both Russia and the United States will withdraw to some extent from such prominent roles in so many quarters of the globe.

Would a widespread belief in the introvert-extrovert rhythm or tendency affect its course in the future? Robert K. Merton describes the "self-fulfilling prophecy," quoting W. I. Thomas' theorem that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."[66] Thus, the extrovert phase might be strengthened, and, furthermore, the introvert phase might come "on schedule," if people were expecting it. Merton also discusses the "self-destroying belief"—a belief which prevents the fulfillment of the very circumstance which would otherwise come to pass.[67] On this theory, if Americans were supremely confident of their extrovert mood and its strength, they might become complacent and lethargic, and thereby lose their role of leadership; or, on the other hand, they might be determined to prevent the coming of the predicted introvert phase. So we can only speculate regarding the possible effect of a presentation of the theory, or of propaganda or education designed to confirm or change the introvert-extrovert tendencies. Schlesinger expressed

[66] Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 179. [67] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

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his belief that propaganda would have little effect on the liberal-conservative trends, and that, to be effective, it "must harmonize with the national bent."[68] These moods of introversion and extroversion may well be beyond effective conscious control, so to speak. Furthermore, the great majority of the electorate could not be expected to be deeply aware of any theories such as the one presented here.

To repeat, the major significance (for the future) of the introvert-extrovert record of America lies in the strengthened assurance that America is probably capable of great world leadership for another decade or more. And even then the "recession" may not come. American leaders should expect the American people to support strong and wise international policies, and should call for great deeds. Free Europeans ought to take heart, and intensify their own efforts. If America sustains the extrovert mood for another decade or more, it should be remembered that she will still have an almost infinite variety of policies to choose from—in terms of the intensity and the foci of effort, and the degree of force, morality, and wisdom to be employed. The supreme task of those devoted to freedom and peace will be to stimulate the energetic, wise, and moral use of America's great and increasing power.[69]

[68] Schlesinger, *Paths to the Present*, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[69] Although George F. Kennan (like Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau) deplores the "legalistic-moralistic approach" of "our past policy formulation" (*American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, 1951, p. 95), he points out the probable powerful impact on world opinion, if it could receive "the news that America had shed the shackles of disunity, confusion and doubt, had taken a new lease of hope and determination, and was setting about her tasks with enthusiasm and clarity of purpose" (p. 146). Wise diplomacy is doubtless necessary to implement great moral purpose, but it can never be a satisfactory substitute.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

A NEW LOOK AT FRANCE

By SHEPARD B. CLOUGH

Edward M. Earle, editor, *Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. xiv, 522. $6.00

OF recent years American interest in France has taken a new turn, for France has become the chief Continental ally of the United States in its power arrangements to prevent Russian aggression, and a bastion in the defense of those values which are the very foundation of Western civilization. Indeed, France occupies, in spite of the events of 1940, a stronger position in the West of Europe than it held in the period between the two World Wars. Now the French have alliances in which they can put confidence and from which they can get real support if *the crisis* comes. And then, as Professor André Siegfried, the dean of commentators upon French affairs and upon Franco-American relations, has written in the opening paragraph of *Modern France*: "With the countries of Eastern Europe looking in a new direction, with a defeated Germany no longer in a dominant position economically or politically, France has of necessity become the center of the entire Continental system." The nation has moved into a partial but temporary vacuum.

The role in which France has been cast in the power alignments of the Atlantic community has led Americans to take a new look at their ally. They are anxious to know how much military potential in its broadest sense the French have at their disposal or can create, to what extent the well-known cleavages of the country divide the people into hostile and ineffective groups, what the chances are that new currents in French life will cut away faith in traditional values, and in what ways or to what degree America must help France in order to make of the Atlantic Pact a viable instrument.[1]

[1] In addition to the volume listed at the head of this article, attention should be called to the important study by Professor Donald McKay, *The United States and*

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It was in order to formulate some reliable answers to these questions that Professor Edward Mead Earle of the Institute for Advanced Study arranged, in collaboration with Columbia, Harvard, and Princeton Universities and with the Carnegie Corporation of New York, a conference of American students of French affairs at which some twenty-seven papers were presented by the younger members of the group and by Professor Siegfried. The documents thus assembled, retouched as a result of discussion about them and ably edited, form the contents of the volume under consideration.

As in practically all collaborative investigations of the scope attempted here, the results are somewhat uneven in quality and at times repetitious. What is of especial note, however, is that the material is not designed to give complete coverage of French life, but by using the particular competences of individual contributors to provide data and interpretation on a wide range of subjects, from economic production, demography, and class structure to questions of political organization, military strategy, international relations, and French *élan*. Furthermore, the topics treated are not arranged in such a fashion as to suggest any overriding theory of society or of human behavior. One discovers little evidence of an effort to attain that social science synthesis which is coming into vogue or to blaze any new trails of methodology. On the contrary, the familiar disciplinary lines of economics, politics, and social behavior have been adhered to. Inasmuch as the book is largely the work of historians, one is not surprised to find that it reflects the extreme empiricism of the guild and a tendency to eschew all theoretical concepts—a quality and a tendency, be it noticed, that is observed also in much of the scholarly writing in political science. The fact that historians dominate among the contributors to the symposium reflects the paucity of American research on France in the other social science disciplines.[2]

France, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, 334 pp., $4.00. This volume appears in the American Foreign Policy Library, edited by Sumner Welles.

[2] At least one noteworthy and refreshing exception should be registered. In Chapter 17, "Strains in the Social Structure of Modern France," John E. Sawyer makes a plea for the use of the sociologist's concept of social organization in social history. Un-

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The volume begins with a consideration of French "spirit," which here has been given the unfortunate name of *élan vital,* a term coined by Henri Bergson and carrying definite philosophical implications. By "spirit" is actually meant the manner in which or the degree of courage with which the French face the public issues of the day. Regarding this kind of *élan* our authors[3] find that there has been a marked decline. In their view, the French are disposed to take a fatalistic attitude of discouragement toward the problems which confront them. Probably there is much truth in this consensus, for nothing succeeds like success and of late the French have not had the kind of triumphs nor occupied a position in economic, political, or intellectual affairs in any sense comparable to that which they enjoyed at the time of the "Sun King," of Voltaire, or of the Great Napoleon. But if this is true, some of the friends of France will consider the change to have been for the better of the world rather than, as the writers here suggest, a tragic loss.

Whatever view may be taken of this matter, however, reasons advanced to explain the change in *élan* are exceedingly interesting. In his contribution John B. Wolf places the blame for a decline in spirit upon the Great French Revolution; John Bowditch sees it as a rationalization of weaknesses in French society; and John B. Christopher attributes it to the desiccating effect of the "bourgeois spirit." These explanations deserve close scrutiny, for there are other states which have their share of bourgeois spirit, but which have ample courage; there are countries with weaknesses similar to the French, but which use other rationalizations of their predicament; and there are many nations which have experienced internal dissension equal to that of the Revolution and which have plenty of *élan.*

The point regarding the fragmenting effect of the Revolution

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fortunately, the author put so much effort into the exposition of his organizational pattern that he was unable to present much new data. He might well have taken advantage of his opportunity to have presented the extraordinarily enlightened findings of the French Institute of Public Opinion Research as published in *Sondages.*

[3] "The *Elan Vital* of France: A Problem in Historical Perspective," by John B. Wolf; "The Concept of *Elan Vital*: A Rationalization of Weakness," by John Bowditch; and "The Desiccation of the Bourgeois Spirit," by John B. Christopher.

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in French public life is well taken, if properly understood. Although in the Old Regime the French were divided into groups which had distinctive and opposing ideologies and interests, a degree of community spirit was realized through the monarchy and by concessions here and there. In the Revolution those groups desiring change in the social and political structure of France went far beyond the limits imagined possible in the first half of 1789 and used force to attain their ends. Recourse to direct action made emotions run high, and subsequently the memory of these events, fostered as it has been by propagandists, politicians, and professors, has kept them high.[4] Because of the particular course which the Revolution followed, monarchism and Catholicism were long considered to be inseparable bedfellows and uncompromisingly opposed to republicanism and the separation of Church and state. Even in our day the French have difficulty in finding a happy medium between authority and anarchy in politics and between Catholicism and laicism precisely because of Revolutionary traditions.

While the argument that events of the French Revolution have tended to divide the French and to keep them divided has much validity, the contention that the concept of *élan* is a rationalization of weakness or that the bourgeois spirit enfeebles the nation carry much less conviction. Indeed, these two notions become shrouded in mystery when their advocates admit to the impossibility of clear and precise statements as to just what they are. A "bourgeois spirit" which wants only comfort and ease may be desiccating, but a "bourgeois spirit" which is associated with Yankee "git up and git" is a constructive element in society. Perhaps the French bourgeois have more of the former than of the latter, but it is unfair and unscientific to attribute a vast array of unsocial practices in France to the bourgeoisie. In fact, many of the so-called bourgeois practices cited here, like tax evasion and desire for material betterment, might have been just as appropriately attributed to, respectively, a "*noblesse* spirit" or a "proletarian spirit."

[4] An interesting study of this subject is that by Paul Farmer, *France Reconsiders Its Revolutionary Origins*, New York, 1942.

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Perhaps the most important section of the book is that which endeavors to analyze the social class structure of the French and to describe how France's major groups attempt to advance their ideologies through political means.[5] The chief of these groups are, to use political names, (1) Communist, (2) Socialist, (3) Radical Socialist, (4) Christian Democratic, (5) Independent and Peasant, and (6) De Gaullist. But no one of these groups has a monopoly of any given set of ideals, principles, or policies. For example, from a socio-economic point of view groups one, two, and four are supported by and work for the interests of labor, but the Communists, who poll the largest popular vote of any party, are anticlerical, approve of direct action, and follow the lead of Moscow; the Socialists are anticlerical, favor gradual social reform, and are willing to join bourgeois ministries; and the Christian Democrats are Catholic, favor moderate social reform, and pay spiritual allegiance to Rome. Of the bourgeois parties, the Radical Socialists are anticlerical, support mild social reform, and defend the interests of petty capitalists; the Independents and Peasants, newcomers on the political scene so far as constituting a separate group is concerned, represent rural interests and favor both clericalism and capitalism; and the De Gaullists are representative of wealthy elements in the population. Parties one and six are for authoritarianism in government, while the other parties, those of the center which constitute the "third force," favor a democratic republic. The center parties favor the Atlantic community, the Communists favor Russia, and the De Gaullists stand either for a kind of "neutralism" that is analogous to American isolationism, or for a strong nationalist policy which would give France a role of leadership in international affairs.

This great maze of interests, which is highly oversimplified here, is made even more confusing by the fact that party

[5] "The Third Force Today," by Charles A. Micaud; "The Christian Democrats in Modern France," by Robert F. Byrnes; "The Decline of the Socialist Party," by Henry W. Ehrmann; "The Struggle for Control of the French Trade-Union Movement," by Val R. Lorwin; "Communists and Peasantry in France," by Gordon Wright; "The Communists and the Foreign Relations of France," by Vernon Van Dyke; and "Gaullism: Retrospect and Prospect," by H. Stuart Hughes.

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strength is so divided that government has to be by coalition. Any coalition means that some planks in the platforms of ministerial parties have to be forgotten and that such neglect is bound to irritate many of the parties' rank and file. In the case of a coalition of the center, the extremes are bound to be in opposition, and if a center ministry moves on any issue toward either the right or left, as it frequently is forced to do by the very nature of public issues, it is certain to lose support from the opposite wing. This fact explains in large part why French ministries are so notoriously unstable, why so frequently after a leftist victory personalities of the center appear in cabinet after cabinet.

That France has been able to get effective compromise on any issue seems at times amazing, but it has done a better job of "muddling through" than most people realize or are willing to admit. It has been able to do this because, as is brilliantly shown by Edward W. Fox in his anachronistically entitled piece, "The Third Force, 1897-1939," Frenchmen have rallied for a long time now, when the chips were actually down, around the idea of a democratic republic. In actual fact, compromise has been obtained in the face of fiery hostility to please the people back home when compromise seemed completely out of the question. Indeed, France of the last fifty years provides an excellent example of how groups in a democracy must and do make concessions in order to preserve those values which are the most essential to society.

So far as the economic side of French life is concerned, *Modern France* is particularly sketchy and impressionistic—a fact which is distressing to one who specializes in French economic affairs. In any survey of France that has as its basic concern the role that France is to play in international relations, the economic side of things deserves a larger place than has been given it here. Above all, one would like to know whether or not France is going to be able to provide the standard of living to which its people have been accustomed and at the same time to contribute its allotted share to the defense of Western Europe. At least, one would like to see this question taken out of the

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realm of wishful thinking and policy proclamations and given the same scholarly consideration that has been devoted in this volume to other issues.

The four chapters which do treat of economic matters are, however, of high quality.[6] Here we are given the details of the nationalization program, which was realized in a moment of postwar exuberance and very quickly brought to an end. We are informed about the application of the Marshall Plan to France and the effectiveness of the aid given. We are told that since 1900 savings and investments have been a very small percentage of French national income and that this fact explains in part why French output per worker has been so low. And we are made to believe that the family character of French business and the unwillingness of the French to take business risks account, in part, for the failure of the French to keep pace economically with some of their more progressive neighbors. On this last point one could have wished for more quantitative data than was given and for more attention to the plain fact that general economic progress has a lower order of priority in France than good food and an inordinate amount of leisure for "the finer things of life."[7]

Finally, there are chapters which deal with recent humanistic and scientific achievements in France, with demography, with military strategy, and with France's place among the powers.[8] The discussion of France's population problems is extremely well informed and points out such important elements in the situation as the unlikelihood of a continuation of the postwar

[6] "French Business and the Businessman: A Social and Cultural Analysis," by David S. Landes; "The French Experiment in Nationalization, 1944-1950," by David H. Pinkney; "The French Investment Program and Its Relation to Resource Allocation," by Richard Ruggles; and "The Marshall Plan and French Foreign Trade," by Warren C. Baum.

[7] Almost no attention has been given to inflation and its social or economic consequences. On these matters one may consult with profit Martin Wolfe, *The French Franc Between the Wars, 1919-1939*, New York, 1951.

[8] "The French Intellectuals: Situation and Outlook," by Kenneth Douglas; "Science and French National Strength," by Henry E. Guerlac; "Population and Population Trends in Modern France," by Dudley Kirk; "The Military Defeat of 1940 in Retrospect," by Richard D. Challener; "Contemporary Concepts of French Strategy," by Donald J. Harvey; "Political Parties and the French Army Since Liberation," by Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.; and "France Among the Powers," by Fred Latimer Hadsel.

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baby boom, the inability of Black Africa to supply cannon fodder, and the lack of immigration into France in spite of labor shortages.

The views expressed regarding military thought are that France has learned the military lessons of the last war, that is, its strategists have come to realize that dogmatism in military matters is as disastrous as dogmatism in other affairs and that any military plan must be flexible, comprehensive, and commensurate with military potential. The opinions expressed regarding France as an ally in the Atlantic community are to the effect that her loyalty can be relied upon and that her interests place her unequivocally in the camp which opposes Russian hegemony in Europe. The concluding paragraph of the book from the pen of Fred L. Hadsel of the Department of State summarizes this entire question in such an admirable fashion and introduces the proper caveats so adroitly that it deserves quoting as a conclusion, and is worth serious contemplation.

> The conflict between historical thinking and current necessities is, as we have seen, the major theme of contemporary French foreign policy. While the effects of this strain are found in every basic question with which the French government has had to deal, France has made notable strides toward harmonizing the divergent tendencies which affect its foreign policy. The extent to which France continues to resolve these conflicts will largely determine its role among the powers. As we have also noted, however, so many obstacles remain to further adjustment of these opposing points of view that the French government cannot by itself be expected to surmount all of them. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that France needs outside assistance for some time to come, and in the last analysis this means continued American support.

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RELEVANT AND IRRELEVANT DOCTRINES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By GERHART NIEMEYER

Percy E. Corbett, *Law and Society in the Relations of States* (Yale Institute of International Studies series), New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1951, pp. xii, 337. $4.75

Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations* (London Institute of World Affairs auspices), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1950, pp. xvii, 903. $18.75

TIME was when a nation, at the pinnacle of its might, asked itself the question: "In the relation of states, what is the right thing, which ought to be done, and what is the wrong thing, which ought not to be done?" It was Spain, a world-conquering power, which thus approached problems of policy in the light of rational choice and raised a crop of great and lucid minds who laid the foundations for what later became international law. But the particular principles to which these men looked for their answers have been proved inadequate, first in the practice of statesmen and then in the theory of jurists. Hopes that international relations could be ordered by the relatively simple moral rules which we recognize in the organized societies of men have been repeatedly and cruelly disappointed. The failure of this one great historic attempt to apply rational concepts to international relations has evidently made us despair of *any* possibility even of different rational systems in this field. For, after a number of false starts and dismal failures, we appear to have come to the point where Western intellect deals with international problems no longer as matters in which rational vision of the whole can provide guidance, but as matters through which one "muddles," i.e., takes what seems the easiest way out of each particular difficulty. This attitude permits force, in its unprincipled barrenness, to act as a guiding criterion, a criterion without order, appeal, or hope.

By virtue of the historical development of Western thought, international law has served as the main vehicle of repeated

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attempts to take hold of international relations in a rational way. This is why a discussion of the scope and role of international law has a relevance far beyond the mere legal aspects of international relations. Such a discussion inevitably touches upon the question of whether there is, besides the traditional content of the law of nations, any alternative principle or rational criterion of international relations which could guide policy choices in this field. Any discussion of international law is quickly led to the question: "Is international law a body of binding obligations regulating the conduct and relations of states, or is it a mere fiction invented by pious daydreamers, or is it, possibly, just a convenient technique by means of which governments pursue non-rational ends?" Two of the most prominent international jurists of this country now throw their weight to the last thesis, denying that the substance of international law represents rational principles capable of enlightening policy choices of governments. It is significant that they are on common ground in this regard, although they dispute each other's views and reject each other's premises. They disagree on the nature of international law, on the function of jurisprudence, on a basic philosophy, but when all is said and done, both display the same lack of ultimate confidence regarding the applicability of rational criticism to international politics, so that the statesman in quest of principles of action would look in vain to either of them for guidance.

Of the two books under review, only Percy E. Corbett's *Law and Society in the Relations of States* is a direct attack on the problem of a rational basis for policy decisions. Hans Kelsen's *The Law of the United Nations* is primarily a commentary on the main portions of the United Nations Charter, and secondarily a treatise on what he calls the "legal technique" in international law. The problem of the nature and scope of international law thus appears in Kelsen's work explicitly only in the preface, and implicitly in the treatment he gives to the Charter provisions. Since his subject is the United Nations, and since Professor Corbett's book also ends with an accent on international organization, the two authors' explicit or implicit posi-

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tions on this subject are comparable and indicative of their ideas on the wider context of international politics.

Corbett's thesis, simply stated, is that "the classification of international usages as law . . . involves wasteful self-deception and misdirection of energy, and leads to false expectations on the part of the public," and that the assumption of a society or community of states "exaggerates the conjunctive and underrates the disjunctive forces in international life, creates immediately an atmosphere of unreality, and results in the chronic misinterpretation of events. These disadvantages . . . assume a practical form in advice to governments, in programs for official and unofficial international agencies, and in over-optimistic communication to the public on the trend of world politics." In other words: there is no international law and no international society, and the attempt to postulate law and society in international relations leads to disastrous results.

Corbett makes a twofold attack on the dogma he rejects. First he shows that it is not well founded even in its own theoretical terms, whatever theory or attempted theory of international law one has in mind. Next he examines international practice in order to prove that nothing deserving the claim of law rules or regulates the external actions of governments. In the field of theory, he criticizes first the natural law systems for their inconsistency in treating *ius gentium* as a part of natural law, for their incapacity to overcome fundamental disagreements among various authors, and for their inability to explain the deviating practices of governments. Then he deals with positivism (which he equates with the idea that international law derives from the consent of states), exposing its various forms as either self-contradictory (e.g., the theory of auto-limitation) or as doing violence to the facts (e.g., Lauterpacht's formula, "The will of the international community must be obeyed"). In similar ways, Corbett attacks the fallacy of postulating a world society. A society composed of subjects that are supposed to be sovereign is a contradiction in itself. Nor can we infer the existence of this society from the functioning of international organizations, since the latter are but associations for special

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purposes, little worlds by themselves rather than manifestations of an over-all system. The idea of a society of nations is also refuted when the often-invoked "legal obligations" of states to that alleged society receive second billing below national statutes in courts which have to decide a conflict between the two systems. Corbett senses that there may be something in the nature of the state which militates against its subordination to a higher law, but he does not get very far in his investigation of this phenomenon. He simply finds that "the sense of community with all mankind is still puny in comparison" (with the state).

But Corbett does not belong to those who are disposed to discount international law in a fit of despair. Having rejected the exaggerated claims on behalf of law and world community, he points out soberly that "such areas of social co-ordination as exist depend upon an active, but fluctuating and limited, consensus. Ordering, as it does, a large part of the business of foreign offices, this consensus is useful." It is limited by "the general understanding . . . that the legal analogy shall not be pressed beyond a certain point. It is recognized, in other words, that when a matter reaches . . . interest regarded as 'vital' by one of the parties, the determining factors become directly political." It is fluctuating because "no established pattern withstands for long adaptation to the interests of States powerful enough, alone or in combination, to ignore external protest," making the patterns of international conduct intimately dependent upon "the initial and continuing consent of the greater powers." These patterns, nevertheless, exercise some restricting and ordering influence, even while yielding to eventual pressure. This is demonstrated in the central part of Corbett's book, which deals in considerable detail with such matters as acquisition and loss of territory, territorial waters, sovereignty, immunities, jurisdiction, status of aliens, war, and neutrality. In practice, he finds, so-called international "law" is a convenient and expedient technique to facilitate international business that is not important enough to warrant a trial of relative forces. This is the essential result of Corbett's most useful survey.

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The idea that law is essentially a technique in the service of non-legal ends is also characteristic of Kelsen's position, although his entire approach is radically different from Corbett's. Kelsen has no doubt that there is international law, that it is positive, binding upon states, and that it constitutes a complete system of international rules. Although he, too, adopts an attitude very similar to Corbett's regarding the influence of international law on international politics, this attitude is hidden away in the folds of his elaborate logical system. Kelsen has written many books on the theory of law in which he expressed himself more fully on the nature and function of law than in this commentary on the UN Charter. Still, in the few pages of the preface, much of Kelsen's central thought is masterfully condensed in the form of a theory of interpretation. Law, he says, is the tool for the attainment of political ends. How do we find out what the law is? By reading the verbal formulation of the norm. In doing this, what are we looking for? The will of the legislator? No, says Kelsen, it is very doubtful whether such a thing exists at all, "especially where the law is the result of a complex procedure." "Every legal instrument has its own life, more or less independent of the wishes and expectations of its begetters." Hence the law is open to more than one interpretation: there is no "true" interpretation, although there is "authentic" interpretation. The latter is interpretation by an agency whose will is binding, an agency possessing authority and exercising power in the legal process. Still, an authentic interpretation is not confined to the range of various meanings of which the wording of the law admits. "Authentic interpretation is a law-creating act. . . . Authentic interpretation may even attribute to a legal norm a meaning which a non-authentic interpretation could never dare to maintain. That is to say, by authentic interpretation a legal norm may be replaced by another norm of totally different content. Interpretation as a legal function is possible only as authentic interpretation. Any other interpretation of a legal norm is an intellectual activity which may have great influence . . . but has no legal importance in itself."

What is the relevance of all this to the problem of interna-

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tional relations? Kelsen narrows the concept of "law" down to the purely technical and formal aspects of legal semantics. The wording, the expression and decision of general and particular prescriptions, plus the hierarchy of persons entitled to make such decisions: that is the length and breadth of law as Kelsen sees it. Law is mere technique used to serve political ends which provide the non-legal substance of legal norms. This substance as such is beyond the purview of the law; it is a reflection of values and as such is subjective, irrational, and unscientific. To the legal scientist whose methods are supposed to be rational, objective, strictly formal, and logically verifiable, the substances of legal rules are given as data.

It seems to me that the concept of "political end" is a kind of myth on which Kelsen relies in order to make the best of both worlds. He assumes its existence, for without it there would be no legal norm, or at least the purely formal norm would have no meaning. "Law is not an end in itself but . . . a specific social technique for the achievement of ends determined by politics." But how are we to know the political end? Since the "will of the legislator" does not inform us, we can find it only in the legal norm itself. However, Kelsen points out, each law admits of a variety of meanings and even then none of these meanings may go into the "authentic" interpretation given to the law by courts or legislators. If neither the "will of the legislator" nor the "law" itself is a reliable clue, we may wonder whether there really exists a "political end" which the law serves to achieve, and where it resides. The question becomes particularly acute in international relations. The "political end," according to Kelsen, belongs to the realm of values and therefore is subjective. When states enter into an agreement, there are therefore different "subjective" (i.e., national) ends pursued by each government. Does the law emerging from their "agreement" represent these divergent ends, or a common end? It would seem, on Kelsen's own showing, that there could be a legal norm only if there existed a political end that, through the agreement, had become common for both governments.

Now the question of whether there are such common interna-

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tional ends and what their scope is belongs precisely to that realm of substance which, in the form of "natural law," or "general principles of law," or "community," or "family of nations," has filled the pages of countless treatises on the subject, and which Kelsen categorically rejects as "unscientific." Kelsen's completely uncritical "acceptance" of the "political ends" which are supposed to provide the *raison d'être* for international legal rules, coupled with his refusal to look for criteria by which the existence of such ends could be ascertained, reduces his method to futility and irrelevance, as far as international law is concerned. Having renounced critical examination of what constitutes the substance of the law, Kelsen, on his own showing, seems to have cut himself off from any discernible path to the "knowledge of what ought to be" (which is his definition of legal science), and seems to be capable, at best, of arriving at some "knowledge" of what might be. In his endeavor to reserve for the legal scientist an ivory tower removed from all judgment and safe against error and fallacy, he has succeeded in resigning from any rational approach to the problems of international order. This is amply demonstrated by the 900-odd pages of his book, from which one could hardly quote any definite view as to what is the law of the United Nations. The best he can do with his method is to spread out before us a number of different readings of which the legal text admits, warning us at the same time that none of these should keep those possessing authority from adopting some other and unpredictable version. If that is the case, one wonders what useful purpose is served by the immense intellectual effort that has gone into this painstaking study.

In view of the admitted irrelevance of this kind of "scientific" approach to the world of action, is one not justified in speaking of this attitude as one of hidden, but profound and complete, resignation? Corbett, on the surface, seems more hopeful. Having discarded all sentimental notions of world society and world law as of the present, he admits that he is not content with this state of affairs. He looks toward a future international order, a real, rational, and reliable law. Before it can come into existence, however, the demonic forces of international politics must be

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brought under control, a task which can be accomplished only by international organization. Corbett's recipe for developing international organization is the "back door approach," by way of regulation of less than vital issues which presumably would lead to a gradual development and ultimately to an organization strong enough to cope with security, armaments, and "vital interests." The particular "back door" that he recommends happens to be the least suitable for this approach, whatever else one might think of the feasibility of gradualism. He believes that the "international protection of the individual," i.e., the regulation of human rights within national communities by international authority, would be a necessary starting-point for all further growth of world government. It so happens that this matter involves moral judgment of each national community by other national communities, a judgment which is usually deeply resented not only by governments but by each individual citizen, and brings into play the most sensitive feelings of national honor and independence. However, it is not with the suitability of Corbett's practical proposal that we are here concerned, but with his general willingness to postpone the solution of intellectual problems until a piece of super-governmental machinery is ready to take their solution out of his hands. For, given Corbett's generally dim view of what passes now as international law and his insistence that the human race can and must do much better than that, one is struck with the weakness of his intellectual response to a profound challenge. His contribution, which must not be belittled, is on the whole negative, though very useful, especially for instruction, since he succeeds in sweeping the house clean. However, having rejected all exaggerated claims and unrealistic pretensions, and yet having stuck firmly to his resolve to hope for a true international order, he fails to produce the slightest intellectual advance toward a more realistic attack on the problem. In the end, he seems to shrug his shoulders, just as Kelsen does. It is a different shrug, differently motivated, but the degree of abdication is the same in both cases.

It seems to me that the attitude toward political reality of

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these two eminent jurists is symptomatic of the tiredness and hopelessness that seems to be eating the very marrow out of the bones of intellectuals in our civilization. Too many of them seem willing to let the doing in this world be a matter exclusively for politicians and to confine rational thought to the role of a technical assistant. A comprehensive view of things, reasoning that joins judgment and information with conviction, thought having the quality of action: these contributions of the intellect are not coming forth in sufficient vigor from the ranks of the professionals. The result in Western society is what one would expect: a tendency toward drifting, parrying, opportunist and unprincipled policies, a general lack of vision and hope, and, since in the absence of clearly stated principles it is very difficult to communicate with one another about motives of action, a creeping paralysis of the vitally necessary trust between various elements of national communities.

This review is not the place to deal with so large a phenomenon. It may be permissible, though, to conclude with some speculative remarks about what intellectuals could do in order to provide that active guidance for policy choices which society properly can expect of them. Corbett is right in pointing out that the traditional theories of international law and a society of nations have turned out to be fallacious attempts in this direction. We need to say and repeat often that the essential prerequisites for a society, a monopoly of force and a broad consensus about the uses of such centralized force, do not exist on a world scale. This means that any rational approach to the problem of international order must take fully into account the existence of a multitude of centers, each capable of exercising a certain amount of ordering functions. The play of forces among these centers, the stability of their positions, and their power relative to each other are phenomena of fundamental importance to the problem of international order. In our traditional approach to this problem, we have made a mistake in dealing with problems of principle apart from problems of power relations, and vice versa. As a result, two distinct and separate fields of knowledge have developed. The men who do their

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thinking in one decry those in the other as cynics, and are themselves accused by their opponents of being dreamers. On the whole, rational thought about world order has limited itself to an imaginary world of systematic rules and principles conceived without regard to power interests, leaving to the statesman's "instinct" the chaotic and immoral matter of status, change, and adjustment in competitive power relations. Actually, the latter is not beyond rational comprehension, nor is it unrelated to moral principle and moral choice.

This deplorable divorce of normative reason from causal analysis is likely to continue as long as in the field of international politics we have nothing comparable to economic theory. Here we are suffering not from lack of information, but from the absence of conceptual tools and mental constructs with which to attempt analysis and prediction. The one crude attempt to find a rational criterion for the practice of power politics is the balance of power principle. It is still superficial since its formulation seldom moves beyond the image of a physical equilibrium, and it is still weak since it is not conducive to any systematic understanding of policy decisions supposedly embodying this principle. Corbett, Kelsen, and other intellectuals concerning themselves with international order must be expected to shrug their shoulders in resignation if the theorists of international relations do not provide them with a general theory of power relations between sovereign states, a theory in terms of armaments, alliances, and policy types that can account for changeability and stability in power relations, that can explain why nations go to war and why they conclude peace, why they fear and why they are secure. This is the contribution which is required from the side of the "realists" of power if the divorce of normative from causal thinking is to be overcome.

On the other side, the students of normative problems must do their share by abandoning the misleading pretense of an existing world society capable of imposing a general system of law on its members. Corbett deserves well of us for warning us so forcefully against the futility of this idea. Rejecting the illusion of an accomplished world society does not, however, entail

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renouncing the quest for international order. The policies of great and well-ordered nations are obviously capable of an ordering and structuring influence far beyond their political boundaries, an influence which can be used for better or for worse effects. These nations are the agents of effective international order, as evidenced, e.g., by Britain's policies of non-intervention and free trade during the nineteenth century. We must recapture an awareness of elements of universal validity in policies which at the same time spring from sound national interests, and we must again realize that in the present state of world affairs no agency can relieve national governments of the primary responsibility of creating, through their power, wealth, and prestige, conditions beneficial both to themselves and to the world at large.

To sum up: if the students of power would develop a systematic theory and the students of principle would acknowledge the agency of national power centers, we could once again hope for vision supported by reason with regard to international order. This reviewer believes in the existence of a moral truth, a higher law above and beyond all man-made rules, a position that is not incompatible with the realization that we move toward this higher law gropingly, by trial and error, and with no assurance of its ultimate attainment. Policy decisions are the vehicle through which international order is furthered or destroyed. Developing policies on a line of principles that married the necessary defense of national power with a general interest, Spain in the sixteenth century and Britain in the nineteenth organized world relations in a way that spread benefits widely. No international organization could accomplish similar results if its principal members shaped their policies without clear and consistent notions of what the world, through their agency, could and should be like.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE ECLIPSE OF EUROPE

By C. E. BLACK

Eric Fischer, *The Passing of the European Age: A Study of the Transfer of Western Civilization and Its Renewal in Other Continents*, rev. ed., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948, pp. xv, 228. $3.50

Hajo Holborn, *The Political Collapse of Europe*, New York, Knopf, 1951, pp. xi, 207. $2.50

Shepard B. Clough, *The Rise and Fall of Civilization: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Economic Development and Civilization*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951, pp. xv, 291. $4.50

IT is doubtless a truism to state that Europe is on the wane, at least as a center of political power. Few would deny that a change of major proportions has taken place since the turn of the century in Europe's role in world affairs. But once this is stated, agreement ceases. The causes and mechanism of Europe's decline have received the most varied interpretations, and the bearing of this change on the future is so profound that each school of thought tends to evaluate the destiny of Europe in terms of its own political philosophy. The widest assortment of scholars and prophets have been drawn to this problem by the fascination of its perplexities, and their treatises already comprise a formidable library. Yet the solutions proposed can scarcely be said to have resulted in a clarification of the problem of Europe, and even the most distinguished and influential of these writers have found relatively few areas of agreement.[1]

The three studies under review are among the most recent efforts to explore the European enigma, and they complement each other by approaching the problem from a sociological, a political, and an economic point of view. While they are not as weighty or comprehensive as the treatises of a Spengler, a Sorokin, or a Toynbee, their very limitation of scope and purpose gives them a special interest. All three have been written

[1] Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis* (Boston, 1950), provides a useful summary and critique of many of these treatises.

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in the light of the situation created by World War II, and they are focussed more directly on contemporary problems of world politics than are the more ambitious projects which sometimes explain less because they try to explain everything. If studies such as these raise more questions than they solve, that in itself is a step in the right direction.

I

Fischer's study is concerned less with the decline of Europe than with the positive aspects of the transfer of European civilization to non-European centers. Yet a discussion of this transfer inevitably involves an inquiry into causes, and this the author undertakes in Chapter VIII, in which he gives his answer to the question, "Why do civilizations pass?" He notes that no civilization has remained vigorous for more than two to four centuries, and illustrates his point with a rapid review of the creative periods of past civilizations. Fischer's explanation of this apparently unavoidable disintegration is a sociological one, and is best expressed in his own words:

> When man and animal power were replaced by use of water power, coal, and oil, the competition first stimulated search for more economic utilization, but now threatens to obstruct development of their full possibilities. Cultural advance means differentiation, therefore growing friction. Growing friction everywhere, in society as well as in machinery, means inefficiency at last. From this point of view we can understand why periods of high civilization come to a standstill after a relatively short time.[2]

Military defeats may in some cases mark the end of civilizations, but in Fischer's view these defeats would never have been decisive if disintegration had not already been far advanced. In the case of Europe, national differentiation and political friction have become marked in the twentieth century and the resulting tensions are apparent to all. Fischer's interpretation is not only brief and general, but it also avoids dogmatism. He acknowledges that the parallels with past civilizations are not close, and does not necessarily maintain that the European age has already

[2] Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-95; this chapter has been revised and expanded since the first edition of 1923.

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passed. He merely affirms his inclination "to regard Europe's great period as near its closing moment. . . ."[3]

For Fischer this decline of Europe is mitigated by the fact that its civilization has already been transferred to other sites, and it is indeed to this process of transfer that the greater part of his study is devoted. In six provocative and original chapters he describes this development on the diverse soils of Latin America, the members of the Commonwealth of Nations, the United States, Russia, and the non-European possessions of France and the Netherlands. The discussion in each instance is of necessity very brief, but the author avoids oversimplification. He is particularly interested in the contributions of the various non-European peoples to the diverse brands of Western civilization which they are in the process of evolving, and he notes as well the influence which they in turn have exerted on Europe. A separate chapter on Germany expresses the view that the decline of European civilization was only accelerated by the German effort to unite the continent under its rule, and that if Germany had been victorious the civilization of Europe would not have survived the destruction of so many of its creative centers.

If Fischer can remain an optimist regarding the survival of European civilization, it is because he believes that its transfer to non-European centers has in large measure been successfully completed. In his final chapter he presents this view in the form of an analogy between Greece and the Hellenistic world on the one hand, and Europe and the future non-European world on the other.[4] In drawing this analogy the author is cautious to point out its shortcomings, as well as the danger of making assumptions even at this late date regarding the vitality of Europe. Regardless of the fate of European civilization on its home continent, however, Fischer is confident that it has a good chance of surviving in its new centers outside Europe.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 198. [4] *Ibid.*, pp. 200-16.

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II

The purpose of Holborn's study[5] is to explore the implications for current American policy of the collapse of the European political system, and his method is that of historical interpretation. "The foremost task of historical interpretation," he notes in his Introduction, "is the establishment of a clear distinction between the forces and ideas of former ages that continue to be alive and those that have ceased to be issues in our time or, perhaps, forever. Only such historical evaluation can enable us to act with discerning judgment."[6] Holborn considers this evaluation to be particularly important because the character of American policy in Europe must inevitably depend on the estimate of our policy-makers as to the durability of the European political system. He fears that much official American thinking has assumed Europe could return to its nineteenth-century stability—an assumption that could only lead to serious blunders. He hopes that American policy can be readjusted to the fact that the traditional system of Europe is "dead and beyond resurrection."[7]

In rapid survey Holborn sketches the European political institutions established after the defeat of Napoleon, which prevented a major war for a hundred years. He traces the development of the balance of power system, which continued to play a significant role during the nineteenth century, and describes the workings of the concert of states which kept a firm hand on European affairs from 1815 to the middle of the century. The greater part of the volume is devoted to the gradual breakdown of this system under the impact of nationalism and of the industrial revolution. Particularly valuable, in view of the many easy generalizations which this subject so often attracts, are Holborn's thoughtful comments on the relationship of capitalism to domestic and international policies, and especially to imperialism.[8] He goes on to show how the European states came to seek national security through military force rather than political

[5] This study is an expansion of Holborn's article, "The Collapse of the European Political System, 1914-45," published in *World Politics*, I, No. 4 (July 1949), 442-66.
[6] Holborn, *op. cit.*, p. xi. [7] *Ibid.*, p. x. [8] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-62.

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compromise, and how this development culminated in the open conflict of the great war in which the entire world was eventually involved. Holborn points out that after World War I a primarily European political system was never reconstructed, and that the more general institutions relying on continued American participation in European affairs and on the League of Nations failed to assure the security of the European states. The search for security continued through a series of local arrangements, but these were soon swept away by the great depression which undermined the political institutions of the continental states. There was thus no political system left to preserve the peace when Hitler's challenge came, and Holborn describes graphically the Munich crisis and the spread of a new war to global proportions.

The essence of Holborn's thesis is thus that the traditional European political system which had been capable of handling major readjustments without the participation of non-European states—if not always without local military conflicts—failed to survive the two World Wars. After the first World War, American policy was based on the assumption that Europe could still handle its own affairs. The second World War proved this assumption to be illusory, and the political collapse of Europe thus opens a new era in American policy. In his final evaluation of these developments,[9] Holborn re-emphasizes the complete defenselessness of Western Europe in face of a challenge such as that of the Soviet Union, even though its annual output is almost double that of Russia and its population about one-third larger. In manpower and output, apart from its cultural heritage, Western Europe still represents a region of great resources. Lacking a political system, however, Western Europe remains a power vacuum and will fall to Russia if the United States does not make it its prime concern to provide an alternative political system. Holborn believes that a good start has been made with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but his evaluation points to the complexity of the task which re-

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 189-93.

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mains if the political integrity of Western Europe—and with it the security of the United States—is to be preserved.

III

Clough's principal concern, like that of Fischer and Holborn, is with the decline of Europe. His study is nevertheless broader in scope, as he investigates the rise and fall of civilization in various cultures since prehistoric time, and his approach is more systematic. The term "civilization" is defined in a special sense in Clough's analysis, and "refers to achievements in such aesthetic and intellectual pursuits as architecture, painting, literature, sculpture, music, philosophy, and science and to the success which a people has in establishing control over its human and physical environment."[10] The terms "culture" and "society," by contrast, refer to varying degrees of intellectual homogeneity. One may thus speak of French society as a part of Western culture, and of the degree of civilization in any society or culture at a given time. After thus defining his terms, Clough goes on to present the hypothesis which is suggested in his subtitle. This hypothesis, stated in the author's words, is that "as a large proportion of human energies in a culture is devoted to the achievement and enjoyment of great works of art—that is, in achieving a higher civilization—the smaller the proportion of energies which will be available for creating economic well-being—that is, in creating a necessary condition in the process of civilization."[11] It follows that the economic decline of a civilization would commence at the time of its highest development. Such decline can nevertheless be prevented, in Clough's view, if the proper balance between aesthetic and economic activity can be achieved.

Having set forth his hypothesis, Clough proceeds to demonstrate it with reference to civilization in the cultures of prehistoric times, the ancient Near East, Greece, and Rome, and in Western culture before and since 1800. In this presentation special attention is devoted to the achievement of economic prog-

[10] Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 3. [11] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

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ress, which is defined as "an increase in output of goods and services per capita in a society."[12] As applied in his final chapter to Western culture in the last century and a half, Clough's analysis stresses the enormous expansion of production resulting from the mechanization of industry, the exploitation of raw materials, the agricultural revolution, and the growth of trade. This expansion of production has been such as to provide not only a rising standard of living for a rapidly growing population, but also a surplus adequate for great artistic and intellectual achievements. If Clough has his doubts regarding Western culture, it concerns rather its success in establishing control over its human environment. However remarkable their achievements in the social sciences, the societies comprising Western culture have been plagued both by domestic social tensions between "haves" and "have-nots" and by international tensions resulting from extreme forms of chauvinism which threaten to drain their resources and undermine their civilization.

Since Western culture is still with us, Clough cannot demonstrate here as fully as with earlier cultures the correspondence between economic progress and the attainment of a high level of civilization. He is nevertheless particularly impressed by the special role of Western Europe in the level of civilization attained by Western culture. Whereas the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, and Sweden produced 61 per cent of the world's manufactures in 1870, as compared with 23.3 per cent for the United States and 3.7 per cent for Russia, the corresponding figures for 1936-1938 were 29.7, 32.2, and 18.5 per cent.[13] He therefore suggests that as a center of intellectual and artistic achievement Western Europe will have to cede to societies with greater economic development. He believes the United States and Canada to be the natural heirs, since they provide at present the most favorable conditions for economic development in relation to their population. In addition to an economic surplus, they also have the degree of freedom of thought and action and the maturity of social organization which Clough regards as essential to the attainment of high

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 11. [13] *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20; see also the table on p. 237.

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levels of civilization. Other societies possessing the methods of Western culture are constantly on the move, however, and Clough's interpretation of history carries the implication that the most civilized societies are always subject to attack.

IV

It would be unfair to expect of these three studies a full interpretation of Europe's dilemma, since each claims to examine only one aspect of the problem. They nevertheless complement each other in large measure, and certain generalizations regarding their common subject may justifiably be set down. The most obvious of these is that the three writers are in agreement, despite the different paths by which they reach this conclusion, that Europe is not what it used to be. None attempts to introduce a serious note of hope in this regard. The height of Europe's development came at the end of the nineteenth century, and the two World Wars were a consequence rather than a cause of its decline. In addition they agree to a considerable extent, which is perhaps more remarkable, in their use of the term "Europe." For them it is a concept in the process of change which, in the nineteenth century, included both the Western states with their world-wide empires and a Russia which was still primarily European.[14] As applied to the twentieth century, however, they tend to share the view that the overseas empires and a Russia which has developed a distinct Eurasian region must now be excluded. What remains today of "Europe" is thus the very "Western Europe" regarding which Fischer by implication and Holborn and Clough explicitly make their final and gloomy comments.

It is also significant that, despite their different terminology and approaches, all three writers point to the same cause of Europe's decline. Fischer's "growing friction," Holborn's "political collapse," and in Clough's language the failure of Western

[14] For a recent discussion of this problem, see Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History*, New York, 1950, pp. 65-141; another viewpoint, illustrated by a number of original maps, is presented in Werner J. Cahnman, "Frontiers Between East and West in Europe," *Geographical Review*, XXXIX, No. 4 (October 1949), 605-24.

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culture in "establishing control over its human environment," appear to boil down to much the same thing. The friction, collapse, and failure all lie in the political sphere and refer to the inability of the European system of states to make provision for peaceful change. While it is agreed that economic and social factors are the source of change, blame is thus placed not on these factors but on the human or political element. Beyond this point it is difficult to compare their conclusions because of differences of method. In Fischer's view the decline was more or less inevitable, since friction and inefficiency necessarily follow cultural advance and differentiation. This approach leaves no room for human intervention, and places contemporary European developments at the mercy of the inexorable laws of sociology. His interpretation stresses indeed the political character of Europe's troubles, but does not suggest that any different trend of affairs was possible. Holborn's approach is frankly political in the traditional sense, and consists primarily of an historical narrative. He describes with clarity and insight the stages by which the European political system collapsed, and establishes his view that it cannot be reconstructed. Clough, on the other hand, presents an ambitious thesis which requires the survey of several cultures and leaves room for only a brief discussion of contemporary European affairs. The advantage of this approach is that he is able to employ the findings of his study of earlier cultures to clarify the position and future of civilization in Western culture. He can thus suggest that leadership in Western culture is passing from Western Europe to North America, and that the latter will in turn become involved in struggles with other cultures.

One question which these interpretations do not clarify, and which in a sense they do not claim to answer, concerns the mechanism of Europe's decline. They all point to the national rivalries in Western Europe as the source of the trouble, but they do not explain why these rivalries have been carried to the point of international anarchy. Yet one is bound to reflect on this question and to ask whether the relationship between the European political and economic systems does not bear further

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investigation in this connection. The European states have served as a mediator between their citizens and the great economic and social forces which have changed the face of Europe in the past century. Whatever human benefits were derived from this economic progress, there can be no question but that it was profoundly disturbing from a social and psychological standpoint. Into this area of disturbance the European states moved boldly after 1850, providing their citizens not only with transportation, loans, and education, but eventually with security against sickness and unemployment, and even with national philosophies of life. The individual thus came to be largely protected against the whirlwinds of economic change, but the national states could afford this protection only so long as their policies could encompass the factors which comprised this economic change. The insecurity reflected in the uneasy imperialism of the 1880's and 1890's, and in the search for security in alliance systems during the first decade of the twentieth century, suggests that this was a critical turning point which deserves further study.

It was at this point that the factors of economic change—natural resources, labor, capital, and markets—began to expand beyond the reach of the national policies of the European states. Sensing the increasing difficulty of providing the extensive services for their citizens which integral nationalism now required, the European states appeared to be seeking through imperialism and alliances to provide that security which only a few decades earlier had been primarily a domestic problem. The economic system, which at the start of the century had been largely a matter of provincial concern, had now expanded beyond national frontiers and kept developing to regional and in some respects global proportions. The system of European states was not so flexible, however, and its inability to adjust to economic change was reflected in the frustrations of two World Wars. An investigation into this aspect of Europe's decline would also have to recognize that the only states which emerged from these two World Wars with their vitality unimpaired were those which could provide within their own political frontiers

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the very natural resources, labor, capital, and markets which eluded the grasp of the states of Western Europe.

The significance for an understanding of contemporary world affairs of increasing investigation along these lines would be to provide a further test of the pessimism which Fischer, Holborn, and Clough share as to the prospects of Western Europe. If indeed it was the inflexibility of the European system of states which caused the trouble, is the situation so hopeless? Is it not possible that the current efforts to provide the economic bases of a politically united Western Europe may in large measure succeed? And if this European federation is able to encompass major elements of the factors of economic change, may it not achieve at least the stability which the continent-states of North America and Russia enjoy? Europe has certainly been eclipsed by its two great neighbors on the East and on the West, but further studies on the part of the social sciences will be required to determine whether this eclipse is indeed the portent of a permanent friction, collapse, and failure, or if an opportunity remains for the European system of states to readjust itself to economic realities.

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